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vviAbstract
The dissertation consists of four self-contained essays. The ﬁrst paper provides a detailed de-
scription of the evolution of wage inequality in East and West Germany in the late years of the
twentieth century. In contrast to previous decades, wage inequality has been rising in several
dimensions during that period. The second paper identiﬁes cohort eﬀects in the evolution of both
wages and employment. Observed structures are consistent with a labor demand framework that
incorporates steady skill-biased technical change. Substitutability between skill and age groups
in the German labor market is found to be relatively high. Simulations based on estimated
elasticities of substitution illustrate that higher wage dispersion between skill groups would have
contributed to a reduction in unemployment. The third paper estimates determinants of indi-
vidual union membership decisions and studies the erosion of union density in East and West
Germany. Using corresponding predictions of net union density, the fourth paper analyzes the
link between union strength and the structure of wages. A higher union density is associated
with lower residual wage dispersion, reduced skill wage diﬀerentials, and a lower wage level. This
ﬁnding is in line with an insurance motive for union action.
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Over the past decades, the German economy has been plagued with high unemployment, espe-
cially among persons with low educational attainment. In the year 2004, unemployment rates in
West Germany were 21.7% among individuals without a vocational degree, 7.3% among those
with a completed apprenticeship, and 3.5% among university graduates, and the respective num-
bers for East Germany were as high as 51.2%, 19.4%, and 6.0% (Reinberg and Hummel, 2005).
Diﬀerent types of rigidities hampering ﬂexible adjustments in the labor market have been hy-
pothesized to have contributed to this situation.
Among the most prominent labor market features, the structure of wages is crucial for the
evolution of employment and diﬀerent degrees of unemployment incidence. With the growing
availability of large micro data sets not only the wage level, but also the degree of wage dispersion
or compression has received increasing attention. Numerous studies employ microeconometric
approaches to analyze various facets of heterogeneity in the wage structure (Katz and Autor,
1999). Particular emphasis is put on returns to human capital and the evolution of skill wage
premia.
The evolution of the West German wage structure between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s has
been extensively studied. By and large, the structure has been found to be relatively compressed
in international comparison and rather stable over time. Returns to human capital components
as well as residual wage inequality showed fairly little variation. However, as elaborated in the
discussion about skill-biased technical change, relative demand for low-skilled labor decreases
faster over time than does relative supply. In line with neoclassical demand theory, market
clearing would in this case require an increase of qualiﬁcational wage diﬀerentials. Therefore,
the “unbearable stability” (Prasad, 2004) of the German wage structure is considered a key
determinant for the asymmetric increase in unemployment.
As a related key issue, the inﬂuence of labor market institutions on economic performance in
general, and on wage setting in particular, is currently under debate (OECD, 2006). In times
of increasingly heterogeneous economic conditions the catchword is eurosclerosis, stating that
institutional inﬂexibilities restrain labor market performance and the dynamics of economic de-
velopment. A major focus is on the impact of trade unions.
12 Introduction
Trade union membership has declined remarkably in many developed countries over the last
decades. In Germany, gross union density, i.e., the ratio of the number of union members and the
number of employees in the labor market, was down to a historically low level of 27% by the year
2004 (Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang, 2006). A large international literature investigates into
causes of this pervasive phenomenon as well as its economic consequences (Addison and Schnabel,
2003). Lacking a direct inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ hiring and ﬁring decisions, trade unions inﬂuence
economic outcomes mainly through the channel of wage bargaining or, put diﬀerently, through
their impact on the wage structure. For example, as wage moderation may lead to a higher level
of employment, a higher union-bargained wage level may be detrimental to employment. A strong
union taste for wage equality, resulting in wage compression, may again worsen the employment
prospects of the low-skilled. In any case, the observed trends towards deunionization are likely
to weaken unions’ bargaining power and therefore their impact on the labor market.
This dissertation collects four self-contained articles which contribute to the active literature on
wage structures, heterogeneous labor demand, and the impact of trade unions. The following
paragraphs put the essays into perspective; they provide an overview of central results and point
to scope for future research.
Chapter 2 (Kohn, 2006) presents a detailed picture of the evolution of wage inequality in East
and West Germany in the late years of the twentieth century.
Wage dispersion in West Germany has been rather low in international comparison and remark-
ably stable between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. Yet studies of the East German wage
structure report an even higher degree of wage compression in the late years of the GDR, reﬂect-
ing the egalitarian doctrine of the socialist system. Newly available register data from the IAB
employment sample (IABS) 1975–2001 allow to reinvestigate the empirical evidence for more
recent years. My paper scrutinizes the evolution of wage levels and wage inequality within and
between diﬀerent labor market groups for the years 1992–2001. I ﬁnd that wage inequality has
in fact been rising in many dimensions throughout this period.
First, the inspection of year-speciﬁc wage distributions reveals that wage dispersion has been
rising both in East and West Germany. The increase was more pronounced in East Germany
such that, starting out from a lower degree in the year 1992, wage dispersion in the East largely
caught up with the West German level until 2001. The increase in wage inequality among
women was more pronounced compared to the increase among men. Moreover, the larger part
of the increase in dispersion among women happened in the lower parts of the distribution, but
dispersion among men increased disproportionately in the upper parts. Convergence in wage
levels between East and West Germany took place only until the year 1996, but substantial
diﬀerences persist since then.Introduction 3
Second, the estimation of censored quantile wage regressions provides insights into the determi-
nants of the observed wage distributions. The bottom line of the regression results meets a-priori
expectations: Age-earnings wage proﬁles not only are the steeper the higher the skill level, but
they are also relatively ﬂat in East Germany in 1992. The uniﬁcation shock clearly led to a
depreciation of human capital in the East. However, this eﬀect wears out with the aging of post-
uniﬁcation labor market cohorts, and diﬀerences between East and West Germany have lessened
by the year 2001. The quantile regression approach further reveals remarkable diﬀerences in the
eﬀects across the wage distribution.
Third, and ﬁnally, Machado-Mata-type analyses decompose diﬀerences in the wage distributions
between East and West Germany as well as corresponding changes over time into “characteris-
tics eﬀects” capturing diﬀerences in the composition of the workforce, and “coeﬃcients eﬀects”
capturing diﬀerences in the returns associated with observed characteristics. Building on the
ﬂexible quantile regressions, this approach depicts heterogeneous eﬀects. In East-West compari-
son, diﬀerences in the composition of the male work force turn out largely negligible. However,
characteristics of full-time working women are mostly in favor of higher wages in the East. Yet
this eﬀect ceases to apply at the lower end of the distribution by the year 2001. With respect
to the evolution of wages over time, changes in the composition of the workforce capture major
parts of the respective wage increases in the upper halves of the wage distributions for West
Germany. This ﬁnding reﬂects a skill upgrading in the work force. Shifts in the industry struc-
ture and skill upgrading yet played only a minor role for explaining the wage increases in East
Germany. For women in the lower parts of the Eastern distribution, the characteristics eﬀect
even worked towards real wage cuts, substantiating the particular increase in wage dispersion
among this group.
The focus of the paper does not aim at providing an in-depth analysis of the economic causes
and consequences of the revealed trends. In face of alternative explanatory hypotheses—such
as accelerating non-neutral technical or organizational change, increased exposure to interna-
tional competition, reduced union power, or more ﬂexible labor market institutions—estimates
of structural models as well as reduced-form approaches using richer data sets may be expected
to complement the descriptive evidence. The papers in the following chapters expand along these
lines.
Chapter 3 (Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2006) focusses on the link between wage structures and
employment in a labor demand framework. Using data from the IABS 1975–1997 for West
Germany, it incorporates age and skill as important dimensions of labor heterogeneity.
On the one hand, the evolution of age-speciﬁc skill wage premia shows that the age proﬁles of
skill wage diﬀerentials have not moved in parallel fashion over time, but rather experienced a
twist. Accordingly, it is unlikely that these developments are associated merely with age and4 Introduction
time eﬀects applying uniformly to all cohorts. On the other hand, we observe a break in the
inter-cohort trend of skill- and age-speciﬁc relative employment such that young birth cohorts
do not follow the path of the older ones towards further skill upgrading. The empirical evidence
thus suggests the existence of cohort eﬀects aﬀecting the evolution of both skill wage premia and
relative employment. Following the testing approach suggested in MaCurdy and Mroz (1995),
we ﬁnd such cohort eﬀects for both relative employment and wage premia.
A coherent operationalization of wages and employment in a labor demand framework is gener-
ally diﬃcult due to the heterogeneous nature of the input factor labor. We extend the structural
approach of Card and Lemieux (2001). In this set-up based on a nested CES model, the simul-
taneous inclusion of skill and age as dimensions of heterogeneity not only enables the separation
of age, time, and cohort eﬀects, but also facilitates the estimation of a speciﬁcation with a
relatively large number of diﬀerent input factors. Moreover, the model incorporates steady skill-
biased technical change. We estimate the model with and without instruments taking account
of the endogeneity of both wages and employment. Our preferred speciﬁcations estimate the
elasticity of substitution between skill groups to range between 4.9 and 6.9, and the elasticity of
substitution between age groups between 5.2 and 20.1. Compared to the literature, these num-
bers are rather high. In international comparison, this ﬁnding reﬂects the fairly small amount of
over-all wage dispersion in Germany as well as the relatively compressed distribution of skills.
Based on the estimated parameters, we conduct some simulation experiments. In particular,
we simulate the magnitude of wage changes for the diﬀerent skill groups that would have been
necessary to reduce skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates in 1997 by one half. With wage changes
equal for all age groups within the respective skill classes, this would have left the wage structure
within skill groups unaﬀected. The necessary nominal wage reductions range between 8.8 and
12.2% and are the higher the lower the employees’ qualiﬁcation. This ﬁnding provides evidence
for the existence of wage compression—relative to a situation with reduced unemployment, there
is in fact too little wage dispersion across the diﬀerent skill groups.
Our analysis shows the necessity to integrate diﬀerent dimensions of heterogeneity into empir-
ically meaningful models of labor demand. The nested CES approach allows to do this in a
parsimonious way and the results give rise to a number of interesting questions for future re-
search: What are the reasons for the high degree of substitutability among German workers?
What led to the slowdown of skill upgrading? And does it continue in more recent years? The
literature on technical and organizational change (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Spitz-Oener,
2006) suggests that skill contents and job tasks changed signiﬁcantly in recent years. Is there
a polarization of the labor market into “lousy and lovely jobs” as observed by Goos and Man-
ning (2003) for Great Britain? And how do labor market institutions contribute to any of the
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Chapter 4 (Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang, 2006) turns towards trade unions as one important
labor market institution. Trade unions bargain for higher wages, equal pay, reduced working
hours, fair working conditions, or employment protection. However, in Germany—as in a number
of other countries—the results of union activity apply to most of the workers irrespective of
membership. Membership is not compulsory and closed shop regulations are illegal. The public
good character of core services oﬀered by trade unions may give rise to free-rider behavior.
Why do people join a union, then? Our study draws on micro-data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) to estimate determinants of individual membership decisions for West
(1985–2003) and for East Germany (1993–2003). The merits of this approach are threefold. First,
our ﬁndings quantify the inﬂuence of socio-demographic personal characteristics, such as age or
marital status; the inﬂuence of workplace characteristics, i.e., match, ﬁrm, or industry-speciﬁc
eﬀects; and the inﬂuence of attitudinal factors for the individual choice to be or not to be a
union member. Determinants are allowed to diﬀer between East and West Germany as well as
over time, and the application of a Chamberlain-Mundlack-type correlated random eﬀects probit
model controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
Second, we use our estimates to project net union density (NUD), deﬁned as the share of employed
union members in the number of employees. The projections for East and West Germany, which
consistently trace the trends towards deunionization in both parts of the country, are then
analyzed by means of decomposition techniques in order to shed light on the diﬀerences in NUD
between East and West Germany and on the corresponding changes over time. We ﬁnd that
changes in the composition of the work force only played a minor role for the observed decline in
both East and West Germany. In East-West comparison, the West German work force exhibits
more attributes supporting union membership. The higher union density in East Germany in
the year 1993 and the stronger subsequent decline therefore reﬂect a lower quality of membership
matches resulting from a widespread, arbitrary membership recruitment directly after uniﬁcation.
Third of all, while the erosion of union membership in Germany is likely to weaken unions’
bargaining power and therefore their impacts on the labor market, the availability of adequate
data from union records to study these impacts is limited. From 1991 onwards, only aggregate
numbers for uniﬁed Germany are available, and unions’ publications do not distinguish between
employed members on the one hand and unemployed, retired, or student members on the other.
Yet this distinction is important from an economic point of view. Net union density is a better
measure of union power than gross union density because it is more closely related to the union’s
ﬁnancial resources and to the potential to mobilize workers within ﬁrms. Union power diﬀers
signiﬁcantly between diﬀerent labor market segments. For example, unions are traditionally
strong in manufacturing industries, but they are of minor importance in personal service sectors.
Oﬃcial membership information does not distinguish between suﬃciently homogenous segments.6 Introduction
Therefore, our microeconometric membership estimations can be used to predict union densities
for homogeneously deﬁned labor market segments, such as industries and/or regions. These
predictions can then be employed to study the impact of unionization on economic performance,
and on employment and the structure of wages in particular.
Chapter 5 uses predictions of net union densities as derived in the preceding chapter in order
to study the impact of union power on the structure of wages in West Germany.1 In this study
we apply a cell-level approach, focussing on labor market segments which correspond to the
structure of the German wage bargaining system. This is important since in contrast to Anglo-
Saxon countries, it is not meaningful to estimate a wage eﬀect of individual union membership
in Germany, where collective agreements on individual membership premia are forbidden by
constitutional law. Given the high rate of collective bargaining coverage in the German labor
market, union-bargained wages apply to the major part of all employees and unions inﬂuence
the wage structure of members as well as of non-members.
How does union power aﬀect wage levels and the degree of wage dispersion against this back-
ground? Do unions aim to realize “equal pay for equal work”? That is, does the impact of
unions reduce residual wage inequality between employees with similar observable characteris-
tics? Moreover, does union power also reduce wage dispersion between employees with diﬀerent
characteristics? Are the eﬀects asymmetric across the conditional wage distribution, correspond-
ing to a minimum wage argument, for instance? Is there a trade-oﬀ between reduced inequality
and higher wage levels, such that a reduction in wage inequality comes along with a lower wage
level? And did any of the eﬀects change over time?
In order to answer these questions we combine data from two diﬀerent data sets. First, we
use GSOEP-based membership estimations to calculate net union densities for labor market
segments deﬁned by the dimensions industry, skill, age, and time. The density estimates are
then imputed to the IABS 1975–1997, whose larger sample size allows for detailed investigations
into the distribution of wages. Using the combined data set, we analyze the correlation of NUD
on the one hand and diﬀerent measures of the wage structure within and between labor market
segments on the other.
Our results show that a higher net union density is ceteris paribus not only associated with
reduced residual wage dispersion, but also with a lower wage level. This—possibly surprising—
result is in line with an insurance motive for union membership. As discussed by Agell and
Lommerud (1992) and Burda (1995), a higher net union density can be accompanied by a lower
wage level if unions have a strong preference for wage equality and also want to prevent nega-
tive employment eﬀects. Skill wage diﬀerentials also turn out smaller in segments with strong
1 This chapter is a translation of our German paper Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005).Introduction 7
unions—the union’s impact even goes beyond “equal pay for equal work”. In line with a minimum
wage interpretation of union-bargained wages, the wage distribution is compressed disproportion-
ately from below. Union eﬀects further vary with the age of the workforce and over time, but
there are no clear trends against the background of the perpetual decline in union membership
since the 1980’s.
The analysis so far can not take account of a possible endogeneity of union density, as the
implementation of structural models as well as an appropriate instrumentation of labor market
institutions prove to be intricate. In future research, the use of richer linked employer-employee
data such as the German Structure of Earnings Survey or the linked IAB data might provide
valid instruments. It further makes sense to disentangle the eﬀects of union density and collective
bargaining coverage (Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke, 2006). Finally, union eﬀects on the wage
structure and on employment should be analyzed simultaneously.82 Rising Wage Dispersion, After All! The German
Wage Structure at the Turn of the Century
2.1 Introduction
The structure of wages is crucial for economic performance and the evolution of employment in
particular; see the handbook article of Katz and Autor (1999) and the more recent survey of
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005b). With the growing availability of large micro data sets not
only the wage level, but also the degree of wage dispersion or compression has received increasing
attention. The evolution of the West German wage structure between the mid-1970s and the
mid-1990s has been extensively studied. By and large, the wage structure has been found to be
relatively compressed in international comparison and rather stable over time; see Fitzenberger
(1999) and Prasad (2004) and the literature cited therein. Returns to human capital components
as well as residual wage inequality showed fairly little variation. In face of an ongoing skill-biased
technical change (Acemoglu, 2002), this “unbearable stability” (Prasad, 2004) is considered a
key determinant for the growing unemployment among low-skilled workers and it is frequently
attributed to institutional rigidities.
Studies of the East German wage structure report an even higher degree of wage compression
in the late years of the GDR, reﬂecting the egalitarian doctrine of the socialist system; see
Krueger and Pischke (1995). This ﬁnding of strong wage compression still holds for the early
years after the German uniﬁcation. Exceptionally ﬂat age-earnings or experience-earnings proﬁles
suggest that experience accumulated under the old system is poorly remunerated afterwards. The
uniﬁcation shock led to a massive depreciation of human capital. However, as post-uniﬁcation
labor market cohorts started to age, wage dispersion increased, catching up to the West German
level; see Franz and Steiner (2000) and Burda and Hunt (2001).
More up-to-date data lately allow us to trace the evolution of the wage structure towards the
turn of the century. Recent evidence from survey data in Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2006) and from
administrative data in Möller (2005) suggests that inequality has in fact been rising in both
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East and West Germany. In this paper, I employ the recently available regional ﬁle of the IAB
employment sample (IABS) 1975–2001 for a comprehensive description of the structure of wages
for diﬀerent labor market groups in the ﬁrst decade after the German uniﬁcation.
An inspection of year-speciﬁc unconditional wage distributions for the diﬀerent groups generally
supports the notion of rising wage inequality. As measured by the interquintile range QD8020,
in the year 1992 dispersion was lower in East Germany than in West Germany, but it was higher
by the year 2001. The increase was highest for full-time working women in East Germany, for
whom QD8020 went up by remarkable 25 log points. Moreover, the larger part of the increase in
dispersion among women happened in the lower parts of the respective distributions. Dispersion
among men increased disproportionately in the upper parts, though. Convergence in wage levels
between East and West Germany has not been achieved.
The subsequent analysis contributes to the literature by means of two approaches. First, I
estimate wage equations in order to shed light on the determinants of observed wages. The large
sample size of the IABS allows the application of quantile regression techniques, which are more
ﬂexible than the least squares estimations employed by most existing studies. Due to censoring
of the wage data at the social security taxation threshold, I use censored quantile regressions
(CQR). In sum, the regression results meet a-priori expectations. Age-earnings proﬁles not
only are the steeper the higher the skill level, but they are also relatively ﬂat in East Germany
in 1992. The eﬀect of the uniﬁcation shock in fact wears out with the aging of post-uniﬁcation
labor market cohorts, and diﬀerences in the proﬁles have lessened by the year 2001. The quantile
regression approach reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the eﬀects across the wage distribution. The
result that low-skilled women working full-time in East Germany are left particularly worse-oﬀ
at the lower end of the distribution substantiates the high and asymmetric increase in dispersion
for this group.
Second, I employ the decomposition technique introduced by Machado and Mata (MM, 2005),
which builds on the estimation of quantile regressions, in order to shed light on (1) diﬀerences of
the wage distributions between East and West Germany and (2) changes of the wage structure
over time. The MM decomposition is well-suited to depict heterogeneous characteristics and
coeﬃcients eﬀects across the wage distribution. In East-West comparison, diﬀerences in the
composition of the work force turn out to be largely negligible for men. However, characteristics
of full-time working women are mostly in favor of higher wages in the East. Yet this eﬀect ceases
to apply at the lower end of the distribution in 2001. With respect to the evolution of wages over
time, characteristics eﬀects capture major parts of the respective wage increases in the upper half
of the wage distribution for West Germany. This ﬁnding reﬂects a skill upgrading in the work
force. Restructuring and skill upgrading yet played only a minor role in explaining the wage
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eﬀect even worked towards real wage cuts, substantiating also the particular increase in wage
dispersion among this group.
With these two approaches, the paper goes beyond the recent studies of Möller (2005) and
Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2006) which also report rising wage dispersion in Germany. Using the
IABS 2001, Möller compares raw decile ratios of wage distributions for some selective labor
market groups, but he does not investigate into the nature of observed diﬀerences by means of
regression or decomposition techniques. Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer do employ wage regressions and
decompositions, but their analysis is restricted by the small sample size of the GSOEP survey
data such that they do not run separate analyses for women and have to rely on OLS regressions
and the decomposition technique introduced by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993). As it turns
out in this paper below, the more ﬂexible MM decompositions unveil important diﬀerences across
the respective distributions.
The course of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 starts out from related analyses of
the German wage structure in the literature. It introduces the data at use and oﬀers a snapshot
of raw wage distributions for diﬀerent labor market groups. Section 2.3 introduces the estimation
approach and discusses estimation results. The particular focus is on diﬀerences in estimated
coeﬃcients for age and skill and on the shape of age-earnings proﬁles. Decomposition techniques
for the setting at hand are introduced in section 2.4. The subsequent discussion of results
scrutinizes patterns in the respective wage distributions and discusses the eﬀects underlying the
wage diﬀerentials between East and West Germany as well as the changes of the wage structure
over time. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Approaching the German Wage Structure
The evolution of the West German wage structure between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s
has been extensively studied since large micro data sets have become available. Studies used the
survey data provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) or the administrative IAB
employment samples (IAB-Beschäftigtenstichproben, IABS). By and large, the wage structure
has been found to be relatively compressed in international comparison and rather stable over
time; see Fitzenberger (1999) and Prasad (2004) and the literature cited therein. Returns to
human capital components such as skill and experience as well as residual wage inequality showed
fairly little variation. In face of an ongoing skill-biased technical change (Acemoglu, 2002), this
“unbearable stability” (Prasad, 2000) is considered a key aspect for the growing unemployment
among low-skilled workers. Compression and stability is often attributed to institutional factors.
However, some degree of variability is found by a few studies with more in-depth focus. For
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(1999) reports some changes in the upper and in the lower parts of the wage structure, and when
looking separately at diﬀerent age groups Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006) ﬁnd that there was quite
some variation in the skill premia across age: cohort eﬀects diﬀerently aﬀected the diﬀerent skill
groups. Observed trends prove consistent with steady skill-biased technical change.
In their early study of the East German wage structure, Krueger and Pischke (1995) use the 1988
Survey on Income of Blue and White Collar Households in the GDR (Einkommensstichprobe
in Arbeiter- und Angestelltenhaushalten) and the retrospective 1989 information of the 1990
GSOEP-East to ﬁnd an even more compressed wage structure in the late years of the GDR,
expressing the egalitarian doctrine of the socialist system. Follow-up comparative studies using
diﬀerent GSOEP waves1 conﬁrm this eﬀect for the ﬁrst years after the German uniﬁcation. In
particular, they report ﬂat age-earnings or experience-earnings proﬁles in the East. The ﬁndings
suggest that experience accumulated under the old system is poorly remunerated afterwards. The
uniﬁcation shock led to a massive depreciation of human capital. However, as post-uniﬁcation
labor market cohorts start to age, increasing wage dispersion is observed in East Germany during
the 1990s.
More up-to-date administrative data for both parts of the country have recently been made
available with the regional ﬁle of the IAB employment sample (IABS) 1975–2001. This version
of the IABS is a 2% random sample of German social security accounts; see Hamann et al.
(2004) for a description of the data set.2 While excluding mainly self-employed workers and civil
servants, the IABS covers about 80% of all employed persons. Employment in East Germany is
included from 1992 onwards. The IABS oﬀers a large sample size and—due to its administrative
character—a reliable quality of data. In particular, the wage data are very accurate compared to
survey data. On the downside, the data set provides relatively few covariates and no information
on working time except from a distinction between full-timers and part-timers. Besides, the wage
data are top-coded at the social security taxation threshold (SSTT).
Möller (2005) uses the years 1992–2001 of the IABS to compare raw decile ratios of log wage
distributions for some selective labor market groups in 1992 to the respective ratios in 2001. His
main ﬁndings are that wage inequality has generally been rising between 1992 and 2001 and
that the rise in inequality has been more pronounced for low-skilled compared to medium-skilled
1 Schwarze and Wagner (1992), Schwarze (1993), and Bird, Schwarze, and Wagner (1994) also use the retro-
spective information for 1989 in addition to waves up to 1991. Burda and Schmidt (1997) employ the waves
1990–1993. Steiner and Wagner (1997a), Franz and Steiner (2000), as well as Steiner and Hölzle (2000) es-
timate wage regressions based on the waves 1990–1995 or 1990–1997, respectively. Burda and Hunt (2001)
compare the waves 1990–1999 and Hunt (2001) studies wage growth and job mobility in East Germany based
on the waves 1990–1996. She concludes that the observed wage growth patterns provided insuﬃcient incentives
for worker mobility, which impeded eﬃcient restructuring and employment recovery.
2 For further information (on antecedent versions of the IABS) see also Bender, Hilzendegen, Rohwer, and
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workers and for women compared to men. Starting out at a lower level in 1992, wage inequality
in East Germany has largely caught up with the level of inequality in West Germany by 2001.
GSOEP survey data employed by Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2006) suggest that the trends towards
increasing inequality continued at least until the year 2004.
In this paper, I also employ the years 1992–2001 of the IABS. In order to give a comprehensive
description for diﬀerent groups in the labor market I take advantage of the large sample size and
consider separate distributions for men working full-time, women working full-time, and women
working part-time in East and West Germany in each of the years 1992–2001. For each of these
subsamples, I select individuals aged between 25 and 55 years who are not currently in education.
Marginal part-time workers (geringfügig Beschäftigte) are not included in the analysis in order
to avoid spurious eﬀects through changes in the employment of this group.
Figure 2.1 depicts the evolution of log nominal daily wages for the diﬀerent labor market groups.3
The deciles changed rather smoothly over the period 1992–2001 so that it makes sense to focus on
the two boundary years in the following. Table 2.1 depicts median wages LNW50 and percentile
diﬀerences QD8050 and QD5020 for the diﬀerent groups in 1992 and 2001. As expected, the
wage level is generally higher for men compared to women and for workers in West Germany
compared to East Germany in 1992. Until 2001, the gender wage gap narrowed especially in
East Germany. The East-West wage gap in the wage level also went down, but persisted to
some degree for full-time employees. Figure 2.2 reveals that convergence in—nominal as well
as real—wage levels took place until the year 1996, but then basically stopped: Starting out
at 58%, 34%, and 17% in 1992, the respective nominal diﬀerences for men, full-time working
women, and part-time working women all shrunk by 7 to 10 real log points (pp). However, only
little variation is observed from 1996 on. Nominal diﬀerences of 38–40% and 18–20% remain
for full-time working men and women, but there is virtually no more diﬀerence for part-time
working women.4
Table 2.1 further shows that wage dispersion as measured by the percentile diﬀerences generally
increased for all groups between 1992 and 2001. With the only exception of part-time working
women the increase was considerably stronger in East Germany than in West Germany. By
the year 2001, the level of wage dispersion in the East even exceeded the level in the West.
Moreover, there are remarkable diﬀerences across groups. For Men in West Germany, QD8050
3 At this point I examine nominal wages in order to facilitate East-West comparisons because it is not clear a
priori which price deﬂator and which base year to choose when comparing East and West Germany in real
terms; see the discussion in Franz and Steiner (2000). When comparing East and West German wage levels
in ﬁgure 2.2 below I also present alternative price normalizations. All comparisons across time in section 2.4
are based on real wages, deﬂated by consumer price indices.
4 This eﬀect has already been extensively discussed in the literature; see, e.g., Burda and Schmidt (1997) and
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increased by about 6 pp and QD5020 by 3 pp, adding up to an increase in the interquintile range
QD8020 of 9 pp. The larger part of this increase therefore is due to changes in the upper part
of the distribution.5 Since the 80th percentile for men in East Germany is censored in 1992, an
analogous statement for this group cannot be inferred directly from table 2.1. Yet the results
in section 2.4 show that wages for men in East Germany also went up disproportionately in
the upper part of the distribution.6 Having said that, wage inequality among full-time working
women increased disproportionately in the lower half of the distribution, and most strikingly
so in East Germany: whereas QD8050 and QD5020 went up by 3 and 4 pp in the West, the
respective numbers for East Germany are 8 and 17 pp, adding up to a remarkable increase of
the interquintile range QD8020 of 25 pp.
In what follows, the observed distributions are investigated by means of wage regressions for
the years 1992 and 2001 to capture the changes over time. The application of (censored) quan-
tile regressions allows to look at between and within inequality, and it sets the stage for the
decomposition analyses in section 2.4. Considering the years 1992 and 2001 is warranted for
the following two reasons. First, both years are similar with respect to their location in the
West German business cycle: Whereas the uniﬁcation boom faded out in 1992, the year 2001
marked the end of the new economy boom. Second, the labor force in East Germany dropped
sharply from about 10 to below 7 million in the course of the German uniﬁcation and most of
the immediate downturn took place in 1990 and 1991; see Kommission (1996). Net emigration
from East Germany was highest between 1989 and 1991; see Hunt (2006). 1992 was the ﬁrst
year with positive GDP growth in East Germany after the uniﬁcation shock (Burda and Hunt,
2001) and thus is the ﬁrst year not heavily exposed to distortions resulting from the uniﬁcation.
2.3 Wage Regressions
Let Ys;i ´ lnWs;i denote log wages for individuals i, drawn from a distribution Fs(Ys) in an
adequately deﬁned labor market segment s. Given the focus of this paper one might think of
segments as regions (East and West Germany) or diﬀerent points in time (years).
Since the wage data used use are censored from above at the social security taxation threshold
cs, one observes only ~ Ys;i = minfYs;i;csg. One thus might apply Tobit regression (after Tobin,
5 This ﬁnding is similar to the trends observed by Fitzenberger (1999) for the period 1975–1990.
6 The conclusion is also corroborated by Möller’s (2005) result for the core group of medium-skilled men.Rising Wage Dispersion 15
1956) to estimate the conditional expected value E(YsjXs) based on covariates Xs, assuming
normality of the error term us in
Ys = E(YsjXs) + us = Xs¯s + us: (2.1)
A more informative approach is to employ quantile regressions, which do not only capture the
expected value, but the entire distribution. As introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and
generalized by Powell (1984, 1986), conditional quantiles
Qµ(YsjXs) = Xs¯s(µ) (2.2)
in the case of censoring from above can be estimated for a given quantile µ 2 (0;1) by minimizing
over ¯s the objective function
N¡1
s
Ns X
i=1
½µ(~ Ys;i ¡ minfXs;i¯s;csg); (2.3)
where the residuals us;i for individuals i = 1;:::;Ns are weighted in an asymmetric way by the
check function
½µ(us;i) =
(
µus;i for us;i ¸ 0
(µ ¡ 1)us;i for us;i < 0
: (2.4)
There are diﬀerent algorithms to solve this non-convex optimization problem in the literature;
see, e.g., Buchinsky (1994), Fitzenberger (1997a, 1997b), or Koenker and Park (1996). In the
following applications, I apply the Buchinsky algorithm as well as the Fitzenberger algorithm
for diﬀerent starting values and choose the respective best estimator in terms of the objective
function (2.3). Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are obtained by means of design
matrix bootstraps. Here, it asymptotically suﬃces to draw on observations for which predicted
values are not censored; see Bilias, Chen, and Ying (2000).
Quantile regressions are particularly suited for the purpose of this paper because they do not
only reveal diﬀerences between, say, diﬀerent skill or age groups, but also allow these diﬀerences
to diﬀer across the wage distribution.
2.3.1 Coeﬃcients Across the Distribution
The estimated log wage equations include a set of formal skill dummies (low-skilled dl: workers
without vocational training and without university degree, medium-skilled (base category): those
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or technical college degree)7, (normalized) age, and age squared (agesq). In order to allow for
diﬀerent age-earnings proﬁles across skill groups I include interaction terms of skill and age as
well as skill and agesq, yielding the following speciﬁcation which is estimated separately for all
segments s:
Ysi = ¯1s + dl;si¯2s + dh;si¯3s + agesi¯4s + agesqsi¯5s (2.5)
+dl;siagesi¯6s + dl;siagesqsi¯7s + dh;siagesi¯8s + dh;siagesqsi¯9s + usi:
All regressions further include a set of industry dummies (16 industries as provided with the
IABS 1975–2001) and a dummy for individuals working in Berlin. Observations are weighted
by the length of the respective employment spells. Summary statistics of the covariates are
displayed in tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Figures 2.3 to 2.8 show coeﬃcient estimates for censored quantile regressions (CQR) at diﬀerent
deciles of the distributions as well as Tobit coeﬃcients for comparison. The results are grouped
by labor market groups (full-time working men, women working full-time, and women working
part-time) and years (1992 and 2001), and each of the ﬁgures shows coeﬃcients for West (left
panel) and East Germany (middle panel) as well as diﬀerences between the two parts of the
country (right panel).
In general, the estimated eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Merely some age£skill
interactions in East Germany prove insigniﬁcant in some parts of the distributions. Moreover,
CQR coeﬃcients generally vary signiﬁcantly across the distribution and diﬀer from the more
restrictive Tobit estimates, with the only exception of part-time working women, for whom the
conﬁdence bands are relatively wide. The censoring problem is most severe for older high-
skilled employees. The interaction terms of age and high skill thus are somewhat sensitive. For
example, the median coeﬃcient of age£high skill for full-time working men in West Germany
2001 is extraordinarily low, whereas the median eﬀect of agesq£high skill jumps up. At the 60%
quantile, things are reversed. This eﬀect might aﬀect the shape of single age-earnings proﬁles
(see this section below), but its impact on predictions (as used for the decomposition analyses
in the next section) can be expected to be small.
Due to the inclusion of the interaction eﬀects, the interpretation of some of the coeﬃcients is not
apparent, and I resort to looking at age-earnings proﬁles in the next subsection. Nevertheless,
there are some notable diﬀerences of coeﬃcients across quantiles. For example, the eﬀect of age
is found to become steeper and more concave at higher quantiles for full-timers. The (negative)
7 In order to deal with measurement error in the education variable when deﬁning skill groups, I correct the
skill information such that formal degrees an individual has once obtained are not lost later on; see also
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base eﬀect of low skill tends to be smallest at low quantiles, and so does the (positive) base eﬀect
of high skill. These results are well in line with the predictions of human capital theory; see
Becker (1964) and Card (1999).
Looking at West-East diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients for the year 1992, diﬀerences in the base
eﬀects of skill turn out to be relatively small. The base trajectory of age is steeper and slightly
more concave for men in West Germany, but the picture is reversed for full-time working women,
most strikingly in the lower half of the distribution. Diﬀerences in the returns to skill among
part-time working women are relatively large in the lower half of the distribution. In the year
2001, the diﬀerences in the age eﬀects are basically the same as in 1992, but now low-skilled
men are particularly worse oﬀ in East Germany in the lower half of the distribution. On the
other hand, the base return to high skill in East Germany has increased disproportionately at
the upper end of the distribution so that one ﬁnds a negative diﬀerence there.
Changes of the coeﬃcients between 1992 and 2001 can be inferred from ﬁgures 2.9 to 2.14,
which rearrange the estimation results in the left two panels and show the changes between 1992
and 2001 explicitly in the right panel. In West Germany, the base wage has increased, and for
full-timers this eﬀect was stronger at higher quantiles. Base skill diﬀerentials for both men and
women (except for high-skilled part-timers at the top of the distribution) have increased, hinting
at an increasing inequality between skill groups. The base returns to age only changed little,
though. The changes in East Germany are qualitatively comparable to those in the West. Yet
the baseline increased even more distinctly over time, and more pronounced diﬀerences across
quantiles hint at a higher degree of within dispersion. The negative base wage premium for low
skill has grown most strikingly at the lower end of the distribution, whereas the base premium
for high-skilled men has grown most at the top of the distribution.
2.3.2 Age-Earnings Proﬁles
Figures 2.15 to 2.18 present age-earnings proﬁles used to judge diﬀerences in the remunerations
of formal skill and age. The two panels display results for West and East Germany, respectively.
In most cases, the proﬁles have the familiar concave form. However, some proﬁles for high-skilled
employees, for whom the censoring problem is most severe, should be interpreted with caution;
compare the discussion above.
Figure 2.15 displays results of the median regressions for diﬀerent skill groups. Trajectories are
generally the steeper the higher the skill level. The only exception is the group of low-skilled
women working part-time in East Germany in 2001 which exhibits an exceptionally steep proﬁle.
In West Germany, the proﬁles for women are usually ﬂatter than those for men, but men and
women do not diﬀer as much in East Germany.18 Rising Wage Dispersion
In East-West comparison, the proﬁles in the East are ﬂatter and decrease more pronouncedly
for older workers in the year 1992. This ﬁnding mirrors the low returns to age or experience
as human capital components in East Germany in the aftermath of the uniﬁcation. Yet the
diﬀerence has lessened by the year 2001, indicating some recovery of returns. Whereas the proﬁles
for West Germany are rather similar between 1992 and 2001, changes occurred in the East, where
the proﬁle for high-skilled men became particularly concave—returns recovered most distinctly
for high-skilled post-uniﬁcation cohorts. On the other hand, the proﬁles of low-skilled women
improved for part-timers, but deteriorated for full-timers. Given the position of the low-skilled
at the lower end of the unconditional wage distribution, this eﬀect contributes substantially to
the asymmetric rise in dispersion among women working full-time in East Germany.
The general picture is also reﬂected in ﬁgures 2.16 to 2.18 which display skill-speciﬁc proﬁles at
diﬀerent quantiles (20%, 50%, and 80%). Standard proﬁles with steeper trajectories in higher
regions of the distribution are primarily observed for the core labor market group of male full-
timers with an apprenticeship degree. When looking at (full-time as well as part-time working)
women in West Germany in the year 2001, one ﬁnds an analogous standard ordering of the
proﬁles for the high-skilled, but a reversed ordering for the low-skilled: Women with low formal
qualiﬁcation gain most from accumulating experience at the lower end of the pay scale. In East
Germany, the proﬁles decrease for older workers across all quantiles. Yet high-skilled men at
younger age gained most in the upper part of the distribution and the position of older low-
skilled women deteriorated particularly at the lower end. Again, the ﬁndings underline the
depreciation of human capital and the asymmetric recovery in the aftermath of the uniﬁcation.
2.4 Decomposing Diﬀerences Across Wage Distributions
The above regression analyses provided detailed insights into the remuneration of observed worker
characteristics in diﬀerent labor market segments and in diﬀerent parts of the wage distribution.
Decomposition analyses are well-suited to complement the regression evidence by answering
the question whether diﬀerences in observed distributions result from diﬀerences in estimated
coeﬃcients or from diﬀerences in the composition of the workforce. I focus on diﬀerences between
East and West Germany and on changes of the respective wage structures over time.
A Blinder (1973)-Oaxaca (1973)-type decomposition for the diﬀerence between the expected
wages in two segments s and ~ s is:
E(YsjXs) ¡ E(Y~ sjX~ s) = (Xs ¡ X~ s)¯s + X~ s(¯s ¡ ¯~ s): (2.6)Rising Wage Dispersion 19
To apply the Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) decomposition in case of censored data, I evaluate equation
(2.6) at mean values of the characteristics and use the coeﬃcients estimated by means of Tobit
regressions.8
The ﬁrst summand on the right hand side of equation (2.6), traditionally labeled “characteristics
eﬀect”, captures the part of the diﬀerence that is attributable to diﬀerences in the covariates across
the two segments. The second summand known as “returns” or “coeﬃcients eﬀect” captures the
part of the diﬀerence that is attributed to diﬀerences in the returns to the covariates. When
decomposing West-East wage gaps in the next section, I choose the counterfactual XEast¯West
to answer the question what the expected log wage would have been, had a population with the
same distribution of characteristics as East Germany faced returns to characteristics as in the
West.9 The approach assumes that the West German returns are the relevant benchmark for
the distribution in the absence of any “discrimination”. In case of the comparison across time
in section 2.4.2 the counterfactual X1992¯2001 hypothesizes what the expected wage would have
been in face of returns in the year 2001, had the distribution of characteristics not changed since
1992.10
A further method introduced by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) and applied in a series of
papers by Blau and Kahn (1992, 1994, 1997) also decomposes the change of a wage gap over
time. This approach has got the additional merit that it decomposes also residual eﬀects into
a quantity and a price eﬀect. However, it suﬀers from the shortcoming that it assumes unique
coeﬃcients across segments s and ~ s. What is more, the decomposition of the residual terms is
inapplicable in the case of censored data, in which residuals can only be used for uncensored
observations.
The main disadvantage of all techniques discussed so far is that all of them consider only mean
eﬀects. In contrast, Machado and Mata (2005) build on quantile regressions to decompose diﬀer-
8 In contrast to the traditional OLS case, however, the predicted conditional diﬀerence does not necessarily
coincide with the observed mean diﬀerence. “Observed” mean wages in the censoring case have to be estimated
by means of Tobit regressions on a constant.
9 It is well known that the partition depends on the ordering of the eﬀects and that the decomposition results
may not be invariant with respect to the choice of the involved counterfactual X~ s¯s; see the surveys of Oaxaca
and Ransom (1994) and Silber and Weber (1999). Therefore, the choice of a counterfactual should be guided
by the question of economic interest.
10 There are alternative methodologies to the standard B-O decompositions in the literature. In light of the
present focus on diﬀerences in two dimensions, techniques to decompose changes of wage gaps over time in
one single exercise—as proposed by Smith and Welch (1989) or Wellington (1993)—would be of particular
interest. However, I opt to consider both decompositions separately for two reasons. First, any combination
of involved counterfactuals—be it with or without interaction terms between the diﬀerences in characteristics
and diﬀerences in coeﬃcients—bears an even higher degree of arbitrariness; see Le and Miller (2004). Second,
and most importantly, each of the two comparisons, the diﬀerences between East and West Germany as well
as the changes of the wage distributions within the two regions over time, is interesting on its own.20 Rising Wage Dispersion
ences across entire distributions. They propose an estimator F¤
s (Ys) of the marginal distribution
of wages which conforms to the linear conditional model (2.2) as follows:
1. Draw M numbers µ1;:::;µM at random from a uniform distribution U(0;1).
2. For each µm, estimate the conditional quantile (2.2), using the sample fYs;i;Xs;igNs
i=1. This
yields coeﬃcient estimates ^ ¯s(µ1);:::; ^ ¯s(µM).
3. Draw M random draws X1
s;:::;XM
s from the sample fXs;igNs
i=1.
4. Then, the data set fY ¤m
s ´ Xm
s ^ ¯s(µm)gM
m=1 constitutes a random sample from F¤
s (Ys).
An estimator F¤
s (Ys(X~ s)) of the counterfactual marginal distribution, which relies on the coef-
ﬁcients of segment s but on the characteristics of segment ~ s, can be obtained in an analogous
way by drawing resamples from X~ s rather than from Xs in the third step. The Machado/Mata
(MM) decomposition based on the estimated distributions therefore writes
^ Fs(Ys) ¡ ^ F~ s(Y~ s) = F¤
s (Ys) ¡ F¤
~ s (Y~ s) + ² (2.7)
= [F¤
s (Ys) ¡ F¤
s (Ys(X~ s))] + [F¤
s (Ys(X~ s)) ¡ F¤
~ s (Y~ s)] + ²;
where ^ Fs(¢) denotes an estimator of the distribution based on the observed sample. Similar
to the B-O decomposition, the term in the ﬁrst brackets on the right hand side of (2.7) is a
characteristics eﬀect, and the one in the second brackets a returns eﬀect. Provided that the
linear speciﬁcation (2.2) is appropriate, the residual term ² is negligible for large samples. With
respect to the choice of a counterfactual distribution the same caveat as in the B-O case applies.
I employ the MM technique, resorting to quantile measures for the involved distributions in order
to gauge the elements of the decompositions. However, a couple of adaptations are undertaken.
First, I estimate CQR as explained above. Second, I follow Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman
(2001) to save computation time: Rather than drawing M random numbers for µm and then
estimating M (censored) quantile regressions, I estimate one regression for each single percentile
and then draw M = 1000 random draws from the distributions of the covariates for each ^ ¯s(¢).
Third, and ﬁnally, predictions above the SSTT are censored to this value in order to replicate
the censoring of the wage data. As a consequence, all comparisons of the simulated distributions
F¤
s (¢) consider only the respective uncensored parts.
There are also alternative approaches in the literature for decomposing diﬀerences across entire
distributions. The decomposition introduced by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (JMP, 1993), which
is also used by Blau and Kahn (1996) for cross-country comparisons and by Steiner and Wagner
(1997, 1998) and Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2006) for German data, employs the distribution of
residuals resulting from wage regressions to rank observations. This approach gives a structuralRising Wage Dispersion 21
interpretation to the regression residual. Yet it faces a couple of shortcomings. First, its focus
on the distribution of residuals renders the approach as inapplicable in the case of censored data
as the related (1991) approach. Second, even without censoring of the data, the JMP (1993)
decomposition is valid only in the case of homoscedasticity, which is usually rejected for empirical
wage regressions. Third, and most importantly, it is more restrictive than the MM technique
because it assumes a single linear model to hold for the entire wage distribution, whereas the
latter approach based on quantile regressions allows for ﬂexibility across the distribution.
Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a) also build on the MM approach, while DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (1996) exploit kernel density estimations to decompose diﬀerences in a nonparametric
setting. Compared to this approach, the semiparametric MM framework is restrictive by nature.
Yet by quantifying diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients it sheds light on that part of a diﬀerence which
would be left unexplained in the nonparametric framework.
2.4.1 Diﬀerences between East and West Germany
Table 2.4 reports observed and predicted West-East diﬀerences in log wages across quantiles
for the years 1992 and 2001.11 Observed and predicted quantiles of the unconditional wage
distributions show a close resemblance, therefore suggesting that estimation and speciﬁcation
error is of minor importance. The predicted gaps thus broaden the snapshot discussion of section
2.2. Decile diﬀerences which cannot be interpreted due to the censoring problem are marked by a
dot. The Tobit results reported in the last column are usually close to the values at the median.
For the group of full-time working men the gap varies between 55% at the ﬁrst decile and 61%
at the eighth decile in 1992. The observation that the gap at the upper end of the distribution
exceeds the gap at the lower end by 6 pp indicates a higher wage dispersion in the West as
compared to the East. In 2001 the East-West diﬀerential varies less between quantiles (38%
at the ﬁrst decile and 40% at the eighth): Wage dispersion in East Germany has caught up
to a large degree. Except for the diﬀerence in the level, the picture for women working full-
time in 1992 is very similar to that for males in the upper two thirds of the distribution: The
gaps at the third and at the eighth decile diﬀer by 4 pp. However, the gap of 22% at the ﬁrst
decile falls below the gap at the third decile by remarkable 14 pp—at the very low end of the
distribution the West-East gap is less severe. This ﬁnding still holds for the year 2001, but now
the diﬀerential at the third decile also exceeds the diﬀerential at the eighth by 9 pp: The upper
half of this group’s distribution participated most strikingly in the closing of the West-East wage
gap. Women working part-time in East Germany in 1992 were relatively well oﬀ at the low and at
the high end of the distribution, and the West-East diﬀerential was highest around the median.
11 The analysis in this section is based on nominal numbers; see the discussion in section 2.2.22 Rising Wage Dispersion
The diﬀerential for this group had basically vanished by 2001, though. At the ﬁrst decile wages
were even slightly higher in the East.
When decomposing West-East wage diﬀerentials in order to judge whether the diﬀerentials stem
from diﬀerent decompositions of the work force or whether employees’ characteristics are remu-
nerated diﬀerently in East and West Germany, one generally ﬁnds relatively small impacts of the
characteristics. The better parts of the diﬀerentials are in most cases captured by diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients.
For full-time working men the characteristics eﬀect is largely negligible in both years 1992 and
2001. If anything, diﬀerent characteristics explain 2 pp of the West-East diﬀerential in the upper
part of the distribution in 2001. In the group of women working full-time in 1992, the charac-
teristics eﬀect ranges between –9 pp at the ﬁrst decile and –6 pp at the eighth. It therefore is
in favor of higher earnings in East Germany and most pronounced in the lower half of the dis-
tribution. In relative terms, women selecting into full-time jobs in East Germany had preferable
characteristics in 1992. This tendency still holds for 2001, but to a lesser degree and mainly in
the upper half of the distribution. In the lower part of the distribution the relative deterioration
of characteristics contributed substantially to the worsened position in the pay scale. A similar
reasoning also applies for women working part-time in 1992. However, there are only little oﬀ-
setting characteristics and coeﬃcients eﬀects in the year 2001, by which convergence of wages
has been achieved for this group.
The conclusion that diﬀerences in employees’ characteristics only play a minor role in explaining
East-West wage diﬀerentials is supported by the summary statistics of the covariates in tables
2.2 and 2.3. By and large, diﬀerences are very small. In both years 1992 and 2001 and for all
labor market groups, the level of formal education in East Germany is higher than in the West.
Only the proportion of male employees with a university degree is higher in West Germany in
2001.
The latter ﬁnding is in line with the results of the B-O decompositions in Burda and Schmidt
(1997) and the JMP decompositions in Steiner and Wagner (1997a), both of which use GSOEP
data for the early 1990s and report a minor importance of diﬀerences in the characteristics of the
work forces. Görzig, Gornig, and Werwatz (2004), using a decomposition based on establishment-
level data, compare wages in East and West Germany for the years 1994 and 1998. They stress
the importance of diﬀerences in establishment types and conclude that the catching-up in the
East was in part oﬀset by an increasing share of low-wage-type establishments in East Germany.
The analysis of East-West migrants in Kirbach and Smolny (2004) also concludes that only
a small part of observed East-West wage gaps can be attributed to observed socioeconomic
characteristics of the workers.Rising Wage Dispersion 23
2.4.2 Changes in the Wage Structure Over Time
In order to analyze changes in the wage structure over time, I use real wages (normalized by
consumer prices of 1992, diﬀerentiated by regions). In a setup analogous to that of table 2.4 in
the previous section, the panels in table 2.5 display the observed and predicted log wage changes
between 1992 and 2001. Diﬀerences of the numbers across quantiles give account of the evolution
of wage inequality.
Among the group of men working full-time in West Germany, inequality as measured by percentile
diﬀerences QD8020 has increased by 9 pp and this increase was slightly more pronounced in the
upper half of the distribution. The eighth decile gained 5% while the second decile lost by 4%.
Due to the censoring problem, changes at the very high end of the distribution cannot be assessed,
but wages at the very low end exhibited a remarkable real loss of almost 8%. The (predicted)
interquintile range QD8020 of 14 pp for men in East Germany shows that wage dispersion went
up even more remarkably. Moreover, most of this increase (10 pp) took place in the upper half
of the distribution. Yet even at the lower end real wage growth was positive for this group.
Real wages of women working full-time in West Germany hardly changed in the lower third of
the distribution. Only the ﬁrst decile exhibited a decline of 2%. Negative real wage growth of
up to –4% is found in the lower third of the distribution for this group in East Germany. The
gender wage gap in East Germany thus did not close, but rather widened in this part of the
distribution. Wage growth further diﬀered substantially at higher quantiles: Whereas Western
wages increased by up to 8%, wages in the East went up by remarkable 23% at the eighth decile.
The corresponding interquintile range QD8020 of 25 pp shows that the increase in inequality
was most striking among this group.
The group of part-time working women in West Germany experienced real wage growth between 5
and 11%, with highest increases at the extreme deciles. In East Germany, the range of diﬀerences
across quantiles is 9 pp. However, the biggest increase is observed in the middle part of the
distribution and—well in line with the observed closing of the East-West gap for this group—the
level of changes exceeds that in the West by about 10 pp.
The decomposition of the wage changes reveals characteristics eﬀects in the range between 1 pp
(in favor of higher earnings in 2001) at the ﬁrst decile and 5 pp at the eighth decile for all three
labor market groups working in West Germany. With shares of about one half for women and
virtually full coverage for men, changes in the characteristics therefore capture the better part of
the respective wage increases in the upper halves of the distributions. The ﬁnding likely reﬂects
some skill upgrading in the prime-age work force. In fact, reconsidering the summary statistics
of the covariates in tables 2.2 and 2.3, one ﬁnds that skill upgrading took place in both East and
West Germany between 1992 and 2001. As the proportion of low-skilled workers decreased in all24 Rising Wage Dispersion
labor market groups, the proportion of high-skilled went up. This increase was more pronounced
in West Germany than in the East. With respect to changes in the industry structure of the
work force, employment in public and social security system services (sector 16) decreased most
remarkably in East Germany.
Restructuring and skill upgrading yet played only a minor role in explaining the striking wage
increase (especially in the upper half of the distribution) for men working in East Germany: The
characteristics eﬀect does not exceed 2 pp. A similar result holds for the majority of women
working full-time in East Germany, but for this group the characteristics eﬀect goes down up to
–7 pp in the lower middle of the distribution. The characteristics in that part of the distribution
working towards real wage cuts, the increasing inequality was driven by a more advantageous
development of characteristics at the upper end. Finally, the contribution of changes in the
characteristics is largely negligible across the entire distribution of wage changes for women
working part-time in East Germany.
A bottom line of this exercise is that the diverse patterns of changing wage levels and increasing
inequality are due to changes in the composition of the respective work forces and changing
remunerations of relevant characteristics. This result diﬀers from that of related studies in the
literature12, all of which use the more restrictive B-O or JMP decompositions for diﬀerent periods
of time and ﬁnd basically no composition eﬀects among prime-age employees.
2.5 Conclusions
The German wage structure has been rather compressed in international comparison and “un-
bearabl[y] stable” (Prasad, 2004) between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. Newly available
register data from the IAB employment sample 1975–2001 now allow researchers to reinvestigate
the empirical evidence for more recent years. This paper studies the evolution of wage levels
and wage inequality within and between diﬀerent labor market groups for the years 1992–2001.
I ﬁnd that wage inequality has in fact been rising in many dimensions throughout this period.
A comparison of mean wage diﬀerences reveals that convergence in wage levels between West
and East Germany took place until the year 1996, but nominal diﬀerences of about 40% for men
and 20% for full-time working women persisted until 2001. No more diﬀerence is observed in the
wages of part-time working women.
12 Steiner and Wagner (1998a) analyze the evolution of wage inequality among West German males by means
of JMP decompositions applied to GSOEP and IABS data for the years 1984–1990. Note that their analysis
for the IABS bears some problems because it only considers uncensored wages. Burda and Hunt (2001) apply
B-O decompositions to the GSOEP East 1990–1999. Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2006) also use GSOEP data for
1984–2004 and apply JMP decompositions.Rising Wage Dispersion 25
The inspection of year-speciﬁc wage distributions unveils rising wage dispersion. As measured
by interquintile ranges QD8020, dispersion was generally lower in East Germany than in West
Germany in the year 1992, but it caught up until 2001: Whereas QD8020 increased by 8 to 9 log
points (pp) for men and full-time working women in West Germany, the corresponding numbers
are 14 to 25 pp in the East. Moreover, the larger part of the increase in dispersion among women
happened in the lower parts of the respective distributions, but dispersion among men increased
disproportionately in the upper parts.
The estimation of censored quantile wage regressions provides insights into the determinants of
the observed diﬀerences and changes. The bottom line of the regression results meets a-priori
expectations. Age-earnings proﬁles not only are the steeper the higher the skill level, but they are
also relatively ﬂat in East Germany in 1992. The uniﬁcation shock clearly led to a depreciation of
human capital in the East. However, this eﬀect wears out with the aging of post-uniﬁcation labor
market cohorts, and diﬀerences in the proﬁles between East and West Germany have lessened
by the year 2001. The quantile regression approach further reveals signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
eﬀects across the wage distribution. The result that low-skilled women working full-time in East
Germany are left particularly worse-oﬀ at the lower end of the distribution substantiates the
high and asymmetric increase in dispersion for this group.
Drawing on the ﬂexible quantile regression approach, the decomposition technique introduced by
Machado and Mata (2005) is well-suited to depict heterogeneous characteristics and coeﬃcients
eﬀects across the respective wage distributions. In East-West comparison, diﬀerences in the
composition of the work force turn out largely negligible for men. However, characteristics of
full-time working women are mostly in favor of higher wages in the East. Yet this eﬀect ceases
to apply at the lower end of the distribution by the year 2001.
With respect to the evolution of wages over time, characteristics eﬀects can account for major
parts of the respective wage increases in the upper halves of the wage distributions for West
Germany. This ﬁnding reﬂects a skill upgrading in the work force. Restructuring and skill
upgrading yet played only a minor role in explaining the wage increases in East Germany. For
women in the lower parts of the Eastern distribution the characteristics eﬀect even worked
towards real wage cuts, substantiating again the particular increase in wage dispersion among
this group.
The ﬁnding of rising wage inequality is broadly in line with the evidence in Möller (2005), who
compares decile ratios for selective labor market groups and also stresses the importance to distin-
guish between men and women when assessing asymmetries in the evolution of wage inequality.
Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2006), also reporting increasing wage inequality, do not distinguish be-
tween sexes and therefore do not give account of the striking asymmetries between the groups
in East Germany. As a consequence, their JMP decompositions do not detect this eﬀect, either.26 Rising Wage Dispersion
All of the results discussed in this paper are descriptive by nature. Unfortunately, the IABS
provides only relatively few covariates, such that it is impossible to venture upon instrumental
variable estimation or a control function approach in order to account for a possible endogeneity
of educational attainment or diﬀerences in the selection into the labor market. The analysis
focusses on core labor market groups and leaves aside marginal part-time workers (geringfügig
Beschäftigte), among others. This is important to note because it renders the ﬁnding of increasing
inequality even more meaningful.
An analogous argument applies with respect to migration, which is not modeled explicitly. East-
West migration in the aftermath of the uniﬁcation had already come down to stable numbers
by the year 1992 and the evidence for the existence of a brain drain is mixed; see Arntz (2006),
Büchel, Frick, and Witte (2002), and Hunt (2006). However, if emigration from East Germany
during the observation period is skill- or age-biased, i.e., if migrants are in fact either better
educated workers or low-skilled who have been laid-oﬀ (Hunt, 2006), the observation that wage
inequality increases faster in East Germany is even more remarkable.
Finally, it is not the aim of this paper to speculate about the economic causes and consequences
of the unveiled trends. In face of alternative explanatory hypotheses—such as accelerating non-
neutral technical change, increasingly heterogeneous work environments, more ﬂexible labor mar-
ket institutions, or a decline in union power—estimates of structural models may be expected to
complement the descriptive evidence in future research.
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Figure 2.1: Nominal Wage Distributions, 1992–2001
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Figure 2.2: West-East Wage Gaps, 1992–2001
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Figure 2.3: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in East-West Comparison: Men Working Full-Time, 1992
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Figure 2.4: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in East-West Comparison: Women Working Full-Time,
1992
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Figure 2.5: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in East-West Comparison: Women Working Part-Time,
1992
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Figure 2.6: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in East-West Comparison: Men Working Full-Time, 2001
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Figure 2.7: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in East-West Comparison: Women Working Full-Time,
2001
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Figure 2.8: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in East-West Comparison: Women Working Part-Time,
2001
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Figure 2.9: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in Comparison over Time: Men Working Full-Time, West
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Figure 2.10: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in Comparison over Time: Women Working Full-Time,
West
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Figure 2.11: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in Comparison over Time: Women Working Part-Time,
West
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Figure 2.12: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in Comparison over Time: Men Working Full-Time,
East
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Figure 2.13: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in Comparison over Time: Women Working Full-Time,
East
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Figure 2.14: Regression Coeﬃcients by Deciles in Comparison over Time: Women Working Part-Time,
East
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Figure 2.15: Median Age-Earnings Proﬁles for Diﬀerent Skill Groups
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Figure 2.16: Age-Earnings Proﬁles across the Wage Distribution, by Skill Groups: Men Working Full-
Time
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Figure 2.17: Age Earnings Proﬁles across the Wage Distribution, by Skill Groups: Women Working
Full-Time
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Figure 2.18: Age Earnings Proﬁles across the Wage Distribution, by Skill Groups: Women Working
Part-Time
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Results of censored quantile regressions. Solid lines: 20% quantile; long dashed lines: 50% quantile; short dashed
lines: 80% quantile; dotted lines: mean (Tobit). Data source: IABS 1975–2001.48 Rising Wage Dispersion
Table 2.4: Decomposition I: West-East Wage Diﬀerences Across the Distribution
Men Working Full-Time
1992 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Tobit
Observed gap 0.546 0.570 0.579 0.574 0.576 0.590 0.604 ¢ ¢ 0.587
Predicted gap 0.555 0.569 0.573 0.578 0.579 0.595 0.607 0.614 ¢ 0.578
Char. eﬀect -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.000 ¢ -0.018
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.557 0.570 0.570 0.572 0.571 0.585 0.603 0.614 ¢ 0.596
2001
Observed gap 0.381 0.413 0.405 0.417 0.395 0.405 0.405 0.402 ¢ 0.382
Predicted gap 0.370 0.398 0.405 0.413 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.398 ¢ 0.386
Char. eﬀect 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.022 ¢ 0.008
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.360 0.390 0.396 0.401 0.391 0.388 0.388 0.376 ¢ 0.378
Women Working Full-Time
1992 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Tobit
Observed gap 0.219 0.317 0.360 0.369 0.368 0.378 0.381 0.399 ¢ 0.342
Predicted gap 0.238 0.327 0.358 0.369 0.373 0.376 0.378 0.388 ¢ 0.345
Char. eﬀect -0.086 -0.086 -0.079 -0.076 -0.066 -0.056 -0.056 -0.059 ¢ -0.073
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.324 0.414 0.437 0.445 0.439 0.433 0.434 0.447 ¢ 0.417
2001
Observed gap 0.150 0.254 0.276 0.234 0.177 0.146 0.143 0.161 0.171 0.179
Predicted gap 0.171 0.249 0.263 0.227 0.192 0.164 0.157 0.158 0.156 0.179
Char. eﬀect -0.015 -0.030 -0.034 -0.039 -0.041 -0.036 -0.042 -0.043 -0.055 -0.047
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.186 0.279 0.297 0.266 0.233 0.200 0.199 0.201 0.211 0.226
Women Working Part-Time
1992 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Tobit
Observed gap 0.061 0.187 0.201 0.215 0.212 0.210 0.187 0.151 0.125 0.168
Predicted gap 0.096 0.197 0.213 0.215 0.208 0.199 0.181 0.161 0.147 0.186
Char. eﬀect -0.049 -0.038 -0.028 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.018 -0.033 -0.016
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.145 0.235 0.241 0.231 0.223 0.212 0.198 0.179 0.180 0.202
2001
Observed gap -0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.018 0.000 0.013 -0.013
Predicted gap -0.063 -0.020 0.000 -0.010 -0.004 -0.009 -0.017 0.003 0.008 0.003
Char. eﬀect -0.023 -0.021 -0.028 -0.015 -0.009 -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.004
Coeﬀ. eﬀect -0.040 0.001 0.028 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.020 0.024 0.007
Nominal diﬀerences, evaluated at various percentiles. Tobit “observed” gaps estimated by Tobit regressions on a
constant. ¢ indicates censored deciles. Data source: IABS 1975–2001.Rising Wage Dispersion 49
Table 2.5: Decomposition II: Changes of the Wage Structure, 1992–2001
Men Working Full-Time
West Germany 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Tobit
Observed change -0.075 -0.038 -0.023 -0.010 -0.006 0.016 0.030 0.051 ¢ -0.004
Predicted change -0.075 -0.039 -0.027 -0.015 0.001 0.012 0.030 0.051 ¢ 0.001
Char. eﬀect 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.023 0.032 0.037 0.045 0.052 ¢ 0.036
Coeﬀ. eﬀect -0.084 -0.052 -0.040 -0.038 -0.030 -0.025 -0.015 -0.001 ¢ -0.036
East Germany
Observed change 0.001 0.031 0.062 0.058 0.087 0.112 0.140 ¢ ¢ 0.112
Predicted change 0.022 0.044 0.052 0.062 0.080 0.106 0.136 0.179 ¢ 0.104
Char. eﬀect -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.007 -0.003 0.006 0.013 ¢ -0.011
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.034 0.057 0.067 0.076 0.087 0.109 0.130 0.166 ¢ 0.115
Women Working Full-Time
West Germany 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Tobit
Observed change -0.024 0.000 -0.001 0.035 0.045 0.053 0.068 0.075 0.106 0.040
Predicted change -0.017 -0.009 0.008 0.027 0.043 0.053 0.065 0.082 0.103 0.032
Char. eﬀect 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.021 0.027 0.034 0.036 0.047 0.054 0.017
Coeﬀ. eﬀect -0.023 -0.013 -0.004 0.007 0.016 0.019 0.029 0.035 0.049 0.015
East Germany
Observed change -0.043 -0.025 -0.006 0.081 0.147 0.197 0.217 0.225 ¢ 0.113
Predicted change -0.038 -0.019 0.015 0.081 0.137 0.177 0.197 0.224 ¢ 0.110
Char. eﬀect -0.044 -0.044 -0.067 -0.064 -0.038 -0.012 0.003 0.013 ¢ -0.026
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.006 0.025 0.082 0.144 0.175 0.190 0.195 0.212 ¢ 0.136
Women Working Part-Time
West Germany 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Tobit
Observed change 0.112 0.054 0.051 0.065 0.068 0.091 0.104 0.114 0.111 0.079
Predicted change 0.076 0.037 0.039 0.054 0.072 0.087 0.097 0.108 0.106 0.077
Char. eﬀect 0.011 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.030 0.024
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.066 0.012 0.017 0.030 0.046 0.056 0.071 0.074 0.076 0.053
East Germany
Observed change 0.127 0.152 0.163 0.191 0.191 0.212 0.220 0.176 0.134 0.173
Predicted change 0.147 0.166 0.163 0.190 0.195 0.206 0.207 0.178 0.156 0.172
Char. eﬀect 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.017 0.005 0.007 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.008
Coeﬀ. eﬀect 0.127 0.146 0.163 0.173 0.190 0.198 0.190 0.165 0.149 0.164
Real diﬀerences, evaluated at various percentiles. Tobit “observed” gaps estimated by Tobit regressions on a
constant. ¢ indicates censored deciles. Data source: IABS 1975–2001.503 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort
Eﬀects: Are Workers in Germany All of the Same
Type?
3.1 Introduction
Numerous empirical studies record descriptive micro-data evidence on the evolution of wages
and employment measures; see the survey article of Katz and Autor (1999). To capture the
heterogeneity of labor, authors usually undertake a grouping into diﬀerent classes based on
observed covariates like age and sex of employees or on the basis of job characteristics. Available
studies typically report considerable wage dispersion both between and within adequately deﬁned
classes. Variation over time yet generates another important dimension of heterogeneity.
Particular attention is given to skill wage premia and the evolution of skill-speciﬁc employment.
As a stylized fact, the unemployment rate is the higher the lower the (formal) qualiﬁcational level
of the employees. In West Germany, for example, the respective rates for employees without a
vocational degree, for those with, and for those with a university degree were 21.7%, 7.3%, and
3.5% in the year 2004 (Reinberg and Hummel, 2005).
Rigidity of the wage structure is often referred to as a major cause for the diﬀerent degrees of
incidence of unemployment; compare, e.g., Fitzenberger and Franz (2001). As elaborated in
the discussion about employment impacts of skill-biased technical change (SBTC; see Katz and
Autor, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002), relative demand for low-skilled labor decreases faster over time
than does relative supply. In line with neoclassical demand theory (Hamermesh, 1993), market
clearing would in this case require an increase of qualiﬁcational wage diﬀerentials.
Despite the popularity and plausibility of this hypothesis an empirical operationalization of
the interrelation between wage structures and employment that goes beyond mere descriptive
evidence proves diﬃcult due to the heterogeneity of labor, among other things. Conventional
empirical analyses of qualiﬁcational labor demand typically take into account only a small number
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of homogeneous skill groups—mostly not more than three; cf. the surveys in Hamermesh (1993)
and Katz and Autor (1999) and for Germany, e.g., the studies of Fitzenberger (1999), Steiner and
Wagner (1998b), or Falk and Koebel (1999, 2002). These approaches are often justiﬁed in light
of the fact that satisfactory solutions to the problem of aggregation do not exist.1 Also, standard
approaches based on cost-minimizing behavior like ﬂexible translog systems, which allow for a
larger number of factors, quickly become impracticable.
Based on US data, Katz and Murphy (1992) analyze wage diﬀerentials between high school and
college graduates in the context of supply and demand eﬀects. A CES model proves compatible
with the developments of wage premia and employment over time. These are consistent with the
labor market entry of young and the exit of older birth cohorts on the one hand and an increase
in average educational attainment on the other. The literature interprets these trends as a race
between changes in the skill structure of labor supply and that of labor demand; cf., for example,
Johnson (1997), Topel (1997), and Machin (2002). However, in addition to the variation of skills
between diﬀerent cohorts, human capital endowments also change with age. Whereas increasing
labor market experience and job tenure augment human capital stocks with age, skill-biased and
accelerating structural change might invalidate individual endowments of older workers. Freeman
(1979) and Welch (1979) thus account for imperfect substitutability between workers of diﬀerent
age by means of CES technologies for workers from discrete age or “career phase” groups.
Card and Lemieux’s (2001) – henceforth CL – investigation using US, UK, and Canadian data
reconciles the analysis of Katz and Murphy (1992) with those of Freeman (1979) and Welch
(1979). In a set-up which uses the nested CES model developed by Sato (1967) the simultaneous
inclusion of skill and age as dimensions of heterogeneity not only enables the separation of age,
time, and cohort eﬀects, but also facilitates the estimation of a speciﬁcation with a relatively
large number of diﬀerent input factors. The estimation strategy undertaken in particular yields
elasticities of substitution both between high school and college graduates and between workers
belonging to diﬀerent age classes.
The starting point of the study by CL is the observation that the college-high school gap in
wages has increased strongly for younger US men whereas the gap for older men has remained
nearly constant. The driving force for these observed cohort-speciﬁc changes is the slowdown in
the growth of college-educated labor which did not keep up with the steady skill bias in labor
demand; see also Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005b) for a recent reassessment.
Wage trends in West Germany diﬀered from what happened in countries like the US, UK, or
Canada over the last decades. In particular, wage dispersion for male workers did not increase
1 For discussions of the problem of aggregation in the context of labor demand estimations see, e.g., Koebel
(2005) and Katz and Autor (1999).Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 53
to the same extent (Prasad, 2004). In fact, skill wage diﬀerentials decreased between workers
with and those without a vocational training degree; see Fitzenberger (1999) and Fitzenberger
and Wunderlich (2002). Regarding the diﬀerential between workers with a vocational degree
and workers with university-type education there is conﬂicting evidence; see Steiner and Wagner
(1998a), Möller (1999), and Fitzenberger (1999). Little evidence exists regarding age-related
wage diﬀerentials. Fitzenberger (1999) and Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002) ﬁnd that cross-
sectional age proﬁles became somewhat steeper for male workers without and for those with a
vocational training degree. According to the SBTC hypothesis, skill upgrading in employment
should thus have occurred at a faster rate in Germany compared to countries like the US, the
UK, or Canada and, in the spirit of CL, cohort eﬀects are likely to be of importance in West
Germany as well. There is recent concern that the necessary skill upgrading of the labor force in
Germany is too slow to combat the high unemployment of the low-skilled; see the stylized facts
reported in OECD (2004).
This paper broadens the scope of the nested CES framework and provides estimates based on the
IAB employment sample (IABS) for Germany. While consistently reconciling the developments
of relative wages and employment, our treatment extends upon the existing literature in several
directions. First, we let three skill groups account for heterogeneity within the qualiﬁcation
dimension. This extension is necessary in light of the coexistence of vocational training and
university education in Germany. Second, we treat the identiﬁcation of cohort eﬀects more
rigorously. Tests for the existence of cohort eﬀects and their separability from age and time eﬀects
(as suggested by MaCurdy and Mroz, 1995) are applied to check the validity of the speciﬁcation.
Third, rather than merely running regressions for skill wage diﬀerentials, we estimate a full
system of skill and age premia implied by the nested CES model. Fourth, we take a closer look
at the notions of observed employment and let instrumental variable techniques account for the
endogeneity of both wages and employment. Finally, we draw on the estimated substitution
parameters in order to conduct two simulation experiments: We calculate the magnitude of
wage changes in the three skill groups that would have been necessary to halve skill-speciﬁc
unemployment rates in 1997 (the latest period available). While allowing for relative changes
between skill groups, this would have left the wage structure within skill groups unaﬀected. Due
to the particularly high unemployment rate among low-skilled employees in Germany, the design
imposes a disproportionately prominent increase in employment of this group, and thus is of high
policy relevance. Alternatively, one might be interested in changes of the wage structure within
skill groups, holding the structure across the respective groups constant. Here, the model set-up
may provide an answer to the question how wages for employees of diﬀerent age would have had
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the trends in skill
wage premia and skill-speciﬁc employment in the IABS between 1975 and 1997. Following
an investigation into the nature of cohort eﬀects in section 3.3, section 3.4 discusses diﬀerent
facets of the nested CES model which allow for the reconciliation of the stylized empirical facts,
and section 3.5 estimates elasticities of substitution across and within skill groups. Based on
the resulting parameters, the simulation experiments are presented in section 3.6. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Descriptive Evidence
A number of recent empirical studies provides descriptive evidence for skill wage diﬀerentials in
the German labor market. Among the analyses—comprising, e.g., Christensen (2003), Chris-
tensen and Schimmelpfennig (1998), Fitzenberger (1999), Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2002),
Möller (1999), Prasad (2004), Riphahn (2003), Steiner and Mohr (2000), and Steiner and Wagner
(1998a)—there is some consensus that, by and large, the earnings distribution across skill groups
stayed relatively stable during the 1980’s and 1990’s.
A closer look calls for detailed investigations which take into consideration further aspects of
heterogeneity. In the tradition of Mincer (1974) work experience is an important additional
determinant of individual earnings, and the eﬀects of age—often used as a proxy for experience—
are of interest themselves. Prasad (2004) and Riphahn (2003), for example, estimate year-speciﬁc
Mincer equations and depict the evolution of returns to potential experience. Studies explicitly
accounting for the age dimension of wage distributions examine single cross-sectional age proﬁles,
like Fitzenberger and Reize (2003), or focus speciﬁcally on cohort analyses, as Boockmann and
Steiner (2000) or Fitzenberger, Hujer, MaCurdy, and Schnabel (2001), for example. Beißinger
and Möller (1998) account for the age dimension in the distribution of (un)employment for
discrete years between 1980 and 1990.
Our study scrutinizes both wages and employment across the two dimensions skill and age for
the time span 1975–1997. It is based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a 1% random
draw of German employment spells subject to social insurance contributions. The IABS covers
about 80% of all employed persons, and it provides detailed information on daily wages for blue
and white collar workers as well as the exact timing of employment spells. We classify employees
into three skill groups and consider six age classes. An extensive description of the data and
classiﬁcations used is given in appendix 3.A.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 55
3.2.1 Stylized Facts I: The Evolution of Wage Diﬀerentials
Age-speciﬁc skill wage premia or skill wage diﬀerentials rsm;a;t among workers of age a at time t
are deﬁned as the diﬀerence in mean log wage of high-skilled (s = h, employees with a university
degree) or low-skilled workers (s = l, employees with neither university nor vocational training
degree) and that of medium-skilled workers (s = m, employees with a vocational training degree).
Using dummy variables ds;a;t for the diﬀerent skill groups and possibly controlling for further
inﬂuences,2 they can be derived from regressions
ln(wa;t) = constanta;t + rl;a;t ¢ dl;a;t + rh;a;t ¢ dh;a;t + controlsa;t + ²a;t (3.1)
in the respective age-time cells. Due to the social security taxation threshold, wage data in the
IABS are censored from above. Thus (3.1) is estimated by means of Tobit regressions. Obser-
vations are weighted by the length of the respective employment spells. Results are provided in
tables 3.4 and 3.5 in appendix 3.B.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the evolution of age-speciﬁc wage diﬀerentials for males over time. Skill
premia generally grow with age. Taking age as a proxy for experience, this corresponds to classical
human capital theory (Becker, 1964). The estimated premia have evolved quite diﬀerently,
though.
The education premium for high-skilled employees compared to the medium-skilled stayed
roughly constant for the oldest age class until 1987 and declined by about 9 percentage points
(ppoints) thereafter. The relative position of 30- to 35-year-old high-skilled, on the other hand,
deteriorated by about 9 ppoints during the late 1970’s, partly rose again in the ﬁrst half of the
80’s, and stayed constant from 1986 on.
The diﬀerential between older medium- and low-skilled workers exhibited a decline of about
5 ppoints during the eighties and recovered to an overall decline of about 2 ppoints during
the nineties. In the youngest age class this wage premium exhibited an even higher volatility:
Between 1975 and 1986, low-skilled workers on average gained around 6 ppoints compared to
the medium-skilled. Later on, the diﬀerential increased again and even exceeded the 1975-level
in 1997.
To infer the evolution of age proﬁles across time, we plot the wage diﬀerentials for three years
against the age dimension in ﬁgure 3.3. Average wage diﬀerentials between high- and medium-
skilled generally increase rather steeply with age: The premium grows by up to 29 ppoints.
However, the shape of the proﬁles changes over time.
2 Cf. appendix 3.A for details on implemented speciﬁcations.56 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
In 1975 the proﬁle is considerably curved, showing especially a pronounced rise for young indi-
viduals. In transition to the mid-1980’s, the curvature declines whilst the proﬁle still shows a
similarly high increase over the entire age span: In particular for middle-aged workers the pre-
mium for higher education declines compared to 1975. Starting in the second half of the eighties,
one observes a twist of the proﬁle. Whereas the increase in the premium for higher education
for workers up to their mid-thirties is much the same in 1997 as in 1986, the proﬁle has become
ﬂatter for older employees: The relative position of older high-skilled workers has deteriorated
in comparison to the situation in 1986.
In comparison, the proﬁle of the wage diﬀerential between low- and medium-skilled workers is
typically much ﬂatter, especially for older workers. The diﬀerential declines strongly for younger
workers between 1975 and 1986 and it increases again strongly between 1986 and 1997. But
even though the maximum decline—roughly 8 ppoints in 1986—is found to be small relative to
the one experienced by the high-to-medium-skilled diﬀerential, the picture of the developments
over time is still striking. In 1975 the average education premium moderately rose with age,
showing increments declining with age. Up to 1986, the proﬁle shifted downward by about 2–6
ppoints, becoming steeper for younger age classes. In 1997, however, the proﬁle shows a twisted
shape: Whilst the diﬀerential for older workers partly recovered in a parallel kind of manner,
the youngest workers now face a premium increased by 6 ppoints that renders the entire proﬁle
nearly ﬂat.
Taking the above results together, we assert a ﬁrst stylized fact:
Between the mid-1970’s and the mid-1990’s, age proﬁles of skill wage premia have not
moved in parallel fashion over time. Skill wage premia declined over time (especially
between the 1970’s and 1980’s) in a non-uniform fashion across age groups.
Thus, the developments are not likely to be the result of pure age and time eﬀects alone. Cohort
eﬀects, i.e., systematic diﬀerences across birth cohorts, supposedly play an additional important
role. Our subsequent theoretical and empirical investigation into the development of skill wage
premia hence takes account of age, time, and cohort eﬀects.
3.2.2 Stylized Facts II: Trends in Relative Employment
Based on the individual spell data, we use a weighted headcount as our measure of employment:
In each age-time cell, the number of skill-speciﬁc employed is summed up, weighted by the
duration of the respective employment spells.
Figure 3.4 presents relative employment trends for the diﬀerent age classes. These are the
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skill group, respectively. The measures show the skill upgrading over the past decades: For most
of the sample period, both the ratio of high-skilled to medium-skilled and that of medium-skilled
to low-skilled employment were the higher the younger the respective age class. Furthermore,
the skill-intensity of employment has increased over time. Starting from a situation of uniform
skill upgrading in all age classes, however, the increase of relative employment of the skilled slows
down considerably or even comes to an end at some point in time. Beginning in the mid 1980’s,
this break occurs ﬁrst for the youngest age group. It then works through the older classes during
the following years until it aﬀects the oldest employees in the second half of the 1990’s.3
We record a second stylized fact:
There is a break in the inter-cohort trend of relative employment such that younger
birth cohorts do not follow the older ones towards further skill upgrading.
The empirical evidence thus suggests the existence of cohort eﬀects in the employment dimension,
too.
3.3 Testing for Cohort Eﬀects
To distinguish age, cohort, and time eﬀects in wage premia ra;t, CL undertake a decomposition
of wage premia by the following regression:
ra;t = ba + ct¡a + dt + ²a;t (3.2)
where ba, ct¡a, and dt denote age, cohort, and time dummies, respectively. However, one should
be cautious with respect to the identiﬁcation of wage premia. When separating cohort eﬀects
from pure time and age eﬀects an identiﬁcation issue arises because the cohort (deﬁned by the
individual’s year of birth) is calendar time minus age.
As a ﬁrst identiﬁcation approach, we follow CL by estimating equations (3.2), setting the eﬀects
for the oldest birth-cohorts (up to 1928) equal to zero. The model is formally “identiﬁed” based
on annual data by using ﬁve-year age intervals and implicitly assuming age and cohort eﬀects
to be constant within each interval.4 A test for the existence of cohort eﬀects is then conducted
3 Note that the approximate zero-growth of the relative employment of high-skilled in the ﬁrst age class should
not be over-interpreted in our context, because it likely reﬂects the extension of education durations and
the corresponding deferments of labor market entries during the last decades; cf., for example, Reinberg and
Hummel (1999).
4 Boockmann and Steiner (2000) follow a similar identiﬁcation strategy by deﬁning their cohorts to span periods
of ﬁve or ten years. In addition, the study considers actual experience rather than age.58 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
by testing for joint signiﬁcance of all other cohort terms. This approach is suggestive from
an economic point of view. However, it resolves the identiﬁcation problem in a rather ad hoc
way; see Heckman and Robb (1985) for a detailed discussion of the identiﬁcation issue. We
employ an alternative approach introduced by MaCurdy and Mroz (1995) and also used in
Fitzenberger, Hujer, MaCurdy, and Schnabel (2001) which deals with the identiﬁcation issue
both more explicitly and more rigorously.
Following this approach, we formalize cohort eﬀects as the outcome of interaction between age
and time by allowing for interaction terms of diﬀerent order. For identiﬁcation, the linear cohort
eﬀect is explicitly set to zero.5 To test for the existence of cohort eﬀects, we estimate the following
speciﬁcation:
rsm;a;t = bsm;a + dsm;t +
4 X
i=1
°i;smRi;a;t + »a;tKsm;after(ca;t) (3.3)
+(1 ¡ »a;t)Ksm;before(ca;t) + ²sm;a;t; s 2 fl;hg; »a;t =
(
1 : ca;t ¸ 0
0 : else
;
using age and time dummy variables as well as year of birth ca;t as cohort variable, normalized
to zero for those aged 25 in the year 1975. The pure, separable cohort eﬀects for those entering
the labor market after and before 1975, respectively, are given by
Ksm;k(ca;t) = ±k;1;smc2
a;t + ±k;2;smc3
a;t + ±k;3;smc4
a;t; k 2 fafter,beforeg; s 2 fl;hg: (3.4)
The terms Ri;a;t capture polynomial interaction terms between age and cohorts in the time
derivative of rsm;a;t as deﬁned in MaCurdy and Mroz (1995).6
As a second speciﬁcation, we use polynomials of order four in time instead of time dummies. In
both speciﬁcations separability of age and time eﬀects on the wage diﬀerentials holds if °i;sm = 0
for all i. Under this assumption, additive models can be valid representations. Uniform growth
in wage ratios holds if additionally the pure eﬀects for the cohorts after 1975 are equal to zero:
°i;sm = ±after;j;sm = 0 for all i;j. In this case, the existence of cohort eﬀects is denied for those
whose entire working life cycle falls into the observation period. Finally, one may test whether
even older cohorts do not face any cohort eﬀects: °i;sm = ±after;j;sm = ±before;h;sm = 0 for all
h;i;j; see MaCurdy and Mroz (1995) for further details.
5 It is natural to set the linear cohort eﬀect to zero because in a model with separable age and time eﬀects and
only a linear cohort eﬀect, one only observes parallel shifts of the cross-sectional age proﬁles over time; see
Fitzenberger, Hujer, MaCurdy, and Schnabel (2001).
6 Adapted to our notation, the integrals of interaction terms up to second order are given by R1;a;t = ca;ta
2
a;t=2+
a
3
a;t=3, R2;a;t = c
2
a;ta
2
a;t=2+2a
3
a;tca;t=3+a
4
a;t=4, R3;a;t = ca;ta
3
a;t=3+a
4
a;t=4, and R4;a;t = c
2
a;ta
3
a;t=3+a
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a;tca;t=2+
a
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The approach is also applied to test for the existence of cohort eﬀects in the employment dimen-
sion suggested by the graphical inspection in section 3.2.2. In this case, rsm;a;t in equation (3.3)
is replaced by ln(Ls;a;t=Lm;a;t).
The detailed estimation results for the cohort eﬀects and the associated tests can be found in
tables 3.6 and 3.7 in appendix 3.B. Our major ﬁndings are that there is evidence for cohort eﬀects
in skill wage diﬀerentials as well as in relative employment measures.7 Yet additive separability
of age, time, and cohort eﬀects in the evolution of wage diﬀerentials does not have to be rejected.
Based on these results, the estimation of the structural model introduced and discussed in the
subsequent section is in fact justiﬁed.
3.4 Estimation Framework
Building on the stylized facts, we follow CL in applying a model based on the two-level CES
production function developed by Sato (1967). The model treats not only workers with diﬀerent
educational attainment, but—well in line with the conjectures of Freeman (1979) and Welch
(1979)—also similarly educated workers of diﬀerent age as imperfect substitutes. Given factor
remunerations according to their respective marginal products, it can be transformed into relative
wage equations which permit to separate age, time, and cohort eﬀects on the wage gaps—and
therefore provides an analytical framework to link the stylized facts outlined above.
Our study extends the analysis of CL in several directions. First, we consider the three skill
groups introduced above. Second, we do not only look at skill premia, but also take account of
age premia implied by the model. When estimating the model, these two points require system
estimation techniques. Third, we additionally allow for the possibility of cohort eﬀects in age-
speciﬁc productivity terms. Fourth, we are concerned with possible endogeneity of employment
and estimate the model with and without instrumental variables.
3.4.1 The Two-Level CES Model
The Sato (1967) framework suggests a CES model of aggregate production yt:
yt =
³
µl;tL
½
l;t + µm;tL
½
m;t + µh;tL
½
h;t
´ 1
½ ; (3.5)
7 Since the restrictive decomposition of cohort and age eﬀects in equation (3.2) following CL is rejected, we do
not discuss the associated results. Though, if accepted as such, this approach suggests the existence of cohort
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where Ls;t, the measures of employment in skill group s and period t, themselves are CES
subaggregates of the skill- and time-speciﬁc employment quantities Ls;a;t of individuals in age
groups a:
Ls;t =
"
X
a
Ás;aL¼
s;a;t
# 1
¼
; s 2 fl;m;hg: (3.6)
The productivity parameters µs;t covering the usual CES distribution parameters as well as the
(relative) eﬃciency terms of the diﬀerent skill groups are allowed to vary over time to capture
(skill-biased) technical change, and Ás;a map the productivities of the diﬀerent age classes within
the skill classes.8 ¾S = 1=(1 ¡ ½) and ¾A = 1=(1 ¡ ¼) denote the elasticity of substitution
between two skill groups and the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent age groups within
the same skill group, respectively.
Let wages be determined by the respective marginal products:
ws;a;t
w~ s;~ a;t
=
@yt
@Ls;a;t
@yt
@L~ s;~ a;t
=
µs;t ¢ L
½¡¼
s;t ¢ y
1¡½
t ¢ Ás;a ¢ L¼¡1
s;a;t
µ~ s;t ¢ L
½¡¼
~ s;t ¢ y
1¡½
t ¢ Á~ s;~ a ¢ L¼¡1
~ s;~ a;t
(3.7)
for all s; ~ s 2 fl;m;hg and a;~ a 2 f27;:::;52g. Then age-speciﬁc skill premia
rs~ s;a;t = ln(ws;a;t=w~ s;a;t) result as
rs~ s;a;t = ln
µ
µs;t
µ~ s;t
¶
+ ln
µ
Ás;a
Á~ s;a
¶
¡
1
¾A
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
L~ s;a;t
¶
+
·
1
¾A
¡
1
¾S
¸
ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶
; s 6= ~ s: (3.8)
Moreover, the production technology speciﬁes the skill-speciﬁc wage premia across age rs;a~ a;t =
ln(ws;a;t=ws;~ a;t) as
rs;a~ a;t = ln
µ
Ás;a
Ás;~ a
¶
¡
1
¾A
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
Ls;~ a;t
¶
; a 6= ~ a: (3.9)
Note that CL base their empirical analysis just on (3.8) whereas our study considers all infor-
mation implied by both (3.8) and (3.9).
The occurrence of perfect substitutability between diﬀerent age groups, i.e., ¾A ! 1, nests the
standard case of a CES with skill groups being homogeneous in the age dimension.9 One would
expect substitutability to be higher within skill groups than across, i.e., ¾A > ¾S. In this case
both age group-speciﬁc relative employment ln(Ls;a;t=L~ s;a;t) and aggregate relative employment
ln(Ls;t=L~ s;t) exert a negative impact on the skill premia in (3.8).
8 Note that the evolution of the relative eﬃciency terms over time captured by trends in µs;t also includes drifts
in the overall eﬃciency of age-speciﬁc labor that are common across all age groups but may vary across skill
classes. Any changes, e.g., in capital endowments aﬀecting the productivity of the diﬀerent skills implicitly
enter this way.
9 Note that this occurrence does not preclude diﬀerences in the productivity parameters Ás;a across age groups.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 61
Moreover, rewriting equation (3.8) as
rs~ s;a;t = ln
µ
µs;t
µ~ s;t
¶
+ ln
µ
Ás;a
Á~ s;a
¶
¡
1
¾S
ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶
¡
1
¾A
·
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
L~ s;a;t
¶
¡ ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶¸
(3.10)
unveils the nature of incorporated cohort eﬀects. If ln(Ls;a;t=L~ s;a;t)¡ln(Ls;t=L~ s;t) varies over time,
there are cohort eﬀects in relative employment in the sense that age-speciﬁc relative employment
evolves diﬀerently from the aggregate measure.10 If, in addition, ¾A is ﬁnite, then diﬀerences in
cohort size aﬀect rs~ s;a;t through the term in brackets.
To show that cohort eﬀects identify ¾A, consider the general decomposition
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
L~ s;a;t
¶
= ~ Ãs~ s;a + ~ ¹s~ s;t¡a + ~ ºs~ s;(a;t¡a) (3.11)
such that the model involves year- (index t), age- (index a), and cohort-speciﬁc (index t ¡ a)
eﬀects. Then,
rs~ s;a;t = ln
µ
µs;t
µ~ s;t
¶
+
·
1
¾A
¡
1
¾S
¸
ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶
+ ln
µ
Ás;a
Á~ s;a
¶
¡
1
¾A
~ Ãs~ s;a
¡
1
¾A
¡
~ ¹s~ s;t¡a + ~ ºs~ s;(a;t¡a)
¢
´ ¸s~ s;t + Ãs~ s;a + ¹s~ s;t¡a + ºs~ s;(a;t¡a); s 6= ~ s: (3.12)
Observe that equations (3.3) and (3.4) used to test for cohort eﬀects in section 3.3 are ﬂexible
parameterizations of (3.12). It is clear that the identiﬁcation of ¾A depends on the existence of
cohort size eﬀects.
By disregarding variations of age-speciﬁc productivity Ás;a over time, any cohort eﬀects found in
the skill wage premia are implicitly attributed to changes in labor quantities. This assumption
is suited in light of our main focus to operationalize the relationship between relative wages and
employment, and it is not contradicted by the test results of section 3.3; compare also Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Welch (1979). Yet we also show how it can be relaxed in section
3.4.3 below.
Apart from being operational for a large number of input factors, being consistent with a neo-
classical production function is a great merit of the CES framework. The two-level CES oﬀers
the additional advantage that it accounts for an important aspect of heterogeneity within the
skill groups: Workers of diﬀerent age are allowed to be imperfect substitutes.11
10 This is what has been tested explicitly in section 3.3 using the MaCurdy and Mroz (1995) approach.62 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
3.4.2 Empirical Implementation
Equations (3.8) and (3.9) specify all wage ratios rs~ s;a~ a;t across skill and age groups for given t;
see ﬁgure 3.1.12
Figure 3.1: System Structure of Wage Ratios
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Knots: input factors. Solid lines: age-speciﬁc skill wage premia; dashed lines: skill-speciﬁc age premia.
The solid lines correspond to the age-speciﬁc skill wage premia in equation (3.8), the dashed lines
to the skill-speciﬁc age premia in equation (3.9). With a total of 3£6 = 18 input factors (knots),
the system implies 6 £ 3 = 18 age-speciﬁc skill premia plus 3 £ 5(5 ¡ 1)=2 = 45 skill-speciﬁc
age premia, adding up to 63 possible equations. However, there are only 17 independent wage
ratios (lines). The additional 46 ratios are redundant in the sense that they can be expressed
by means of the 17 independent ones.13 For example, the wage diﬀerential between high-skilled
and medium-skilled workers on the one hand and the diﬀerential between medium-skilled and
low-skilled on the other hand add up to the diﬀerential between the high-skilled and the low-
skilled, i.e., rhl;a;t = rhm;a;t + rml;a;t. Analogously, age premia add up; for example, rs;3727;t =
rs;3732;t + rs;3227;t.
The adding-up constraints translate to cross-equation restrictions in the estimation of the system.
Our basic approach is to estimate the full-rank system (17 ratios) by means of Feasible GLS
11 Prima facie, one might judge the model’s functional form restrictive. In particular, the elasticities of sub-
stitution between (identically skilled) workers of diﬀerent age are restricted to be all equal, so that, say, a
55-year-old executive can be replaced by an experienced 50-year-old as well as by a 25-year-young entrant.
However, the model is well-suited to tell apart the eﬀects of the two dimensions age and time. In contrast
to feasible translog systems, for example, its age£time dimensioning allows to incorporate a relatively large
number of input factors. For discussions on functional speciﬁcation and aggregation see, e.g., Koebel (2005).
12 One could also write down wage ratios across time based on the CES production function. However, the
output in diﬀerent time periods yt would not cancel.
13 There exist even more redundant wage ratios across both age and skill (rs~ s;a~ a;t, s 6= ~ s, a 6= ~ a).Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 63
(FGLS).14 In order to achieve invariance with respect to the choice of the excluded equations,
we estimate the 63-equation system by System OLS (SOLS) at the ﬁrst stage. As compared to
the approaches pursued in the literature so far, the inclusion of equations for age premia (3.9)
promises more accurate estimation of, in particular, ¾A. The following paragraphs describe the
estimation strategy in more detail.
The two-level CES basically entails nonlinear system equations. However, estimation can be
achieved by estimating linear models in three steps:15
(1) Estimate the equation system
rs~ s;a;t = bs~ s;a + ds~ s;t ¡
1
¾A
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
L~ s;a;t
¶
+ ²s~ s;a;t; s 6= ~ s (3.13)
rs;a~ a;t = bs;a~ a ¡
1
¾A
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
Ls;~ a;t
¶
+ ²s;a~ a;t; a 6= ~ a (3.14)
to obtain an estimate for 1
¾A, which is equal across equations. At this step, the ﬁrst-
stage SOLS contains the full set of 63 equations, but the system rank, i.e., the number of
equations estimated in the second stage of FGLS, is reduced to 15: in comparison with the
above number of 17 independent ratios, one additional degree is lost for each of the two
estimated skill ratios due to the inclusion of the skill-speciﬁc time dummies ds~ s;t.
(2) SOLS estimation of the 18-equation system
ln(ws;a;t) +
1
^ ¾A
ln(Ls;a;t) = ds;t + ln(Ás;a) + ²s;a;t (3.15)
then provides estimates of Ás;a and allows to calculate the skill group aggregates Ls;t deﬁned
in (3.6).
(3) Finally, the entire model—equations (3.9) and (3.10) extended by additive error terms—
can be estimated, using the generated aggregates and taking account of the cross-equations
restrictions concerning 1=¾A and 1=¾S. Again, ﬁrst-stage SOLS employs all 63 equations,
but now FGLS uses 17 equations as explained above.
FGLS makes use of the covariance of the error terms across equations within a year. The relative
productivity of workers over time, ln(µs;t=µ~ s;t), is assumed to follow a linear time trend. This
14 As will become evident below, there are also cross-equation restrictions within the non-redundant part.
15 In general, the model can be estimated in one step using nonlinear techniques. Following CL, we proceed in
three steps to avoid numerical diﬃculties. This is the only viable alternative because we apply bootstrapping
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approach captures the steady demand hypothesis (Acemoglu, 2002)—the steady shift towards a
higher relative demand for more highly skilled labor reﬂects a constant rate of SBTC.16
Concerning the age-productivity within skill groups, Ás;a, two speciﬁcations are possible: First,
ln(Ás;a=Á~ s;a) and ln(Ás;a=Ás;~ a) can be estimated freely at the third step, using age dummies in
analogy to the ﬁrst step (model version (a)). Alternatively, Ás;a may be treated as predetermined
by the estimate from the second step (model version (b)). Furthermore, a version (c) would treat
¾A at the third step as predetermined by ﬁrst-step estimate, and ﬁnally, both Ás;a and ¾A can
be taken as predetermined from previous steps (version (d)). We compare the four versions (a)
to (d) in a Monte Carlo study in appendix 3.C. By and large, version (a) performs best in terms
of closest point estimates and minimum root mean squared error. All of our estimations thus
use this speciﬁcation.
To account for estimation error in all steps of the estimation approach, we obtain bootstrap
standard errors (details can be found in appendix 3.D). This is crucial because the third step
estimates are based on the generated regressor Ls;t.
3.4.3 Model Relaxations and Extensions
We consider two types of model relaxations (speciﬁcation tests) of the tight speciﬁcation of the
production technology introduced in section 3.4.1. First, we allow for elasticities of substitution
between age groups being diﬀerent across skill groups by replacing (3.6) with
Ls;t =
"
X
a
Ás;aL¼s
s;a;t
# 1
¼s
; s 2 fl;m;hg: (3.16)
The third step now estimates
rs~ s;a;t = bs~ s;a + ¯s~ st ¡
1
¾S
ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶
¡
1
¾As
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
Ls;t
¶
+
1
¾A~ s
ln
µ
L~ s;a;t
L~ s;t
¶
+²s~ s;a;t (3.17)
rs;a~ a;t = bs;a~ a ¡
1
¾As
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
Ls;~ a;t
¶
+ ²s;a~ a;t: (3.18)
This relaxation is quite plausible and the hypothesis ¾As = ¾A for all s 2 fl;m;hg is easily
tested.
16 See also Murphy and Welch (1992, 2001) and Card and DiNardo (2002) regarding the pros and cons of this
hypothesis. We also experimented with modeling breaks in SBTC which might have resulted from German
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A second relaxation, regarding additionally the uniform elasticity of substitution between skill
groups, can be implemented at the third step replacing (3.9), (3.10) by
rs~ s;a;t=bs~ s;a+¯s~ st¡
1
¾Ss
ln(Ls;t)+
1
¾S~ s
ln(L~ s;t)¡
1
¾As
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
Ls;t
¶
+
1
¾A~ s
ln
µ
L~ s;a;t
L~ s;t
¶
+²s~ s;a;t (3.19)
rs;a~ a;t=bs;a~ a ¡
1
¾As
ln
µ
Ls;at
Ls;~ at
¶
+ ²s;a~ a;t (3.20)
and testing whether ¾Ss = ¾S for all s 2 fl;m;hg. Note however that this ad hoc relaxation
abandons the theoretical consistency of the model and has to be viewed as a speciﬁcation test.
The parameters ¾Ss are no longer elasticities of substitution.
The model speciﬁcations discussed so far are referred to as “benchmark version (i)”. Next, we
describe the model versions (ii) to (ix) which are estimated as extensions of (i) as part of our
extensive sensitivity analysis. Table 3.8 in the appendix conveniently summarizes all estimated
versions.
As discussed in section 3.4.1, a further type of cohort eﬀects could arise if age-speciﬁc productivity
Ás;a were allowed to vary with time. This case would match an age bias in the evolution of the
returns to (i.e., the price of) experience over time: There might be diﬀerential trends in the
relative productivity of diﬀerent age groups thus implying an age/cohort bias in technological
progress (see footnote 8). The separability of these particular productivity components from the
time eﬀects captured by the educational skill measure µs;t has to rely on further functional form
assumptions; cf. the discussion about the identiﬁcation of cohort eﬀects in section 3.3. A simple
and convenient form is to assume multiplicative interaction of age or cohort and time. Then,
equation (3.6) is replaced by
Ls;t =
"
X
a
Ás;a exp(±szt)L¼
s;a;t
# 1
¼
; s 2 fl;m;hg; (3.21)
where z = a (version (ii)) or z = t ¡ a (version (iii)), respectively. Then, equations (3.9), (3.10)
become
rs~ s;a;t = bs~ s;a+¯s~ st+(±s¡±~ s)zt¡
1
¾S
ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶
¡
1
¾A
·
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
L~ s;a;t
¶
¡ ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶¸
+²s~ s;a;t (3.22)
rs;a~ a;t = bs;a~ a + ±s(z ¡ ~ z)t ¡
1
¾A
ln
µ
Ls;a;t
Ls;~ a;t
¶
+ ²s;a~ a;t; (3.23)
where ~ z = ~ a (version (ii)) or ~ z = t¡~ a (version (iii)), respectively. We test for signiﬁcance of the
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Further sensitivity tests are straightforward. Following CL, we estimate the limited information
version (iv) which involves estimating solely equation (3.10) for skill wage diﬀerentials but dis-
regards the skill-speciﬁc age premia (3.9). Version (v) excludes the youngest group of university
graduates (25 to 29 years old) because the descriptive results in section 3.2.2 showed quite dif-
ferent trends for this group. Version (vi) examines possible breaks in the SBTC trends caused
by German uniﬁcation in 1990.
As comparison with a traditional CES model we estimate model version (vii) with ¾A being
restricted to inﬁnity. Focusing on the estimation of ¾S, this version still allows for productivity
diﬀerences across age. Moreover, we estimate a traditional CES model (version (viii))
rs~ s;t = constants~ s + ¯s~ st ¡
1
¾S
ln
µ
Ls;t
L~ s;t
¶
+ ²s~ s;t; s 6= ~ s; (3.24)
again testing for uniqueness of ¾S. Here, time-speciﬁc mean wage diﬀerences rs~ s;t = ln(ws;t=w~ s;t)
are calculated as a weighted average
rs~ s;t =
1
Ls;t + L~ s;t
X
a
(Ls;a;t + L~ s;a;t)(!s;a;t ¡ !~ s;a;t); s 6= ~ s (3.25)
of time- and age-speciﬁc diﬀerences !s;a;t pre-estimated by period speciﬁc Tobit regressions
ln(wt) =
X
s
X
a
!s;a;t ¢ ds;a;t + controlst + ²t ; (3.26)
where ds;a;t indicate dummies for the diﬀerent skill£age groups. Alternatively, version (ix)
obtains skill diﬀerentials rsm;t directly from standard regressions which include separate skill
and age dummies:
ln(wt) = rlm;t ¢ dl;t + rhm;t ¢ dh;t +
X
a
$a;t ¢ da;t + controlst + ²t: (3.27)
In contrast to the previous versions, (viii) and (ix) average out the age dimension before estimat-
ing the elasticity of substitution and Ls;t measures aggregate employment as a headcount rather
than in eﬃciency units. Hence, the resulting elasticities should be comparable to those found in
the literature for employment in persons.
3.4.4 Endogeneity of Employment
The diﬀerent measures of employment (headcounts for Ls;a;t and eﬃciency units for Ls;t) are
crucial here. The estimation approach builds on inverting labor demand and the literature (e.g.,
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being inelastic in the short run. Market clearing is highly questionable in the case of Germany,
since it disregards unemployment driving a wedge between demand and supply of labor.
Moreover, both observed wage premia, i.e., the relative price of skilled labor, as well as observed
relative employment generally result as outcomes of all labor market processes—and should
therefore be treated as endogenous in the empirical implementation. Endogeneity of employ-
ment follows, for instance, in wage-setting models with right-to-manage (RTM) assumption or
eﬃcient bargaining, in which wage bargaining takes account of the ﬁrms’ employment decisions
(McDonald and Solow, 1981, Nickell and Andrews, 1983,, or Arnsperger and de la Croix, 1990).
Under the RTM assumption—in contrast to eﬃcient bargaining—observations on wages and em-
ployment lie on the demand curve. Then, the coeﬃcient on relative employment ¡1=¾ in any of
the models above represents the (negative) relationship between wage premia rs~ s = ln(ws=w~ s)
and relative employment ln(Ls=L~ s) on the demand schedule. Unobserved shocks in output de-
mand aﬀect wages and employment in the same direction. Such shocks render relative employ-
ment endogenous and dilute the negative labor demand relation. Least squares estimation then
yields (in absolute terms) downward-biased estimates of the true relationship or, put diﬀerently,
upward-biased estimates for the elasticity of substitution ¾.
As a remedy, we implement an instrumental variable (IV) approach. As instruments, we use
measures of labor supply, which is assumed inelastic in the short run, possibly due to past
human capital investment (Katz and Autor, 1999 and CL).17 We compile measures of skill£age-
speciﬁc labor force numbers L
supply
s;a;t and aggregate numbers L
supply
s;t =
P
a L
supply
s;a;t from German
Microcensus data available at the Federal Statistical Oﬃce and estimate a system of IV equations
with equation-speciﬁc instruments as follows.
To instrument age-speciﬁc employment Ls;a;t at the ﬁrst and the third step of the estimation
approach, we have the 3 £ 6 = 18-equation system
ln(Ls;a;t) = ®s;a + ds;t +
X
~ s
®~ ss ln
³
L
supply
~ s;a;t
´
+ ²s;a;t (3.28)
with skill£age-speciﬁc intercepts ®s;a, skill-speciﬁc time dummies ds;t, and the impact ®~ ss of
the excluded instruments L
supply
~ s;a;t .18 The system (3.28) is also estimated ﬁrst by SOLS and sub-
sequently by FGLS in order to increase eﬃciency.19 We then use predicted employment values
^ Ls;a;t from (3.28) at the ﬁrst and at the third step of the estimation approach; see appendix 3.D
for estimation of the covariance of this sequential estimator.
17 Accounting for the endogeneity of relative employment is also crucial as traditional demand analysis treats
prices/wages as exogenous (Hamermesh, 1993).
18 For versions (ii) and (iii), the equations of (3.28) also involve the terms ®sat and ®s(t ¡ a)t, respectively.68 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
At the third step, we additionally instrument aggregate employment Ls;t based on
ln(Ls;t) = ®s + ¯st +
X
~ s
®~ ss ln
³
L
supply
~ s;t
´
+ ²s;t (3.29)
with skill-speciﬁc intercepts ®s, skill-speciﬁc linear time trends ¯st, and ®~ ss as coeﬃcients of
the excluded instruments L
supply
~ s;t .20 In this case, there are no cross-equation restrictions and the
estimation by SOLS and FGLS is straightforward. Predicted values ^ Ls;t based on (3.29) are used
at the third step of the estimation approach.
Results for the IV equations and tests for signiﬁcance of the excluded instruments are displayed
in tables 3.12 and 3.13 in appendix 3.B. The excluded instruments are jointly signiﬁcant both
for age-speciﬁc employment and aggregate employment, which we take as suﬃcient evidence in
favor of our IV estimation approach. Note, however, that lack of individual signiﬁcance is often
the case, especially for aggregate employment.
3.5 Estimation Results
We estimate the model versions (i) to (ix) described in section 3.4.3 (see table 3.8 for a short
description). Tables 3.9 to 3.11 comprise the estimates of the substitution parameters estimated
at the ﬁrst and at the third step and report the results of speciﬁcation tests.
3.5.1 Preferred Speciﬁcations
Table 3.1 shows estimates of our preferred speciﬁcations (i), (ii), and (iii). Recall that version (i)
is the benchmark speciﬁcation and versions (ii) and (iii) allow for cohort eﬀects in age-speciﬁc
productivity.
In eﬀect, the estimated elasticity ¾A usually proves ﬁnite, meaning that the estimated 1=¾A is
signiﬁcantly positive: Employees of diﬀerent age are imperfect substitutes. The structural model
consistently mirrors the dimensions of cohort eﬀects uncovered by the descriptive inspection in
section 3.2. The preferred speciﬁcations in table 3.1 let the elasticity between age groups ¾As vary
across skill classes (relaxation 1), but stick to a single elasticity of substitution across skill classes
¾S. The assumption of identical ¾A turns out overly restrictive in almost all cases; compare the
19 Due to the cross-equation restrictions for the time dummies ds;t, the rank of the system covariance matrix is
reduced to 15, which does not allow us to estimate freely all age speciﬁc intercepts ®s;a with FGLS. Therefore,
we replace the skill£age dummies ®s;a with skill-speciﬁc age polynomials of order three. The SOLS estimates
for ®s;a do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from polynomials of order three in age.
20 In case of the model version (iv), the equations of (3.29) further include skill-speciﬁc breaks in the linear time
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Table 3.1: Elasticities of Substitution, Preferred Speciﬁcations of the Nested CES
model version (i) (ii) (iii)
Estimation FGLS FGLS-IV FGLS FGLS-IV FGLS FGLS-IV
l 8.58 10.31 9.18 9.44 9.20 8.68
(0.67) (1.64) (0.74) (1.62) (0.74) (1.40)
¾A m 4.81 5.27 5.23 6.01 5.22 5.38
(0.32) (0.66) (0.38) (0.86) (0.37) (0.73)
h 19.52 20.13 10.36 8.50 10.15 8.59
(5.87) (11.11) (1.98) (2.57) (1.83) (2.63)
¾S 9.36 6.15 9.49 6.97 6.32 4.91
(0.91) (2.87) (0.93) (2.85) (0.55) (1.54)
Model versions: (i) benchmark model; (ii) with age£time interaction in age-speciﬁc productivity; (iii) with
cohort£time interaction in age-speciﬁc productivity. Standard errors in parentheses based on 500 bootstrap
repetitions. Bold numbers: Elasticities ﬁnite (inverses signiﬁcant at 0.95 level). Data sources: IABS 1975–1997,
German Microcensus.
test results in tables 3.9 and 3.10. However, diﬀerences in ¾Ss across skill groups are signiﬁcant
in most cases for FGLS, but no so for FGLS-IV. Moreover, the restricted FGLS-estimate for ¾S
provides reasonable estimates of the average ¾Ss. Imposing the restriction of a uniform ¾Ss does
not aﬀect ¾As in a noticeable way. For these reasons, we will focus on the restricted estimates.
Regarding instrumentation, we ﬁnd only little diﬀerences in the point estimates for ¾As. Yet
the IV estimates for ¾S are considerably reduced. Along the reasoning of the previous section,
unobserved shocks aﬀect particularly aggregate relative employment, rendering this measure
endogenous and estimation of ¾S without instruments inconsistent. Not surprisingly, though,
the estimated standard errors are higher in case of IV estimation such that in some cases ¾S is
not statistically diﬀerent from 1.21
Our estimates of ¾S, ranging from 4.9 to 6.9 in case of IV, imply a rather high degree of sub-
stitutability compared to ﬁndings in the related literature; cf. the surveys in Hamermesh (1993)
and Katz and Autor (1999). CL report elasticities of substitution between college graduates and
high school graduates for Canada, the UK, and the US between 2 and 2.5.22 In international
comparison, our high elasticities are likely to reﬂect the small amount of over-all wage dispersion
21 Large standard errors of our estimates may result for various reasons: First, the aggregate employment
measures included at the third step are pre-generated regressors, the variation of which the bootstrap procedure
takes account of. Second, FGLS instrumentation has to account for the estimation error in earlier estimation
steps. Third, we lose precision by instrumentation. The labor force numbers taken to instrument employment
do not diﬀer strongly from linear time trends such that especially ¾S, the coeﬃcient of predicted aggregate
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as well as the more compressed distribution of skills in Germany; cf. Nickell and Bell (1996)
and Freeman and Schettkat (2001). Comparable studies for Germany also take account of three
skill types, but they ﬁnd elasticities not higher than 3.6.23 Diﬀerences in the estimates may be
attributed to the selection of data or the model’s functional form. We address this issue when
discussing additional model speciﬁcations in the next section.
Employees with diﬀerent skill levels are more diﬃcult to substitute than those with identical skill
levels. The substitutability across diﬀerent age groups with values of ¾As between 5.3 and 8.6
(version (iii), IV) is lowest among the medium-skilled.24 This ﬁnding supports the view that low-
skilled employees, mainly in positions which do not require intensive training, can be substituted
relatively easily. Contrary to the hypothesis that substitutability between young and old workers
diminishes (monotonically) with educational attainment (Welch, 1979),25 an analogous reasoning
applies to university graduates of diﬀerent age, whose education is often said to provide them
with a high competence in general problem solving. Workers with a vocational degree, however,
qualify for speciﬁc tasks such that, say, younger colleagues can substitute older workers less
easily.
3.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 3.9 to 3.11 report the results for all diﬀerent model versions. First of all, table 3.11
reports the outcomes of models which assume perfect substitution across age classes. Estimates
of the nested CES with ¾A restricted to inﬁnity at the third step (version (vii)) as well as from
the CES model (viii), which still incorporates age£skill speciﬁc intercepts, are very close to the
22 Other studies quantifying elasticities for the US present ¾-estimates within a similar range: Autor, Katz,
and Kearney (2005b), also applying a nested CES model, report elasticities around 1.6. Bound and Johnson
(1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) report 1.8, 1.4, and
1.7, respectively. Ciccone and Peri (2005) prefer a span between 1.2 and 2.2, and Stapleton and Young (1988)
note a value of 3.0.
23 Fitzenberger and Franz (2001) estimate elasticities of substitution between medium- and low-skilled of 0.6–1.4
for manufacturing and of 3.0–3.6 for non-manufacturing industries, while Steiner and Wagner (1998b) and
Steiner and Mohr (2000) report values for all three classes of merely 0.3–0.5 for manufacturing and 1.4 for
construction and transportation. Falk and Koebel (1999, 2002) ﬁnd at most substitutability between medium-
and low-skilled employees, whereas Koebel, Falk, and Laisney (2003) bilaterally classify high- and medium-
skilled as well as medium- and low-skilled as substitutes, but they ﬁnd complementarity between low- and
high-skilled employees. Entorf (1996) ﬁnds elasticities between 0.5 and 1.5 for blue and white collar workers
and Beißinger and Möller (1998) of 1.8 for males and 3.3 for females.
24 ¾Am even turns out lower than ¾S in several speciﬁcations reported in tables 3.9 and 3.10.
25 Studies for the US report a much higher degree of substitutability between age classes within the group of
high school graduates than among those with a college degree: Freeman (1979) ﬁnds elasticities of 14 and 2,
respectively (even if the estimated reciprocals of both values show insigniﬁcant). Stapleton and Young (1988)
note amounts of 73.6 (reciprocal insigniﬁcant) and 2.5. CL do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences, though.
They report signiﬁcantly ﬁnite values of ¾A in the range of 4–6. Our higher estimates then reﬂect a higher
degree of homogeneity within the skill groups deﬁned for Germany, compared to that within the college and
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results above. However, we get lower estimates of ¾S between 3.7 (IV) and 4.9 (no IV) from a
traditional CES model (ix), which does not allow for age£skill interaction. On the one hand,
the fact that the latter estimate is still relatively high in comparison with the literature suggests
that prime age males are indeed a relatively homogeneous group. On the other hand, the ﬁnding
that all speciﬁcations (i) to (viii) yield higher elasticities than the more restrictive version (ix)
warrants the conclusion that models (including those in the literature) disregarding diﬀerences
in the relative productivity of the diﬀerent age classes incorrectly attribute too much variation
in (relative) wages to changes in (relative) employment.
Second, disregarding the equations for age premia as in version (iv) in table 3.10 basically leaves
¾S unchanged, while estimates for ¾A increase. Since this approach does not use the full infor-
mation content of the system, we consider these results to be less reliable.
Third, the additional interaction terms in versions (ii) and (iii) in table 3.9 are signiﬁcant in most
cases. Thus, there is evidence for cohort eﬀects in age-speciﬁc relative productivities in addition
to the cohort eﬀects in relative employment. Yet the resulting elasticities are comparable to
those obtained from the benchmark model (i). If anything, ¾Ah is lower in the versions with
interactions (ii) and (iii).
Fourth, while we have so far assumed a constant rate of SBTC, we also estimated breaks in
the linear time trends to capture a possible slowdown or an increase in SBTC resulting from
German uniﬁcation. The corresponding breaks generally turned out insigniﬁcant; see the results
for version (vi) in table 3.10. Finally, the results do not change notably either when we exclude
the particular group of 25–29-year-old university graduates26 from the analysis; see version (v)
in table 3.10. We are thus somewhat conﬁdent about the results of our preferred speciﬁcations
in table 3.1.
3.6 Simulation Experiments
In light of the ongoing policy debate about cures for unemployment and the creation of employ-
ment, estimates from the above structural model can be used to assess the eﬀect of wage changes
on employment by means of simulation experiments.
First, and similar to the experiment conducted by Fitzenberger and Franz (2001), we estimate
the magnitude of wage changes in the three skill groups that would be necessary to induce, say,
a reduction of unemployment rates by one half in all three skill groups. Due to the particularly
high unemployment rate among the low-skilled,27 this design enquires about a disproportionately
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sizeable increase in employment of that deprived group, and thus is of high policy relevance. The
relative wage changes are assumed to be equal for all age groups within the respective skill groups:
¢ln(ws;a) = ¢ln( ¹ ws) for all a. While allowing for relative changes between skill groups, this
leaves the wage structure within skill groups unaﬀected.
The calculations are done for the latest available year 1997. The time index t is omitted for
notational simplicity. We use a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of overall employment in each
skill group s as the sum of employment in the respective age groups a:
L¤
s =
X
a
L¤
s;a =
X
a
Ã
Ls;a +
X
~ s
X
~ a
@Ls;a
@ ln(w~ s;~ a)
¢ln(w~ s;~ a)
!
; s 2 fl;m;hg; (3.30)
where L¤
s, L¤
s;a are the employment targets consistent with the goal to reduce unemployment
rates by one half. Drawing on the wage elasticity of labor demand
´s~ s;a~ a =
@Ls;a
@w~ s;~ a
w~ s;~ a
Ls;a
=
@ ln(Ls;a)
@ ln(w~ s;~ a)
=
@Ls;a
@ ln(w~ s;~ a)
1
Ls;a
; (3.31)
equation (3.30) can be written in terms of relative changes:
¢Ls
Ls
=
L¤
s ¡ Ls
Ls
=
X
a
Ls;a
Ls
X
~ s
X
~ a
´s~ s;a~ a¢ln(w~ s;~ a): (3.32)
The relationship between wage elasticities ´s~ s;a~ a, Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution ¾s~ s;a~ a,
and cost shares Ss;a implied by cost minimizing behavior of employers is given by
´s~ s;a~ a = S~ s;~ a¾s~ s;a~ a + S~ s;~ a´ for a 6= ~ a _ s 6= ~ s; (3.33)
where ´ denotes the price elasticity of product demand and
´ss;aa = ´ ¡
X
~ s
X
~ a6=a
´s~ s;a~ a ¡
X
~ s6=s
´s~ s;aa = Ss;a´ ¡
X
~ s
X
~ a6=a
S~ s;~ a¾s~ s;a~ a ¡
X
~ s6=s
S~ s;a¾s~ s;aa; (3.34)
see, e.g., Hamermesh (1993). Based on the nested CES production function, inter-class Allen-
Uzawa partial elasticities of substitution and intra-class elasticities,28 write
¾s~ s;a~ a = ¾S for s 6= ~ s; and ¾ss;a~ a = ¾S +
1
Ss
(¾A ¡ ¾S) for a 6= ~ a: (3.35)
27 The skill-speciﬁc and age-speciﬁc rates of unemployment in West Germany our simulations make use of are
displayed in appendix 3.A.
28 For model relaxation (3.16), ¾A in equation (3.35) has to be replaced by ¾As.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 73
On principle, cost shares for the nested CES model can be derived directly from the model via
Shepard’s Lemma as functions of the productivity parameters µs and Ás;a and wages ws;a; cf., for
example, Chung (1994). Yet the actual calculation fails this way due to the underidentiﬁcation
of the productivity parameters. Hence, we employ observed cost shares
Ss;a =
ws;aLs;a P
~ s
P
~ a w~ s;~ aL~ s;~ a
and Ss =
X
a
Ss;a: (3.36)
The targeted relative change of employment can be inferred from the unemployment rates urs =
Us=WFs = 1¡Ls=WFs, where Us and WFs denote unemployment and work force in skill group
s, respectively:
¢Ls
Ls
=
L¤
s ¡ Ls
Ls
=
(0:5WFs + 0:5Ls) ¡ Ls
Ls
= 0:5
urs
1 ¡ urs
: (3.37)
As ´ we take a weighted average of the elasticities estimated by Fitzenberger and Franz (2001)
separately for the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector, with employment ratios in
the respective sectors as weights.
Since we set ¢ln(ws;a) = ¢ln( ¹ ws) for all a, the system (3.32) yields unique solutions for the
necessary wage changes based on our estimation results. The calculation of standard errors is
based on the errors of the estimated parameters.
Alternatively, one might be interested in changes of the wage structure within the skill groups,
holding the structure across the respective groups constant. In this context, the model set-
up allows us to answer the question how the wages for employees of diﬀerent age would have
to change—identically in all skill groups—to reduce all age-speciﬁc unemployment rates ura =
Ua=WFa = 1 ¡ La=WFa by one half.
In analogy to (3.30), we write
L¤
a =
X
s
L¤
s;a =
X
s
Ã
Ls;a +
X
~ s
X
~ a
@Ls;a
@ ln(w~ s;~ a)
¢ln(w~ s;~ a)
!
; a 2 f27;:::;52g: (3.38)
Now assuming ¢ln(ws;a) = ¢ln( ¹ wa) for all s, the system
¢La
La
=
L¤
a ¡ La
La
=
X
s
Ls;a
La
X
~ s
X
~ a
´s~ s;a~ a¢ln( ¹ w~ a) (3.39)
can be solved for the necessary wage changes within the skill groups.
To evaluate the respective real magnitudes of the wage changes, we calculate the price adjust-
ments induced by the nominal wage reductions. Here, the assumption of proﬁt maximizing74 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
behavior under monopolistic competition takes account of endogenous output eﬀects. We con-
sider the Amoroso-Robinson relation for the output price level p and a constant elasticity of
product demand ´,
µ
1 +
1
´
¶
p = MC; such that dln(p) = dln(MC); (3.40)
with marginal costs
MC =
X
s
X
a
ws;a
@Ls;a
@y
=
X
s
X
a
ws;a
Ls;a
y
@Ls;a
@y
y
Ls;a
=
X
s
X
a
ws;aLs;a
y
: (3.41)
The last equality in (3.41) follows from the constant returns to scale assumption. Relative price
changes then arise from (3.40) as
dln(p) =
P
s
P
a
Ls;aws;a
y dln(ws;a)
P
~ s
P
~ a
L~ s;~ aw~ s;~ a
y
=
X
s
X
a
Ls;aws;a P
~ s
P
~ a L~ s;~ aw~ s;~ a
dln(ws;a): (3.42)
Now let ¢ln(ws;a) = ¢ln( ¹ ws) for all a in the ﬁrst experiment. Then,
¢ln(p) =
X
s
¢ln( ¹ ws)
X
a
Ls;aws;a P
~ s
P
~ a L~ s;~ aw~ s;~ a
: (3.43)
In the second experiment, ¢ln(ws;a) = ¢ln( ¹ wa) for all s, and so
¢ln(p) =
X
a
¢ln( ¹ wa)
X
s
Ls;aws;a P
~ s
P
~ a L~ s;~ aw~ s;~ a
: (3.44)
Table 3.2 displays the outcome of the ﬁrst simulation experiment and compares it to results
obtained in Fitzenberger and Franz (2001).
Considering the employment target of reducing skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates, wages paid are
too high in all skill groups, and the necessary wage reductions—ranging from 8.8 to 12.2%—are
the higher the lower the skill level. This result provides evidence for wage compression across
skill groups. The fact that estimated wage reductions appear rather modest may be ascribed to
at least two reasons: on the one hand to the high wage elasticities resulting from the substantial
elasticities of substitution, and to the assumption of constant returns to scale on the other.
The latter point becomes evident by the comparison of our results to those of Fitzenberger and
Franz (2001): Their speciﬁcation 4, which likewise postulates constant returns to scale, yields
estimates very similar to ours, whilst their unrestricted speciﬁcation 3 indicates higher (nominal)
reductions. The range of dispersion, however, turns out rather similar in all models.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 75
Table 3.2: Wage Changes for Diﬀerent Skill Groups Necessary to Halve Skill-Speciﬁc Unemployment
Rates in 1997 and Induced Price Change
Model ¢ln(wl) ¢ln(wm) ¢ln(wh) ¢ln(p)
(i) FGLSa -0.109 -.093 -0.091 -0.094
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139)
(i) FGLS-IVa -0.117 -0.092 -0.089 -0.094
(0.0175) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0135)
(ii) FGLSa -0.109 -0.093 -0.091 -0.094
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139)
(ii) FGLS-IVa -0.114 -0.093 -0.090 -0.094
(0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0151)
(iii) FGLSa -0.116 -0.092 -0.089 -0.094
(0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139)
(iii) FGLS-IVa -0.122 -0.092 -0.088 -0.094
(0.0173) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0151)
F/F (2001)b -0.141 -0.103 - -0.105
(0.019) (0.020) (-) (0.020)
F/F (2001)c -0.342 -0.313 - -0.314
(0.099) (0.020) (-) (0.020)
a Calculations based on the results displayed in table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses based on 500 bootstrap
repetitions.
b Fitzenberger and Franz (2001), speciﬁcation 4; assumption of constant returns to scale; elasticities of substitution
between the high-skilled on the one hand and medium- and low-skilled on the other restricted to equal 1; no changes
in wages and employment for the high-skilled; results for 1995.
c Fitzenberger and Franz (2001), speciﬁcation 3; elasticities of substitution between the high-skilled on the one
hand and medium- and low-skilled on the other restricted to equal 1; no changes in wages and employment for
the high-skilled; results for 1995.
The induced relative price changes are a weighted average of the wage reductions; compare equa-
tion (3.43). Thus, given our estimates of nominal wage reductions, the high-skilled experience a
real wage increase, whereas the low-skilled face real losses ex constructione.
To put this result into perspective, some remarks are in order: First, the experiment models a
shock to the employment decision of the ﬁrm—we do not attempt to account for supply-side
reactions to the wage changes. Second, capital and other inputs are assumed to be constant, as
well.29 Third, and similarly, the simulation does not consider substitutability with respect to
29 None of the simulations reported in table 3.2 takes into consideration substitution eﬀects with respect to
intermediate inputs or capital stocks. Given capital-skill complementarities, for example, the reported numbers
might overstate actual necessary wage changes. For the importance of capital issues in labor demand cf. Krusell,
Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000).76 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
participants in diﬀerent labor market segments, like women or employees in mini jobs not subject
to social security contributions.
The results of the second experiment, regarding a reduction of age speciﬁc unemployment rates,
are displayed in table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Wage Changes for Diﬀerent Age Groups Necessary to Halve Age-Speciﬁc Unemployment
Rates in 1997 and Induced Price Change
Model ¢ln(w27) ¢ln(w32) ¢ln(w37) ¢ln(w42) ¢ln(w47) ¢ln(w52) ¢ln(p)
(i) FGLS
a -0.087 -0.087 -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128)
(i) FGLS-IV
a -0.087 -0.087 -0.087 -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
(ii) FGLS
a -0.088 -0.087 -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128)
(ii) FGLS-IV
a -0.088 -0.087 -0.087 -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
(iii) FGLS
a -0.088 -0.087 -0.087 -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128)
(iii) FGLS-IV
a -0.088 -0.087 -0.08 -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Calculations based on the results displayed in table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses based on 500 bootstrap
repetitions.
The calculated wage reductions in the diﬀerent age groups are very similar. Yet the small
degree of variation comes as no surprise because the diﬀerences in unemployment rates across
the age classes are rather small. In particular, it has to be recalled that very young as well as
older participants close to (early) retirement age, who can be expected to face deviant labor
market conditions that result in diﬀering unemployment rates, have been excluded from the
analysis. For our sample of prime age males there is no evidence of wage compression across
the age distribution. As to the underlying high elasticities of substitution and concerning the
interpretation of the induced price changes, the same caveats as for the ﬁrst experiment apply.
3.7 Conclusions
The evolution of age-speciﬁc skill wage premia in the German labor market between 1975 and
1997 shows that the age proﬁles of skill wage diﬀerentials have not moved in parallel fashion
over time, but rather experienced a twist. Accordingly, it is unlikely that these developments are
associated merely with age and time eﬀects which apply uniformly to all cohorts. Furthermore,
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that young birth cohorts do not follow the path of the older ones towards further skill upgrading.
The empirical evidence thus suggests the existence of cohort eﬀects aﬀecting the evolution of
both skill wage premia and relative employment. Following the approach suggested in MaCurdy
and Mroz (1995), we ﬁnd such cohort eﬀects for both relative employment and wage premia.
A coherent operationalization of wages and employment in a labor demand framework is generally
diﬃcult due to the heterogeneous nature of the input factor labor. We extend the structural
approach of Card and Lemieux (2001) based on the nested CES model of Sato (1967), giving rise
to a complex picture of German labor demand. On the one hand, the model consistently maps
rational behavior within the framework of neoclassical production theory. On the other hand,
its age£time dimensioning allows to incorporate a relatively large number of input factors. This
way, we analyze wage diﬀerences between 18 types of labor.
The results are compatible with the steady demand hypothesis of a constant rate of SBTC as in
Acemoglu (2002). Moreover, employees of diﬀerent age are found to be imperfect substitutes—
the model indeed takes account of age, time, and cohort eﬀects. Our preferred speciﬁcations
estimate the elasticity of substitution between skill groups to range between 4.9 and 6.9, and the
elasticity of substitution between age groups between 5.2 and 20.1. Compared to the literature,
these numbers are rather high. In international comparison, this ﬁnding reﬂects the fairly small
amount of over-all wage dispersion in Germany as well as the relatively compressed distribution
of skills. In comparison with alternative studies using diﬀerent functional forms to model labor
demand in Germany, we reckon that, on the one hand, our focus on prime age male employees in
the IABS in fact results in a considerably homogeneous sample. On the other hand, approaches
in the literature which disregard the interaction of skill and age are likely to report spuriously
small elasticities.
On the basis of the estimated parameters, simulation experiments allow for policy-relevant im-
plications. We simulate the magnitude of wage changes in the diﬀerent skill groups that would
have been necessary to reduce skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates in 1997 by one half. With wage
changes equal for all age groups within the respective skill classes, this would have left the wage
structure within skill groups unaﬀected. The necessary nominal wage changes range between 8.8
and 12.2% and are the higher the lower the employees’ qualiﬁcation. This ﬁnding provides evi-
dence for the existence of wage compression—relative to a situation with reduced unemployment,
there is too little wage dispersion across the diﬀerent skill groups.
Our analysis shows the necessity to integrate diﬀerent dimensions of heterogeneity into empir-
ically meaningful models of labor demand. The nested CES approach allows to do this in a
parsimonious way. However, it comes at the price of strong functional form assumptions.78 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
As a ﬁnal caveat, it should be mentioned that our neoclassical production function framework
fails to incorporate residual wage inequality that remains within cells deﬁned by skill, age, and
year. Residual wage inequality is a major part of total wage dispersion (Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993) and Fitzenberger, Garloﬀ, and Kohn (2003)). This should be taken account of
in future research on the link between wage diﬀerences and labor demand. Yet no conceptual
framework exists so far to do so.
3.A Data
Throughout the empirical investigation, we make use of the IAB employment subsample (IABS)
1975–1997, a representative 1% random draw of German employees with employment spells
subject to social insurance contributions. Excluding civil servants, self-employed, and freelancers,
the IABS covers about 80% of all employed persons. For an extensive description of these register-
based data see Bender, Hilzendegen, Rohwer, and Rudolph (1996) and Bender, Haas, and Klose
(2000). Selected data at ﬁrst comprise spells of both men and women employed full-time in
West-Germany, excluding parallel employment and training spells.
We restrict attention to prime-age employees between 25 and 55 years to circumvent a number of
sample selection problems. Since the IABS contains no information on hours worked, we under-
take a headcount to derive an employment measure, weighting each observation with the length
of the respective employment spell. This procedure assumes that the number of, say, monthly
hours does not change over time nor does it diﬀer by individual, justifying the concentration on
full-time employees only.
Concerning the wage data, Steiner and Wagner (1997b) report a structural break between 1983
and 1984. In order not to deceivingly interpret this as increasing wage inequality across skill
groups, we apply the correction procedure suggested by Fitzenberger (1999).
Observations are classiﬁed into three skill groups according to the individuals’ educational at-
tainment. The group of the low-skilled consists of employees without any vocational training.
Those with a vocational training degree are considered medium-skilled, and individuals with
a university or technical college degree form the group of the high-skilled. To deal with mea-
surement error in the education information when deﬁning the skill groups, we correct the skill
information such that formal degrees an individual has once obtained are not lost later.
Stage zero of the estimation approach estimates wage diﬀerentials by means of Tobit regressions
due to the censoring of wage data induced by the social security taxation threshold (Beitragsbe-
messungsgrenze). Observations are weighted by the length of the respective employment spells.
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ables and further allows for possible interactions of these with the skill variables. Besides, a linear
age term captures variation within the age classes. Cross terms of female and skill dummies prove
signiﬁcant in nearly all cells. Consequently, we base our analysis on males only. Period-speciﬁc
wage diﬀerentials for the traditional CES are similarly estimated by pre-step Tobit estimations
(3.26), using age-speciﬁc skill dummies and a dummy for foreigners.
Estimation equations at the ﬁrst and at the second step include a full set of age dummies and
time dummies for 1976–1997. The latter are replaced by a linear time trend at the third step.
At steps one and three we instrument observed employment measures by means of the size of
the labor force obtained from the German Microcensus, a representative 1% population sam-
ple collected annually, typically via face-to-face interviews. We use representative subsamples
available through the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt). The cell-speciﬁc labor
force is imputed as the sum of (male) employed and unemployed workers within the skill£age
groups. For several years within our sampling period, however, individual records of educational
attainment were voluntary, leading to sizable shares of missing values. We apply the procedure
developed in Fitzenberger, Schnabel, and Wunderlich (2004) to assign the shares of missings to
the three skill groups in each cell. For the years without any skill information in the German
Microcensus, we interpolate; see also Fitzenberger (1999).
For the ﬁrst simulation experiment, skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates are taken from Reinberg
and Hummel (2002). Rates for low-, medium-, and high-skilled males in 1997 read 27.1%, 6.8%,
and 3.0%, respectively. Age group-speciﬁc unemployment rates for the second experiment are
calculated based on Statistisches Bundesamt (1998). For the six age groups (from young to old)
the rates are 8.5%, 7.5%, 7.4%, 7.1%, 7.0%, and 8.1%.
In order to obtain employment weights for the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sector,
we assign the IABS sector codes to the two categories as done in Fitzenberger (1999). Using
the 1997-weights (0.4412 for manufacturing and 0.4746 for non-manufacturing), we calculate the
price elasticity of demand, ´, as a weighted average of the elasticities ´man = ¡0:7994 and
´non-man = ¡0:1762 estimated by Fitzenberger and Franz (2001).
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of Wage Diﬀerentials over Time
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Figure 3.3: Age Proﬁles of Wage Diﬀerentials
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Figure 3.4: Trends in Relative Employment
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Table 3.4: Estimated Wage Diﬀerentials by Age and Time I
Age 25–29 30–34 35–39
Time rl;a;t rh;a;t rl;a;t rh;a;t rl;a;t rh;a;t
1975 -0.1299 0.2942 -0.1628 0.4338 -0.1689 0.5270
(0.0057) (0.0111) (0.0058) (0.0113) (0.0048) (0.0140)
1976 -0.1187 0.2622 -0.1477 0.3882 -0.1564 0.5235
(0.0057) (0.0102) (0.0062) (0.0102) (0.0050) (0.0123)
1977 -0.1175 0.2535 -0.1467 0.3795 -0.1692 0.5013
(0.0060) (0.0093) (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0055) (0.0113)
1978 -0.1151 0.2517 -0.1439 0.3638 -0.1618 0.4839
(0.0064) (0.0089) (0.0067) (0.0093) (0.0059) (0.0104)
1979 -0.1020 0.2482 -0.1414 0.3407 -0.1544 0.4540
(0.0067) (0.0090) (0.0066) (0.0085) (0.0062) (0.0098)
1980 -0.1117 0.2573 -0.1353 0.3324 -0.1498 0.4486
(0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0068) (0.0102)
1981 -0.1011 0.2669 -0.1387 0.3376 -0.1454 0.4222
(0.0070) (0.0088) (0.0068) (0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0100)
1982 -0.0990 0.2640 -0.1358 0.3473 -0.1553 0.4256
(0.0071) (0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0098)
1983 -0.0947 0.2537 -0.1274 0.3518 -0.1585 0.4236
(0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0096)
1984 -0.0856 0.2585 -0.1289 0.3551 -0.1583 0.4227
(0.0073) (0.0094) (0.0084) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0094)
1985 -0.0683 0.2663 -0.1269 0.3628 -0.1479 0.4251
(0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0087) (0.0078) (0.0084) (0.0092)
1986 -0.0664 0.2718 -0.1189 0.3541 -0.1417 0.4193
(0.0073) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0089)
1987 -0.0716 0.2917 -0.1090 0.3509 -0.1386 0.4174
(0.0072) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0086)
1988 -0.0777 0.2992 -0.1104 0.3413 -0.1317 0.4296
(0.0072) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0083)
1989 -0.0780 0.2839 -0.1039 0.3512 -0.1330 0.4230
(0.0070) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0070) (0.0096) (0.0084)
1990 -0.0866 0.2735 -0.1187 0.3597 -0.1349 0.4172
(0.0069) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0082)
1991 -0.1002 0.2661 -0.1149 0.3574 -0.1379 0.4192
(0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0078) (0.0067) (0.0093) (0.0081)
1992 -0.0924 0.2614 -0.1248 0.3537 -0.1340 0.4126
(0.0066) (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0065) (0.0089) (0.0077)
1993 -0.0840 0.2672 -0.1212 0.3662 -0.1333 0.4190
(0.0069) (0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0065) (0.0089) (0.0076)
1994 -0.0846 0.2514 -0.1238 0.3651 -0.1438 0.4305
(0.0073) (0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0063) (0.0090) (0.0075)
1995 -0.0987 0.2373 -0.1269 0.3598 -0.1423 0.4383
(0.0075) (0.0091) (0.0077) (0.0065) (0.0090) (0.0075)
1996 -0.1156 0.2486 -0.1242 0.3456 -0.1544 0.4255
(0.0079) (0.0097) (0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0076)
1997 -0.1366 0.2764 -0.1271 0.3473 -0.1591 0.4400
(0.0089) (0.0106) (0.0083) (0.0069) (0.0092) (0.0077)
Tobit estimations, observations weighted with the length of the respective employment spells. Standard errors in
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Table 3.5: Estimated Wage Diﬀerentials by Age and Time II
Age 40–44 45–49 50–54
Time rl;a;t rh;a;t rl;a;t rh;a;t rl;a;t rh;a;t
1975 -0.1780 0.5577 -0.1769 0.5445 -0.1725 0.5709
(0.0052) (0.0189) (0.0055) (0.0213) (0.0069) (0.0248)
1976 -0.1586 0.5713 -0.1699 0.5662 -0.1736 0.5537
(0.0053) (0.0147) (0.0056) (0.0183) (0.0065) (0.0208)
1977 -0.1586 0.5713 -0.1699 0.6003 -0.1838 0.5739
(0.0053) (0.0147) (0.0056) (0.0185) (0.0066) (0.0205)
1978 -0.1640 0.5525 -0.1645 0.6142 -0.1824 0.5853
(0.0055) (0.0132) (0.0059) (0.0182) (0.0065) (0.0191)
1979 -0.1577 0.5185 -0.1659 0.5829 -0.1696 0.5589
(0.0054) (0.0118) (0.0057) (0.0161) (0.0063) (0.0169)
1980 -0.1532 0.5171 -0.1615 0.5507 -0.1649 0.5398
(0.0054) (0.0115) (0.0057) (0.0148) (0.0060) (0.0163)
1981 -0.1549 0.5087 -0.1599 0.5420 -0.1782 0.5675
(0.0057) (0.0111) (0.0057) (0.0143) (0.0060) (0.0164)
1982 -0.1585 0.4902 -0.1542 0.5475 -0.1715 0.5682
(0.0060) (0.0105) (0.0057) (0.0128) (0.0062) (0.0155)
1983 -0.1626 0.4905 -0.1561 0.5468 -0.1698 0.5652
(0.0066) (0.0101) (0.0060) (0.0122) (0.0062) (0.0149)
1984 -0.1613 0.4907 -0.1497 0.5296 -0.1674 0.5484
(0.0073) (0.0102) (0.0062) (0.0115) (0.0066) (0.0145)
1985 -0.1498 0.4888 -0.1504 0.5469 -0.1597 0.5655
(0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0065) (0.0116) (0.0069) (0.0145)
1986 -0.1413 0.4869 -0.1517 0.5359 -0.1490 0.5633
(0.0090) (0.0112) (0.0067) (0.0111) (0.0069) (0.0140)
1987 -0.1425 0.5013 -0.1524 0.5289 -0.1418 0.5836
(0.0095) (0.0117) (0.0073) (0.0113) (0.0070) (0.0138)
1988 -0.1425 0.4679 -0.1499 0.5228 -0.1437 0.5495
(0.0096) (0.0110) (0.0077) (0.0108) (0.0071) (0.0124)
1989 -0.1362 0.4725 -0.1465 0.5416 -0.1388 0.5427
(0.0098) (0.0111) (0.0083) (0.0115) (0.0073) (0.0125)
1990 -0.1438 0.4527 -0.1527 0.5045 -0.1424 0.5359
(0.0096) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0118) (0.0073) (0.0122)
1991 -0.1391 0.4578 -0.1490 0.5002 -0.1513 0.5446
(0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0126) (0.0077) (0.0124)
1992 -0.1394 0.4468 -0.1417 0.4860 -0.1562 0.5183
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0080) (0.0120)
1993 -0.1450 0.4803 -0.1472 0.5014 -0.1677 0.5274
(0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0088) (0.0121)
1994 -0.1552 0.4614 -0.1459 0.5024 -0.1697 0.5378
(0.0102) (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0099) (0.0123)
1995 -0.1527 0.4641 -0.1583 0.5034 -0.1682 0.5226
(0.0102) (0.0091) (0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0130)
1996 -0.1568 0.4561 -0.1725 0.4675 -0.1575 0.4877
(0.0105) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0120) (0.0132)
1997 -0.1632 0.4664 -0.1647 0.4766 -0.1628 0.5356
(0.0105) (0.0092) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0129) (0.0141)
Tobit estimations, observations weighted with the length of the respective employment spells. Standard errors in
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Table 3.6: Cohort Eﬀects in Wage Diﬀerentials?
Coeﬃcients Wage Diﬀerential l=m Wage Diﬀerential h=m
DJ32 -0.03277 (-10.72) -0.03278 (-9.51) 0.10880 (12.00) 0.10887 (15.74)
DJ37 -0.05143 (-9.00) -0.05145 (-8.17) 0.19881 (13.88) 0.19895 (15.78)
DJ42 -0.05798 (-5.37) -0.05801 (-4.93) 0.25360 (9.79) 0.25384 (10.69)
DJ47 -0.06539 (-3.37) -0.0655 (-3.10) 0.29732 (6.75) 0.29769 (7.29)
DJ52 -0.06898 (-2.19) -0.06907 (-2.03) 0.32937 (4.87) 0.32994 (5.46)
DT76 0.01123 (3.58) -0.00966 (-0.80)
DT77 0.00835 (2.45) -0.01215 (-1.09)
DT78 0.01117 (3.50) -0.01760 (-1.32)
DT79 0.01841 (5.94) -0.0428 (-3.41)
DT80 0.02124 (5.34) -0.05278 (-3.93)
DT81 0.02133 (5.24) -0.05340 (-3.73)
DT82 0.02226 (5.37) -0.05424 (-3.71)
DT83 0.02336 (4.55) -0.05669 (-3.64)
DT84 0.02661 (4.39) -0.06185 (-3.54)
DT85 0.03486 (5.06) -0.05445 (-2.89)
DT86 0.04075 (5.36) -0.05967 (-2.89)
DT87 0.04317 (4.89) -0.05404 (-2.26)
DT88 0.04341 (4.27) -0.0663 (-2.53)
DT89 0.04695 (4.04) -0.06747 (-2.30)
DT90 0.04024 (3.01) -0.08155 (-2.49)
DT91 0.03848 (2.66) -0.08363 (-2.30)
DT92 0.03976 (2.22) -0.09726 (-2.38)
DT93 0.03882 (1.96) -0.08609 (-1.89)
DT94 0.03565 (1.62) -0.09096 (-1.81)
DT95 0.03279 (1.33) -0.09749 (-1.74)
DT96 0.02853 (1.02) -0.11586 (-1.86)
DT97 0.02480 (0.79) -0.09967 (-1.40)
TIME 0.00174 (1.08) -0.01827 (-4.84)
TIME2 0.00032 (1.09) 0.00217 (3.16)
TIME3 0.00002 (-1.06) -0.00012 (-2.67)
TIME4 2.16e-07 (0.47) 2.38e-06 (2.26)
R1 -0.00054 (-1.05) -0.00054 (-0.96) 0.00059 (0.35) 0.00059 (0.32)
R2 -6.09e-06 (-0.23) -6.14e-06 (-0.22) -0.00009 (-0.80) -0.00009 (-0.78)
R3 0.00017 (1.87) 0.00017 (1.68) -3.65e-06 (-0.01) -3.26e-06 (-0.01)
R4 2.89e-06 (0.44) 2.90e-06 (0.42) 0.00003 (1.30) 0.00003 (1.19)
COHORTA2 0.00018 (1.86) 0.00018 (1.78) 0.00071 (3.22) 0.00071 (4.60)
COHORTB2 0.00093 (3.52) 0.0009 (2.89)
COHORTA3 -0.00001 (-3.67) -0.00001 (-3.84) -0.00003 (-3.32) -0.00003 (-3.62)
COHORTB3 0.00003 (1.75) 0.00003 (1.74)
CONSTANT -0.12597 (-41.59) -0.12178 (-35.41) 0.28023 (23.91) 0.28895 (43.45)
Tests
a
Separability
b 7.83
¤ 6.27 8.11
¤ 9.13
¤¤
Cohorts after 1975
c 36.57
¤¤¤ 34.79
¤¤¤ 34.14
¤¤¤ 36.00
¤¤¤
Any cohort eﬀects
d 233.12
¤¤¤ 232.72
¤¤¤
Data source: IABS 1975–1997. White robust t-values in parentheses. Speciﬁcation of equation (3.4):
Inclusion of additional polynomial cohort terms as long as neither the respective coeﬃcient nor those of
lower orders turn insigniﬁcant.
a Wald tests, Â
2-values.
¤(
¤¤;
¤¤¤ ) Hypothesis rejected at 0.90 (0.95, 0.99) level.
b H0 : Ri = 0 for all i.
c H0 : Ri = COHORTAj = 0 for all i;j.
d H0 : Ri = COHORTAj = COHORTBh = 0 for all h;i;j.86 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
Table 3.7: Cohort Eﬀects in Relative Employment?
Coeﬃcients Log. Relative Employment l=m Log. Relative Employment h=m
DJ32 0.20288 (6.78) 0.20273 (7.04) 0.40904 (10.08) 0.40907 (10.61)
DJ37 0.43241 (9.80) 0.43213 (9.96) 0.19945 (3.48) 0.19952 (3.67)
DJ42 0.74647 (9.19) 0.74594 (9.46) -0.19470 (-2.02) -0.19458 (-2.13)
DJ47 1.0750 (7.67) 1.07414 (7.90) -0.6767 (-4.19) -0.67656 (-4.39)
DJ52 1.271 (5.76) 1.26952 (5.89) -1.164 (-4.61) -1.16373 (-4.84)
DT76 -0.12099 (-5.19) 0.02528 (0.69)
DT77 -0.26984 (-12.28) 0.08666 (2.69)
DT78 -0.38845 (-15.32) 0.13468 (3.18)
DT79 -0.48621 (-17.13) 0.17800 (3.95)
DT80 -0.58195 (-19.86) 0.23592 (5.19)
DT81 -0.6860 (-22.36) 0.30340 (6.54)
DT82 -0.79031 (-24.24) 0.3775 (8.62)
DT83 -0.90355 (-23.41) 0.43387 (9.11)
DT84 -1.0147 (-22.55) 0.50096 (9.02)
DT85 -1.1114 (-21.79) 0.57136 (10.11)
DT86 -1.2122 (-20.47) 0.67825 (11.37)
DT87 -1.3021 (-20.57) 0.78194 (11.87)
DT88 -1.3900 (-19.29) 0.87782 (11.65)
DT89 -1.4639 (-17.60) 0.95953 (11.15)
DT90 -1.5333 (-16.10) 1.0478 (10.62)
DT91 -1.5957 (-15.04) 1.1553 (10.39)
DT92 -1.6613 (-13.83) 1.2654 (10.11)
DT93 -1.7531 (-12.75) 1.3681 (9.60)
DT94 -1.8375 (-11.92) 1.473 (9.18)
DT95 -1.9217 (-11.27) 1.5817 (8.76)
DT96 -2.0027 (-10.59) 1.6518 (8.23)
DT97 -2.0752 (-9.73) 1.771 (7.92)
TIME -0.11679 (-12.16) 0.04054 (2.86)
TIME2 -0.00076 (-0.42) 0.00105 (0.49)
TIME3 0.00020 (1.75) 0.00013 (0.99)
TIME4 -5.38e-06 (-2.04) -4.31e-06 (-1.55)
R1 0.01396 (3.96) 0.01394 (4.10) -0.02248 (-4.80) -0.02248 (-5.10)
R2 0.00011 (0.62) 0.00011 (0.64) 0.00007 (0.32) 0.00007 (0.35)
R3 -0.00443 (-6.99) -0.00443 (-7.34) 0.00455 (5.28) 0.00455 (5.63)
R4 -0.00009 (-2.05) -0.00009 (-2.12) 0.00003 (0.66) 0.00003 (0.71)
COHORTA2 0.00484 (7.97) 0.00484 (8.05) -0.00600 (-8.44) -0.00600 (-8.66)
COHORTB2 -0.00326 (-4.16) -0.00326 (-4.48)
COHORTA3 -0.00010 (-7.00) -0.00010 (-6.91) 0.00011 (7.32) 0.00011 (7.20)
CONSTANT -1.25039 (-40.19) -1.26223 (-42.44) -2.62419 (-47.43) -2.62877 (-55.56)
Tests
a
Separability
b 377.59
¤¤¤ 355.74
¤¤¤ 35.76
¤¤¤ 43.66
¤¤¤
Cohorts after 1975
c 1000.3
¤¤¤ 1035.6
¤¤¤ 1004.0
¤¤¤ 1034.1
¤¤¤
Any cohort eﬀects
d 1011.1
¤¤¤ 1043.8
¤¤¤
Data source: IABS 1975–1997. White robust t-values in parentheses. Speciﬁcation of equation (3.4):
Inclusion of additional polynomial cohort terms as long as neither the respective coeﬃcient nor those of
lower orders turn insigniﬁcant.
a Wald tests, Â
2-values.
¤(
¤¤;
¤¤¤ ) Hypothesis rejected at 0.90 (0.95, 0.99) level.
b H0 : Ri = 0 for all i.
c H0 : Ri = COHORTAj = 0 for all i;j.
d H0 : Ri = COHORTAj = COHORTBh = 0 for all h;i;j.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 87
Table 3.8: Summary of Model Versions (Speciﬁcations)
Label Speciﬁcation Description
(i) benchmark model two-level CES
(ii) extended benchmark two-level CES with age£time interaction in age-
speciﬁc relative productivity
(iii) extended benchmark two-level CES with cohort£time interaction in
age-speciﬁc relative productivity
(iv) sensitivity check two-level CES disregarding age-premia
(v) sensitivity check two-level CES excluding university graduates
aged 25–29 years
(vi) sensitivity check two-level CES with break in SBTC
(vii) restricted benchmark two-level CES with 1=¾A = 0
(viii) CES with interaction CES with age£skill interaction
(ix) traditional CES traditional CES88 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
Table 3.9: Elasticities of Substitution, Speciﬁcations of the Nested CES
model version (i) (i) (i) (ii) (ii) (ii) (iii) (iii) (iii)
l 7.10 7.10 7.24 7.24 7.24 7.24
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
¾
FGLS
A;1st step m 8.28 7.07 7.07 7.53 7.20 7.20 7.53 7.20 7.20
(0.55) (0.48) (0.48) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50)
h 18.55 18.55 8.98 8.98 8.98 8.98
(5.59) (5.59) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51) (1.51)
l 8.58 8.59 9.18 9.21 9.20 9.26
(0.67) (0.69) (0.74) (0.75) (0.74) (0.76)
¾
FGLS
A;3rd step m 8.71 4.81 4.81 7.85 5.23 5.25 7.92 5.22 5.26
(0.63) (0.32) (0.32) (0.60) (0.38) (0.39) (0.61) (0.37) (0.38)
h 19.52 19.69 10.36 10.47 10.15 10.49
(5.87) (5.98) (1.98) (2.02) (1.83) (1.99)
l 12.56 12.72 8.18
(1.58) (1.75) (0.88)
¾
FGLS
S m 8.97 9.36 7.15 9.04 9.49 6.98 5.65 6.32 4.74
(0.81) (0.91) (1.06) (0.84) (0.93) (1.01) (0.46) (0.55) (0.52)
h 6.81 6.78 5.36
(1.00) (0.97) (0.74)
l 6.87 6.87 7.23 7.23 7.23 7.23
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54)
¾
FGLS-IV
A;1st step m 8.11 6.86 6.86 7.44 7.20 7.20 7.44 7.20 7.20
(0.60) (0.53) (0.53) (0.60) (0.54) (0.54) (0.59) (0.54) (0.54)
h 28.95 28.95 9.85 9.85 9.86 9.86
(14.57) (14.57) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25)
l 10.31 11.53 9.44 10.20 8.68 9.22
(1.64) (2.12) (1.62) (1.98) (1.40) (1.62)
¾
FGLS-IV
A;3rd step m 10.25 5.27 5.67 9.22 6.01 6.55 8.23 5.38 5.79
(1.52) (0.66) (0.82) (1.34) (0.86) (1.14) (1.19) (0.73) (0.91)
h 20.13 21.26 8.50 9.10 8.59 9.85
(11.11) (12.10) (2.57) (3.21) (2.63) (3.65)
l 9.67
] 11.54
] 8.03
]
(13.37) (24.50) (8.44)
¾
FGLS-IV
S m 8.14 6.15 5.65
] 7.94 6.97 6.69
] 5.92 4.91 4.48
]
(3.11) (2.87) (5.72) (4.07) (2.85) (7.16) (1.65) (1.54) (2.16)
h 6.8
] 7.19
] 6.38
]
(7.76) (8.13) (4.56)
Model versions: (i) benchmark model; (ii) with age£time interaction in age-speciﬁc productivity; (iii) with
cohort£time interaction in age-speciﬁc productivity. Standard errors in parentheses based on 500 bootstrap
repetitions. Bold numbers: Elasticities ﬁnite (inverses signiﬁcant at 0.95 level).
] Respective parameters not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 0.95 level. Data sources: IABS 1975–1997, German Microcensus.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 89
Table 3.10: Elasticities of Substitution, Further Speciﬁcations of the Nested CES
model version (iv) (iv) (iv) (v) (v) (v) (vi) (vi) (vi)
l 15.19 15.19 6.85 6.85 7.10 7.10
(1.27) (1.27) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49)
¾
FGLS
A;1st step m 16.64 15.13 15.13 7.23 6.83 6.83 8.28 7.07 7.07
(1.37) (1.26) (1.26) (0.50) (0.46) (0.46) (0.55) (0.48) (0.48)
h 26.76 26.76 9.86 9.86 18.55 18.55
(6.37) (6.37) (1.74) (1.74) (5.59) (5.59)
l 17.09 17.20 8.54 8.53 8.62
y 8.64
(1.77) (1.82) (0.66) (0.66) (0.69) (0.69)
¾
FGLS
A;3rd step m 19.01 9.21 9.26 7.65 4.79 4.79 8.86
y 4.84
y 4.84
(2.04) (0.76) (0.79) (0.57) (0.32) (0.33) (0.66) (0.32) (0.33)
h 24.53 25.54 11.19 11.23 19.19
y 18.93
(6.41) (7.00) (2.39) (2.33) (5.66) (5.46)
l 12.31 12.54 24.55
(1.69) (1.70) (14.19)
¾
FGLS
S m 8.94 8.92 6.83 8.59 9.24 6.84 14.42
y 16.69
y 13.02
(0.83) (0.85) (1.09) (0.77) (0.88) (0.96) (4.98) (6.77) (5.64)
h 5.95 6.46 7.13
(0.79) (1.08) (2.03)
l 14.83 14.83 6.71 6.71 6.87 6.87
(1.33) (1.33) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
¾
FGLS-IV
A;1st step m 15.57 14.78 14.78 7.02 6.70 6.70 8.11 6.86 6.86
(1.36) (1.32) (1.32) (0.58) (0.56) (0.56) (0.65) (0.56) (0.56)
h 21.71 21.71 9.13 9.13 28.95 28.95
(4.99) (4.99) (2.00) (2.00) (14.94) (14.94)
l 15.10 15.03 8.70 9.83 10.48
y 10.23
y
(1.33) (1.27) (1.15) (1.57) (1.70) (1.65)
¾
FGLS-IV
A;3rd step m 14.73 8.27 8.26 8.76 4.67 5.16 10.94
y 5.31
y 5.16
y
(1.22) (0.65) (0.63) (1.01) (0.48) (0.68) (1.73) (0.65) (0.61)
h 12.15 11.95 8.40 11.02 26.43
y 20.52
y
(1.64) (1.60) (2.56) (4.80) (16.49) (10.03)
l 12.48
] 13.87
] -26.87
]y
(7.71) (25.22) (72.13)
¾
FGLS-IV
S m 8.09 8.72 6.00
] 8.01 8.75 6.10
] 15.87
y -172.7
y -20.97
]y
(2.98) (3.30) (1.64) (1.90) (3.43) (3.51) (12.29) (2749.2) (72.13)
h 9.10
] 6.11
] 6.70
]y
(3.32) (7.11) (16.96)
Model versions: (iv) excluding equations for age premia; (v) excluding high-skilled of age 25–29; (vi) with break
in SBTC. Standard errors in parentheses based on 500 bootstrap repetitions. Bold numbers: Elasticities ﬁnite
(inverses signiﬁcant at 0.95 level).
] Respective parameters not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 0.95 level.
y Time break
in SBTC insigniﬁcant at 0.95 level. Data sources: IABS 1975–1997, German Microcensus.90 Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects
Table 3.11: Estimates of ¾S, Assuming Perfect Substitution Between Age Classes
model version (vii) (vii) (viii) (viii) (ix) (ix)
l 12.45 11.95 10.57
(1.70) (2.00) (2.28)
¾
FGLS
S m 8.82 6.79 8.25 5.86 4.93 3.81
(0.78) (0.97) (0.97) (0.94) (0.67) (0.45)
h 6.15 4.67 3.36
(0.80) (0.54) (0.24)
l 15.95
] 13.80
] 198.3
(47.95) (8.26) (3132.6)
¾
FGLS-IV
S m 9.14 6.93
] 6.26 6.21
] 3.76 5.15
(8.03) (7.26) (1.16) (1.79) (0.95) (1.99)
h 8.32
] 5.65
] 4.53
(14.30) (1.18) (1.08)
Model versions: (vii) nested CES (benchmark) with 1=¾A restricted to zero at the third step; (viii) CES model
with skill diﬀerentials as employment-weighted average of age-speciﬁc premia; (ix) CES model without skill£age-
interaction. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold numbers: Elasticities ﬁnite (inverses signiﬁcant at 0.95 level).
] Respective parameters not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at 0.95 level. Data sources: IABS 1975–1997, German Micro-
census.
Table 3.12: Instrumental Variables: First Stage Results for Age-Speciﬁc Employment
Model (i)/(iv) (ii) (iii)
Coeﬀ. Std.Err. Coeﬀ. Std.Err. Coeﬀ. Std.Err.
®uu 0.7411
¤¤¤ (0.0716) 0.8091
¤¤¤ (0.0762) 0.8091
¤¤¤ (0.0762)
®mu 0.5254
¤¤¤ (0.1204) 0.5237
¤¤¤ (0.1296) 0.5237
¤¤¤ (0.1296)
®hu -0.3894
¤¤¤ (0.0677) -0.5690
¤¤¤ (0.0832) -0.5690
¤¤¤ (0.0832)
®um 0.0620 (0.0458) 0.1158
¤¤ (0.0490) 0.1158
¤¤ (0.0490)
®mm 0.9232
¤¤¤ (0.0766) 0.9106
¤¤¤ (0.0814) 0.9106
¤¤¤ (0.0815)
®hm -0.1008
¤¤ (0.0450) -0.2272
¤¤¤ (0.0572) -0.2272
¤¤¤ (0.0572)
®uh -0.1603
¤ (0.0899) -0.1044 (0.0947) -0.1044 (0.0947)
®mh 0.6185
¤¤¤ (0.1504) 0.6178
¤¤¤ (0.1592) 0.6178
¤¤¤ (0.1592)
®hh 0.6484
¤¤¤ (0.0848) 0.4987
¤¤¤ (0.1081) 0.4987
¤¤¤ (0.1081)
Â
2 12722.7
¤¤¤ 5150.5
¤¤¤ 5150.5
¤¤¤
Coeﬃcients of additional instruments. See the text for a description of the instrumentation strategy. See the
text and tables 3.9 and 3.10 for descriptions of the model versions (i) to (iv). Â
2: Test for joint signiﬁcance of
additional instruments.
¤(
¤¤;
¤¤¤ ) parameter signiﬁcant at 0.90 (0.95, 0.99) level.
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Table 3.13: Instrumental Variables: First Stage Results for Aggregate Employment
Model (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Coeﬀ. Std.Err. Coeﬀ. Std.Err. Coeﬀ. Std.Err. Coeﬀ. Std.Err.
®uu 0.3466 (0.4031) 0.3409 (0.4028) 0.3187 (0.3906) -0.9379
¤¤¤ (0.2001)
®mu 0.3597 (0.9445) 0.3595 (0.9436) 0.4125 (0.9151) 1.8051
¤¤¤ (0.4019)
®hu 1.4425 (1.3686) 1.4435 (1.3673) 1.3901 (1.3260) 0.3551 (0.5588)
®um -0.2373
¤¤ (0.1074) -0.2435
¤¤ (0.1068) -0.3352
¤¤ (0.1424) -0.0797 (0.1203)
®mm 1.4841
¤¤¤ (0.2517) 1.4763
¤¤¤ (0.2501) 1.6945
¤¤¤ (0.3336) 1.3068
¤¤¤ (0.2417)
®hm -0.0854 (0.3647) -0.0778 (0.3624) -0.2980 (0.4834) 0.0480 (0.3360)
®uh -0.5004
¤¤ (0.2492) -0.4982
¤¤ (0.2465) -0.5909
¤¤ (0.2954) 0.1934 (0.1846)
®mh 2.5600
¤¤¤ (0.5838) 2.5478
¤¤¤ (0.5774) 2.768
¤¤¤ (0.6921) 1.7792
¤¤¤ (0.3707)
®hh -1.5078
¤ (0.8459) -1.4936
¤ (0.8367) -1.7162
¤ (1.0028) -0.9205
¤ (0.5154)
Â
2 235.04
¤¤¤ 240.74
¤¤¤ 233.86
¤¤¤ 250.51
¤¤¤
Coeﬃcients of additional instruments. See the text for a description of the instrumentation strategy. See the
text and tables 3.9 and 3.10 for descriptions of the model versions (i) to (iv). Â
2: Test for joint signiﬁcance of
additional instruments.
¤(
¤¤;
¤¤¤ ) parameter signiﬁcant at 0.90 (0.95, 0.99) level.
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3.C Monte Carlo Study
We conduct a Monte Carlo Study in order to compare the following estimation approaches:
(a) Age-speciﬁc relative productivities Ás;a=Á~ s;~ a and elasticities ¾As estimated freely at the
third step.
(b) Ás;a at the third step taken as predetermined from the second step.
(c) ¾As at the third step taken as predetermined from the ﬁrst step.
(d) Ás;a as well as ¾As at the third step taken as predetermined from previous steps.
We assume the following parameter values for the benchmark model:
² elasticities ¾Au = 15, ¾Am = 10, ¾Ah = 20, and ¾S = 2.
² skill-speciﬁc linear time trends of 1% per year for ln(µh;t=µm;t) and of 2% for ln(µm;t=µl;t).
² age£skill-speciﬁc productivities Ás;a set to appropriate values between exp(9:3) and
exp(9:8).
When simulating log wages, we assume a normally distributed additive error term with standard
deviation STDDEV , which captures residual wage dispersion. The chosen values for STDDEV
between 0.001 and 0.2 correspond to 90–10-percentile wage diﬀerences between 0.2% and 50%.
We then estimate the benchmark version (i) of the model. Results for the diﬀerent approaches
are displayed in table 3.14. None of the approaches strictly dominates the others in terms of
minimum bias or minimum root mean squared error for all parameters. However, approach (a),
which (re)estimates all parameters freely at the third step, performs best in most of the cases
and, what is more, its performance is also fairly good when coming oﬀ second-best. We therefore
decide to use approach (a) for the estimations throughout the paper.Skill Wage Premia, Employment, and Cohort Eﬀects 93
Table 3.14: Monte Carlo Study: Average Third-Step Estimates for 1=¾ and Root Mean Squared Errors
STDDEV Parameter Value (a) (b) (c) (d)
0.001 1=¾Au 0.0667 0.0666 0.0763 0.0739 0.0739
(0.00046) (0.00966) (0.00720) (0.00720)
1=¾Am 0.1 0.1000 0.0976 0.0742 0.0742
(0.00085) (0.00244) (0.02581) (0.02581)
1=¾Ah 0.05 0.0500 0.0477 0.0488 0.0488
(0.00082) (0.00239) (0.00144) (0.00144)
1=¾S 0.5 0.5002 0.4730 0.4993 0.3208
(0.00139) (0.02704) (0.00145) (0.17936)
0.005 1=¾Au 0.0667 0.0666 0.0767 0.0746 0.0746
(0.00230) (0.01023) (0.00810) (0.00810)
1=¾Am 0.1 0.0999 0.0981 0.0748 0.0748
(0.00423) (0.00262) (0.02529) (0.02529)
1=¾Ah 0.05 0.0499 0.0479 0.0496 0.0496
(0.00409) (0.00357) (0.00385) (0.00385)
1=¾S 0.5 0.5004 0.4758 0.4992 0.3180
(0.00691) (0.02530) (0.00659) (0.18496)
0.010 1=¾Au 0.0667 0.0665 0.0771 0.0747 0.0747
(0.00459) (0.01116) (0.00879) (0.00879)
1=¾Am 0.1 0.0998 0.0986 0.0748 0.0748
(0.00847) (0.00401) (0.02542) (0.02542)
1=¾Ah 0.05 0.0498 0.0482 0.0498 0.0498
(0.00818) (0.00607) (0.00767) (0.00767)
1=¾S 0.5 0.5006 0.4765 0.4992 0.3130
(0.01381) (0.02757) (0.01347) (0.19854)
0.050 1=¾Au 0.0667 0.0658 0.0790 0.0741 0.0741
(0.02296) (0.02341) (0.01983) (0.01983)
1=¾Am 0.1 0.0989 0.1020 0.0743 0.0743
(0.04234) (0.01985) (0.03162) (0.03162)
1=¾Ah 0.05 0.0492 0.0463 0.0495 0.0495
(0.04088) (0.03095) (0.03842) (0.03842)
1=¾S 0.5 0.5026 0.4989 0.5009 0.2976
(0.06903) (0.07197) (0.06884) (0.34478)
0.100 1=¾Au 0.0667 0.0649 0.0795 0.0733 0.0733
(0.04592) (0.03973) (0.03737) (0.03737)
1=¾Am 0.1 0.0978 0.1064 0.0735 0.0735
(0.08469) (0.03821) (0.04534) (0.04534)
1=¾Ah 0.05 0.0484 0.0432 0.0491 0.0491
(0.08177) (0.06613) (0.07685) (0.07685)
1=¾S 0.5 0.5049 0.5578 0.5031 0.4805
(0.13808) (0.16231) (0.13778) (0.44487)
0.200 1=¾Au 0.0667 0.0632 0.0746 0.0717 0.0717
(0.09185) (0.07540) (0.07372) (0.07372)
1=¾Am 0.1 0.0955 0.1087 0.0718 0.0718
(0.16939) (0.07247) (0.07874) (0.07874)
1=¾Ah 0.05 0.0469 0.0405 0.0481 0.0481
(0.16356) (0.14403) (0.15371) (0.15371)
1=¾S 0.5 0.5094 0.6651 0.5073 0.7133
(0.27625) (0.30859) (0.27571) (0.51902)
Simulation of the benchmark model based on 1000 resamples. RMSE in parentheses. Bold numbers: minimum
bias and minimum RMSE, respectively. See the text of appendix 3.C for a description of the estimation approaches
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3.D Calculating Standard Errors
The calculation of standard errors and test statistics for the parameters obtained from the multi-
step estimation approach and in the simulation experiment has to take account of pre-step
estimation variability. We therefore use bootstrapping techniques.
We resample from the distribution of ln(ws;a;t) estimated by the Tobit regressions at stage zero
(section 3.2.1, equation (3.1)). All three subsequent estimation steps as well as the calculations
for the simulation experiments are put into a single bootstrap loop. We use 500 repetitions to
obtain the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated parameters from the empirical bootstrap
distribution.
Standard errors for the reported elasticities ¾ can then be calculated by means of the Delta
method relying on the estimated bootstrap distribution of 1=¾. Direct bootstrapping of ¾ is not
possible because of the discontinuity of the inverse function at the argument zero. With negative
estimates of the inverse elasticities for single extreme resamples, direct calculation of the variance
of ¾ would not be not well-deﬁned.
In case of IV estimation the three-step approach is extended at steps one and three by the
estimation of IV equations. In each iteration of the bootstrap loop we draw from the estimated
distribution of IV parameters, calculate predicted values for employment Ls;a;t and Ls;t, and
estimate the three-step model. Note that while predicted employment values are used in the
SOLS and FGLS estimation, the calculation of the respective FGLS weighting matrices from
SOLS residuals relies on actual employment.
When drawing inference on the estimated wage changes in the simulation experiment, we assume
´man and ´non-man, the price elasticities of product demand taken from Fitzenberger and Franz
(2001), to be independently normally distributed.4 The Erosion of Union Membership in Germany:
Determinants, Densities, Decompositions
4.1 Introduction
Trade unions bargain for higher wages, equal pay, reduced working hours, fair working conditions,
or employment protection (Freeman and Medoﬀ, 1984). However, in Germany—and in a number
of other countries—the results of union activity apply to most of the workers irrespective of
membership. Membership is not compulsory and closed shop regulations are illegal. The public
good character of core services oﬀered by trade unions may give rise to free-rider behavior.
Thence, why do people join a union? Given the economic importance of union activity (Addison
and Schnabel, 2003), interest in the determinants of union membership is of its own right. It is
essential to disentangle and quantify the determinants of union membership in order to under-
stand the recent decline in union membership in developed countries; see OECD (2004b) and
Ebbinghaus (2003) for Germany. Moreover, facing the lack of information on union membership
in various data sets, microeconometric membership estimations can be used to predict union
density for homogeneously deﬁned labor market segments, such as industries and/or regions.
These predictions can then be employed to study the impact of unionization on economic perfor-
mance, and on employment and the structure of wages in particular; see Fitzenberger and Kohn
(2005). This is of importance since in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon literature (see the survey by
Card, Lemieux, and Riddell, 2003), it is not meaningful to estimate a wage eﬀect of individual
union membership in Germany, where the public good nature of union activity results in union
coverage being much higher than union density.
For Germany, a couple of microeconometric analyses of union membership using survey data are
available. For example, Windolf and Haas (1989), Lorenz and Wagner (1991), and Schnabel and
Wagner (2005) use diﬀerent sets of cross sectional survey data to estimate binary choice models
of union membership in West Germany. Schnabel and Wagner (2003) also estimate determinants
of union membership in East Germany. However, none of the above studies employs panel data
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methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This was ﬁrst established by Fitzenberger,
Haggeney, and Ernst (1999) and Beck and Fitzenberger (2004), whose analyses for West Germany
are based on three and four waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), respectively.
Our study extends upon this literature in two main directions. First, we estimate determinants
of union membership in East as well as in West Germany, using the panel structure of the
GSOEP and applying a Chamberlain (1980)-Mundlack (1978)-type correlated random eﬀects
probit model. Our estimations are based on six waves during the period 1985–2003 providing
union membership status for individuals in West Germany, and on four waves between 1993 and
2003 for East Germany. In fact, it proves important to control for individual-speciﬁc eﬀects
in the membership decision. Our ﬁndings show the inﬂuence of socio-demographic personal
characteristics, such as age or marital status; the inﬂuence of workplace characteristics, i.e.,
match, ﬁrm, or industry speciﬁc eﬀects; as well as the inﬂuence of attitudinal factors for the
individual choice to be or not to be a union member, and we analyze diﬀerences of these factors
between East and West Germany and across time.
Second, we use our estimates to predict net union density (NUD) as a measure for union strength
in East and West Germany. The predictions, which consistently trace the trends towards deu-
nionization in both parts of the country, are then analyzed by means of decomposition techniques
in order to shed light on (1) the changes in unionization over time and (2) the diﬀerences in NUD
between East and West Germany. We ﬁnd that changes in the composition of the work force only
played a minor role for the deunionization trends in both East and West Germany. In East-West
comparison, diﬀerences in the characteristics of the work force are in favor of higher NUD in the
West. The stronger decline in union membership in East Germany reﬂects a stronger change in
the impact of these characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews related literature on
union membership. Section 4.3 discusses potential determinants of membership decisions. Our
econometric investigation is presented in section 4.4. Corresponding projections of net union
densities and the decomposition analyses are discussed in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
The appendix includes further information on the data and empirical results.
4.2 Related Literature
Studies of union membership in Germany face three challenges. First, collective bargaining is
an open shop system. Negotiation outcomes apply not only to union members, but to the vast
majority of all employees; see, e.g., Bosch (2004). Membership is not compulsory and closed
shop regulations are forbidden by constitutional law. By nature, the core services trade unionsUnion Membership 97
oﬀer have public good character, which gives rise to the possibility of free-riding behavior. Thus,
why would people want to join a union at all? Who joins the union? And how much do diﬀerent
determinants such as personal or workplace characteristics contribute to people’s membership
decision?
Second, union membership rates have been steadily declining in recent decades. Figure 4.1
depicts gross union density (GUD), deﬁned as the ratio of the number of union members and
the number of employees in the German labor market. After a period of slight increases in
the 1970’s, the early 1980’s mark the beginning of a pronounced trend towards deunionization,
which started out at a level of about 40%. By 2004, GUD was down to a historically low
level of 27%. Deunionization was merely interrupted by a uniﬁcation eﬀect in 1990, when West
German institutions were transferred to the East, and unions were initially very successful in
recruiting members in the East. However, the upsurge in aggregate GUD of about ﬁve percentage
points (pp)—which was built on the grounds of the GDR labor organization Freier Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund, whose members had comprised the largest part of the GDR work force—was
not sustainable, and deunionization went on even more rapidly in the 1990’s and 2000’s. Some
trade unions have responded to the decline in size by merging; see, e.g., Keller (2005). To date,
however, unions have not been able to reverse the trend; see also Ebbinghaus (2003) and Fichter
(1997). Against this background, micro-level studies which unveil how individual membership
decisions have been changing over time, can give insight into the nature of observed trends.
Figure 4.1: Evolution of Gross Union Density
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Gross union density in percent; 1960–1990: West Germany; 1991–2004: Uniﬁed Germany.
Union membership in CGB (Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund, data until 1999: German Statistical Oﬃce (Statistis-
ches Bundesamt, Statistische Jahrbücher), union information thenceforward), DAG (Deutsche Angestelltengew-
erkschaft, until 2000; data: German Statistical Oﬃce), DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, data: www.dgb.de),
DBB (Deutscher Beamtenbund, data: www.dgb.de), and DPolG (Deutsche Polizeigewerkschaft, until 1970, data:
German Statistical Oﬃce).
Employment (abhängig Beschäftigte ohne mithelfende Familienangehörige) from German Microcensus:
www.destatis.de.98 Union Membership
Third of all, the availability of adequate data from union records is limited. From 1991 on-
wards, only aggregate numbers for uniﬁed Germany are available, and unions’ publications do
not distinguish between employed members on the one hand and unemployed, retired, or stu-
dent members on the other. Yet this distinction is important from an economic point of view.
Net union density (NUD), deﬁned as the share of employed union members in the number of
employees, is a better measure of union power than GUD because it is more closely related to
the union’s ﬁnancial resources and to the potential to mobilize workers within ﬁrms. Net union
density is lower than gross union density by deﬁnition. Estimates of aggregate NUD usually fall
short of GUD by about 10 pp and this diﬀerence also varies with the business cycle; see Ebbing-
haus (2003). Union power further diﬀers signiﬁcantly between diﬀerent labor market segments.
For example, unions are traditionally strong in manufacturing industries, but they are of minor
importance in personal service sectors. Oﬃcial membership information does not distinguish
between suﬃciently homogenous segments. Detailed NUD estimates obtained from survey data
should thus help providing meaningful measures of union strength.
The following paragraphs review contributions from the theoretical literature and existing em-
pirical studies on these issues. The purpose is to motivate the determinants under study and the
adequacy of the econometric approach pursued later on; see Naylor (2003), Riley (1997), and
Schnabel (2003) for more extensive surveys.
4.2.1 Theoretical Analyses
In a traditional cost-beneﬁt framework, potential union members balance the utility derived from
being member with the costs associated to it. Membership is costly due to membership fees,
and in an open shop system the key beneﬁts arising from union bargaining—like higher wages
and equal pay, reduced working hours, fair working conditions, or employment protection—are
basically public goods. Therefore, a rational individual would not join a union, but rather free
ride in this setting.
Several ways to accommodate the free-rider problem have been considered. First, membership
could be compulsory. Second, membership would be voluntary in a dichotomous labor market
with union and non-union sectors (Grossman, 1983), but all employees in unionized ﬁrms choose
to be member. Both of these arrangements are essentially closed shop solutions, where only
members are eligible for beneﬁts. However, the German as well as most European empirical
evidence dismisses closed shop solutions.
Third, unions oﬀer selective incentives (Olson, 1965) in addition to the collective goods. On
the one hand, these can be actual private goods (Booth and Chatterji, 1995), such as legal aid
and grievance procedures, accident insurances, or even education and further training. More-Union Membership 99
ton (1998), for instance, considers greater job security for union members. On the other hand,
members may comply with a social custom to support the union. The notion of social custom,
as introduced to labor economics by Akerlof (1980), captures the idea that individuals abide
by internal rules or norms set within society because non-conformance would result in a loss
of reputation, which would be costly for the individual (Booth, 1985). Naylor (1989) considers
the case where individuals’ believes about a social custom are heterogeneous, thereby explaining
stable equilibria at intermediate union densities. Alternatively, the incorporation of management
opposition in Corneo (1995) uses the union’s interaction with other institutional agents to ex-
plain stable intermediate levels of unionization. All of the economic models above rationalize a
minimum level of unionization below which a union loses its ability to eﬀectively provide services.
Reduced services would in turn induce more and more members to quit and, at the end of the
day, the union would cease to exist.
Complementary approaches in social and political sciences (Wallerstein and Western, 2000, for
example) discuss internal rules, class consciousness, social values, political attitudes, etc. Though
diﬃcult to measure, these are considered to be highly relevant for union membership. Most of
these factors are likely to induce unobserved heterogeneity in the empirical analysis.
4.2.2 Empirical Studies
There are three important strands of literature; see Riley (1997) and Schnabel (2003) for
overviews. A ﬁrst class of studies uses aggregate time series data. In the tradition of
Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) the analyses focus on long-run trends and business cycle
eﬀects. For Germany, Armingeon (1989) analyzes changes in union density in the period
1950–1985. He ﬁnds that the stability of gross union density was caused by membership gains
in shrinking segments of the labor market on the one hand and stagnation in growing industries
on the other. Similarly, Schnabel (1989) studies trade union growth in the period 1955–1986
and links it to changes in price levels and wages, employment, and unemployment. The
aggregate evidence stresses the importance of environmental factors.
The second strand of the literature analyzes the impact of institutional regulations and interac-
tions in social environments. Centralization and coordination of collective bargaining, coverage
rates, and codetermination are the pillars of an industrial relation system (Hassel, 1999). Inter-
action between these constituents is closely related to union membership. For example, union
membership of a works council increases union density at the ﬁrm level since it facilitates union
access to the work force (Windolf and Haas, 1989). Similar eﬀects can be expected from a Ghent
system of union-managed unemployment insurance. The contact of union oﬃcials to insured
employees supports recruitment eﬀorts. Frege (1996) emphasizes that the membership decision
and the question whether people actually participate in collective action are two separate issues.100 Union Membership
She ﬁnds that there is no diﬀerence in actual behavior of union members between East and West
Germany.
The third class of studies uses micro data to model individual membership decisions. At this
level, determinants can be grouped into three categories.
² Personal characteristics: Observed socio-demographic variables such as age or marital sta-
tus, but also attitudes determine an individual’s decision to be union member.
² Workplace characteristics: Match-speciﬁc, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, as well as industry-speciﬁc eﬀects
can facilitate or impede unionization.
² Social environment: The inﬂuence of reference groups frames the individual decision.
Studies based on micro-level data for Germany analyze membership determinants along these
lines. Windolf and Haas (1989) provide logit estimates based on cross-sectional survey data for
the period 1976–1984 and Lorenz and Wagner (1991) use the 1985 wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999) and Beck and Fitzenberger
(2004) use various GSOEP waves with union membership information in 1985, 1989, 1993, and
1998 (only Beck and Fitzenberger) to estimate West German union membership. Both studies
use panel probit estimators and conclude that the propensity for union membership has not
changed considerably over time. Hence, the observed aggregate decline in union membership
would mainly be driven by composition eﬀects.
Goerke and Pannenberg (2004) also use GSOEP data. They employ ﬁxed eﬀects estimations to
back up a theoretical social custom model. Schnabel and Wagner (2005) conduct an analysis
based on West German data from the general social survey (ALLBUS), a collection of inde-
pendent biannual cross sections. Their probit estimates for years between 1980 and 2000 yield
no consistent picture of the inﬂuence of most variables over time. Applying the same method,
Schnabel and Wagner (2003) use the years 1992, 1996, and 2000 of the ALLBUS data to com-
pare determinants in East and West Germany. They conclude that the factors inﬂuencing an
individual’s propensity to be union member have converged between East and West Germany
between 1992 and 2000.
4.3 Determinants of Union Membership
Our empirical analysis investigates the following theoretical hypotheses about determinants of
union membership; see Schnabel (1993) or Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) for more detailed dis-
cussions.Union Membership 101
² Age: Mobility tends to decrease with the age of a worker. Family ties and speciﬁc human
capital increase with age. Thus, older workers are more interested in job security and there-
fore in union membership as an implicit insurance. Yet the interest in union representation
may fade out once people know that they are successful in the labor market. The link
between age and union membership may also mirror cohort eﬀects. Diﬀerences between
generations in value orientation or social custom may result in diﬀerent attitudes towards
unions; see Blanchﬂower (2006) for an extensive discussion.
² Gender: Compared to males, women are less attached to the labor market and tend to
accumulate less speciﬁc human capital. Besides, trade union services have traditionally
been directed to the needs of male members. Therefore, women are less likely to be union
members. The higher rate of female labor force participation in East Germany and its
increase in the West should reduce the gender diﬀerential.
² Education: Higher education generally implies a higher participation and workplace-related
involvement, hence increasing the propensity for unionization. However, higher education
is usually associated with higher professional status involving a closer relationship to man-
agement, which reduces the desire for a union voice. The latter eﬀect may outweigh the
former in particular for employees with a university degree, whereas the former may dom-
inate among workers with vocational training in comparison to less educated workers.
² Marital Status: If both partners of a couple are working, the risk of a job loss is diversiﬁed
to some extent, which reduces the need for job protection. However, married workers
are responsible not only for themselves but also for their family. This would increase the
propensity to be a union member, especially with children or when being the only earner.
² Citizenship: Foreigners can be expected to have a weaker attachment to the German
labor market and cultural diﬀerences might be an obstacle to unionization. Thus, a lower
unionization rate among foreigners is likely.
² Political Preference: The historically close relationship between the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) and unions suggests that individuals who share values of the Social Democrats
are more likely to be union members. There also exists a strong workers’ wing within the
Christian Democratic Party (CDU), suggesting a somewhat smaller positive eﬀect for the
CDU (relative to the omitted category).
² Wage: Membership fees increase with wages and a higher wage tends to be associated with
a higher professional status, both of which reduce the propensity to join a union. However,
higher wages may indicate higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, thus increasing the demand
for stability. Similar to education, a hump-shaped relationship may arise with a positive
inﬂuence for low wage levels and a negative one for higher wages.102 Union Membership
In closed shop systems as, e.g., in the United States, union membership itself may result
in higher wages; see the broad literature on union wage gaps surveyed in Card, Lemieux,
and Riddell (2003). In Germany, however, there are no wage eﬀects of union membership
per se at the individual level; compare the discussion in Goerke and Pannenberg (2004).
² Employee Status: Trade unions historically evolved as organizations of blue-collar work-
ers, whose relatively homogenous preferences accommodate unionization eﬀorts. A similar
argument applies to civil servants, who share a preference for a stable work environment.
Both of these groups are thus more likely to be union members compared to white-collar
workers. The latter have moved into the focus of union action only recently with the rel-
ative decline of blue-collar employment. With respect to working time, the weaker labor
market adherence of part-time workers renders them less likely to be union members than
full-time workers.
² Unemployment History: Employees who experienced unemployment in the past might join
a union to increase job protection. However, unemployment spells might be associated with
a lower attachment to the labor market, thus reducing membership. The overall eﬀect is
ambiguous.
² Job Satisfaction: In cooperation with works councils, unions provide a platform of voice and
support for dissatisﬁed workers. They can oﬀer legal advice and ﬁnancial support in case of
a lawsuit between employer and employee. Therefore, membership may be more attractive
for dissatisﬁed workers. However, union intermediation also facilitates communication and
understanding between employer and employees which will result in a higher degree of job
satisfaction. The overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
² Tenure: With increasing tenure, the worker accumulates more ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital,
which would call for protection. At the same time, an increasing job duration builds up
identiﬁcation with the job, trust, and loyalty towards the employer, thereby decreasing the
propensity to unionize. The overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
² Firm Size: The existence of ﬁxed set-up and organizational costs favors union recruitment
in larger ﬁrms. Larger ﬁrms also provide larger subsets of homogeneous workers which
accommodate recruitment eﬀorts. Works councils and supervisory boards in large ﬁrms
support union access to the ﬁrm. Large ﬁrms show more scope for rent sharing and,
therefore, the higher is the relevance of wage bargaining. All of these arguments imply a
positive eﬀect.
² Industry: Unions are traditionally pervasive in manufacturing and they are also strong in
the public sector, where competition is generally low and high rents exist which can beUnion Membership 103
shared between employees and employers. Private services, however, have less of a union
tradition, feature more heterogeneous work forces, and face ﬁerce competition in goods
and factor markets as well as rapid structural changes. All of these factors make union
recruitment eﬀorts more diﬃcult in private services.
Each of the above factors may inﬂuence union membership diﬀerently in East and West Germany,
and its impact may change over time. In addition, further unobserved individual factors (e.g.,
social customs) are likely to be of importance.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Correlated Random Eﬀects Probit Model
We employ a Chamberlain (1980)-Mundlack (1978)-type correlated random eﬀects probit model,
which allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity and to take account of possible correlation
of individual- speciﬁc eﬀects with observed characteristics. This is central because it is likely
that people’s attitudes towards unions diﬀer considerably and these attitudes are correlated with
observed characteristics.
Let union membership yit of individuals i = 1;2;:::;N in periods t = 1;2;:::;T be captured by a
binary choice model
yit =
(
1 if y¤
it ¸ 0
0 else
; (4.1)
where the latent variable y¤
it driving the membership decision of individual i in period t is a linear
function of observable characteristics xit and an unobservable individual-speciﬁc, time-invariant
eﬀect ci:
y¤
it = xit¯ + ci + uit: (4.2)
The error term uit is assumed to be normally distributed with unit variance in all periods. The
individual-speciﬁc eﬀect ci controls for unobserved heterogeneity in the membership decision.
What is more, we consider ci as a random eﬀect which can be correlated to some variables in xit.
In the tradition of Chamberlain (1980) and Mundlack (1978) we assume that ci is related to the
time averages ¹ xji of some variables xjit, and that it follows a conditional normal distribution
cijxi1;:::;xiT » N(¹ + ¹ xi»;¾2
²); (4.3)104 Union Membership
where ¾2
² is the variance of ²i in the regression ci = ¹ + ¹ xi» + ²i, therefore constituting the
conditional variance of ci. A detailed discussion of this model can be found in Wooldridge
(2002).
Given this speciﬁcation, the model can be written as
P(yit = 1jxi1;:::;xiT;ci) = ©(µ(xit¯ + ¹ + ¹ xi»)); (4.4)
where µ = (1+¾2
²)¡1=2. As in a standard random eﬀects probit model, the estimation of (4.4) is
straightforward. Adding ¹ xi is quite intuitive: ¯ estimates the eﬀect of xit on the union participa-
tion decision at time t, holding the time average ¹ xi ﬁxed. ¹ xi contributes to the decision through
its eﬀect on the time-invariant individual- speciﬁc eﬀect. Note that ci can only be correlated
to averages of time-varying variables, because the eﬀect of the average ¹ xji of a time-invariant
characteristic xjit could not be discriminated from the direct eﬀect of xjit itself. Furthermore,
a constant in xit cannot be distinguished from ¹. Details on the empirical model selection are
presented in the next section.
4.4.2 Data and Model Selection
We use data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a longitudinal survey of individuals
in private households in the Federal Republic of Germany. The GSOEP started in (West)
Germany in the year 1984, and it was extended to East Germany in 1990; see Haisken-DeNew
and Frick (2003) for detailed information on the GSOEP. Among others, questions related to
the labor market are at the heart of the yearly survey. The question of membership in a trade
union, however, is not included in every wave. Six waves contain accordant information for
West Germany: 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998, 2001, and 2003. For East Germany, we can use four
waves: 1993, 1998, 2001, and 2003. To analyze the determinants of employees’ union membership
decisions, we focus on individuals in gainful dependent employment who are aged between 16 and
65 years and who earn not more than DM15,000 per month.1 Deﬁnitions of variables considered
in the analysis can be found in tables 4.2 and 4.3 in the appendix. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report
summary statistics for our subsamples of West and East Germany, respectively.
In order to avoid the loss of a large number of observations due to missing values, we add dummy
variables for missings in single regressors into the regression equations. In particular, we include
dummy variables for missing values in ABITUR, FIRM-SIZE, and SECTOR since these variables
1 We consider the earnings threshold in order to measure the impact of EARNINGS in the main part of the
distribution, which is skewed to the right. Median earnings lie between DM2,000 (East, 1993) and DM3,000
(West, 2003) per month, and the 99% quantile varies between DM5,100 (East, 1993) and DM10,00 (West,
2003). However, there are outliers with earnings as high as DM31,400. Applying the earnings threshold, we
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contribute most to the problem of missing values. At the same time, some individuals appear in
several, but not in all sample periods—due to unemployment spells, for example. We control for
this by introducing missing-period dummies. For instance, a vector (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) is assigned
to West German individuals observed only in 1993 and 2001—that is, the third and the ﬁfth of
the six waves. Furthermore, time dummies and interactions of these with other regressors are
included to allow each of the eﬀects to vary between diﬀerent years.
We estimate several speciﬁcations of model (4.4), separately for both West and East Germany.
These speciﬁcations are as follows:
(A) Selected Model: The estimation of a random eﬀects probit model is computationally in-
volved due to the numerical integration needed. Therefore, we start by applying pooled
probit estimations, which are consistent and need signiﬁcantly less computation time, to
select variables for a preferred speciﬁcation. The resulting speciﬁcation is then estimated
and tested by means of a random eﬀects probit.
More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst apply a backward selection procedure to select those time-
average regressors in ¹ xi which are correlated to the individual- speciﬁc eﬀect. Start-
ing from a model which includes all xjit as well as averages of all time-varying regres-
sors, we stepwise drop the ¹ xji which is least signiﬁcant, until all remaining averages
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. At the end of this stage, the list of variables related to
the individual- speciﬁc eﬀect comprises for West Germany: CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT,
SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, WHITE-COLLAR, TRAINEE, UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY,
EARNINGS, FIRM-SIZE, and SECTOR. For East Germany, EARNINGS, TENURE,
FIRM-SIZE, and SECTOR turn out to be correlated to the individual- speciﬁc eﬀect.
Given the above choice of ¹ xi, we estimate speciﬁcations which include interactions of the
regressors xit with year dummies in order to allow for the possibility of time-varying coef-
ﬁcients. Again, eﬀects signiﬁcant at the 5% level are kept as time-varying. At this stage,
the variations of AGE and AGE SQUARED are tested jointly, and so are the variations
of EARNINGS and EARNINGS SQUARED as well as those of the SECTOR and the
FIRM-SIZE categories.
At the end, we estimate a correlated random eﬀects probit model using the selected vari-
ables and test it against a model which again includes averages of all time-varying re-
gressors. Joint signiﬁcance of the excluded variables is rejected for both West and East
Germany.
(B) Reduced Selected Model: Some regressors xjit which are generally time-varying show only
limited variation within individuals. For example, an individual’s educational attainment
rarely changes during his or her working life, and civil servants seldom change back to a106 Union Membership
private employer. Nevertheless, the averages of these variables might turn out signiﬁcant in
the selected model (A). This could be due to problems of multicollinearity, with the direct
eﬀects of xjit becoming insigniﬁcant. For this reason, we also estimate a model without
averages of educational attainment and vocational status variables.
(C) Benchmark Model: We further estimate a standard random eﬀects probit as a bench-
mark model. Here we use the same procedure as described above to consider time-varying
coeﬃcients, but we do not include any averages ¹ xi.
(D) IABS Model: Estimates of individual union membership status can be used to predict
union densities; compare section 4.5. Accordant predictions can be based on diﬀerent data
sets with larger sample sizes in order to achieve more detailed and more precise predic-
tions.2 In order to facilitate predictions for individuals in the IAB employment sample
(IAB Beschäftigtenstichprobe, IABS) 1975–2001, we estimate an additional speciﬁcation,
using only those explanatory variables which are available in the IABS. This speciﬁca-
tion excludes the variables CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT, SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, SATIS-
FACTION, TENURE, and MARRIED. The estimation for East Germany further excludes
UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY because the IABS oﬀers accounts for individuals in East
Germany from 1992 onward only. We also incorporate the fact that the IABS distinguishes
between diﬀerent vocational statuses only among full-timers. In all other respects the
selection process is the same as in (A).
(E) GSES Model: For the same purpose as in (D), we also estimate a speciﬁcation which
includes only variables available in the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES,
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung) 2001. We thus exclude CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT,
SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT, SATISFACTION, UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY, FOREIGNER,
and MARRIED. Since the GSES is a cross-sectional data set, this speciﬁcation is estimated
without averages ¹ xi.
4.4.3 Estimation Results
Estimated coeﬃcients for West and East Germany are reported in tables 4.6 and 4.7 in the
appendix. Note that there are only four speciﬁcations for East Germany because the selected
and the reduced selected speciﬁcation coincide for the East. In the following, we compare the
diﬀerent models and then turn to our preferred models in more detail.
2 Most large micro-level data sets for Germany—such as the administrative IAB employment sample or the
Structure of Earnings Survey carried out by the German Statistical Oﬃce—provide no information on union
membership. In order to take advantage of the big sample sizes of these data sets membership propensities
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Comparing ﬁrst the correlated random eﬀects models (A) and (B) to the benchmark models
(C), we ﬁnd signiﬁcance of several elements of » for both parts of the country. Individual-
speciﬁc eﬀects are in fact correlated to averages ¹ xi of some observed characteristics, for which
the eﬀects in the benchmark model are quite similar to the joint impact of the direct eﬀect and
the indirect eﬀect through ci in the models (A) and (B). Yet the economic reasoning behind the
estimated determinants is more subtle in the correlated models. The latter do not only take
account of direct impacts on the membership decision, but also allow for the possibility that
some determinants are correlated with unobserved individual-speciﬁc attitudes towards unions,
which again drive the membership decision. Given this richer interpretation and the statistical
signiﬁcance of », we prefer the models (A) and (B) to the benchmark ones (C). There are only
small diﬀerences of coeﬃcients ¯j for those variables xjit whose time-averages are not included.
When comparing the selected speciﬁcation (A) to the reduced selected model (B), we also ﬁnd
very similar eﬀects. In fact, the direct eﬀect of being a TRAINEE is even insigniﬁcant if the
corresponding average is included. This ﬁnding suggests multicollinearity between the regressor
and its average. Predictions based on either speciﬁcation should not diﬀer fundamentally, though.
Both speciﬁcations yield very similar percentages of correct predictions. Since, above all, the
true channel through which the determinants work is not clear a priori, we prefer the statistically
validated speciﬁcation (A).
The IABS models (D) and the GSES models (E) include only regressors that are also available
in the respective target data sets. Estimated coeﬃcients for the included variables are generally
very similar to the results obtained from the full models, and predictive power is also compa-
rable. More speciﬁcally, recalling that the GSES is a cross-sectional data set, the coeﬃcients
of speciﬁcations (E) match those from the benchmark models (C). The coeﬃcients of the IABS
models (D) match the results of speciﬁcations (A).
We now describe the preferred speciﬁcations (A) in more detail. Results for East and for West
Germany are remarkably similar despite some notable exceptions. First, the baseline (TIME
dummies) and the impacts of EARNINGS and UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY are the only
eﬀects which vary signiﬁcantly across time in the East, whereas some more eﬀects vary in the
West. On the one hand this is to be expected given the longer sample period for West Germany.
On the other hand, East-West convergence (Schnabel and Wagner, 2003) is likely to be driven by
changes in the East. Second, while MARRIED individuals ceteris paribus have a lower propensity
to be a union member in the West, the respective eﬀect is signiﬁcantly positive in the East. This
ﬁnding likely reﬂects East-West diﬀerences in labor force participation. Third, working PART-
TIME has the expected negative eﬀect in West Germany, but it has a positive but insigniﬁcant
eﬀect in East Germany. Fourth, diﬀerences between sectors are stronger in East Germany, and108 Union Membership
most direct SECTOR eﬀects are insigniﬁcant, possibly due to the relatively small number of
observations in some sectors (compare table 4.5) and to less within-individual variation.
The coeﬃcients are generally allowed to vary over time. However, most of the eﬀects do not
change signiﬁcantly. Those which do change mainly show a consistent, monotonic pattern. For
instance, both the linear eﬀect of AGE and the curvature eﬀect of AGE SQUARED decrease in
West Germany over some time, rendering the total impact less concave. In East Germany, the
impact of EARNINGS becomes also less concave. Thus, in contrast to Beck and Fitzenberger
(2004) and Schnabel and Wagner (2005), we ﬁnd some clear patterns of changes. For East
Germany, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive time eﬀect only for 1993, whereas for West Germany
there is a negative time trend throughout the entire sample period. Therefore, the estimated time
trend contributes to the continuous deunionization in West Germany but not in East Germany.
Turning to the eﬀects of the covariates, we can conﬁrm most of the hypotheses in section 4.3.
Women are less likely to be union members. The eﬀect of FOREIGNER is positive but not
signiﬁcant in East Germany. We further ﬁnd that a positive, concave impact of AGE. As ex-
pected, supporters of the Social Democrats (but not those of the Christian Democrats) have a
higher propensity to join a union. Regarding education, ABITUR and UNIVERSITY have a
sizeable negative impact, but the inﬂuence of APPRENTICESHIP is not as clear. In contrast
to SEMISKILLED and—even more substantially—SKILLED BLUE-COLLAR workers, CIVIL
SERVANTS and WHITE-COLLAR workers show a signiﬁcantly lower propensity. The eﬀect
for individuals working PART-TIME has the expected negative sign in West Germany, but it is
positive and insigniﬁcant in the East. The eﬀect of UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY is negative.
However, the eﬀect of average UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY is strongly positive. Employees
who have recently been unemployed are less likely to be union member due to their lower labor
market attachment, whereas employees who are generally at a higher risk of unemployment have
a higher need for protection. Job SATISFACTION shows virtually no eﬀect in the West and
only a limited one in the East.
The concave eﬀect of EARNINGS generally meets our expectations. As discussed above, the
impact becomes ﬂatter over time in East Germany. The EARNINGS eﬀect is more sizeable in
East Germany, being attenuated by converse eﬀects through average EARNINGS and average
EARNINGS SQUARED. The positive but small TENURE coeﬃcient supports the human capital
argument. In contrast, FIRM-SIZE shows a substantial positive impact. However, the diﬀerences
between ﬁrms with more than 200 employees and ones with more than 2000 are negligible. Finally,
considerable diﬀerences in unionization exist between industries. Compared to our reference
SECTOR “Miscellaneous Manufacturing (7)”, the large positive eﬀects of “Chemical Products
(5)” and the formerly public industries “Transport and Communication (11)” are most striking.Union Membership 109
In contrast, “Hotels and Restaurants (10)”, “Financial Intermediation (12)”, or “Other Services
(16)” show signiﬁcantly lower union membership.
4.5 Prediction and Decomposition Analysis
Based on our preferred models, we predict propensities to be a union member for each of the
individuals in our samples. These propensities can be averaged to an estimator for net union
density. More speciﬁcally, we estimate net union density NUDrt separately for regions r 2
fEast, Westg in each year t by
\ NUDrt = N¡1
rt
Nrt X
i=1
©
³
^ µrt(xirt^ ¯rt + ^ ¹rt + ¹ xir^ »rt)
´
: (4.5)
The observed as well as the predicted net union densities are depicted in ﬁgure 4.2. In general,
the predicted densities match the observed frequencies fairly well. Compared to the West, mem-
bership in East Germany started out at a higher level in the year 1993, but exhibited a stronger
decline afterwards. NUD for 1993 and 2003 were 38% and 19% in East and 27% and 21% in West
Germany.3 Aggregate NUD is about 10 percentage points (pp) lower than gross union density
(compare section 4.2).
We now investigate (1) the changes of NUD over time and (2) the diﬀerences in NUD between
East and West Germany by means of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) decomposition tech-
niques, which we adapt to the nonlinear probit framework. To decompose the changes of NUD
within the two regions between 1993 and 2003,4 we write
\ NUD2003 ¡ \ NUD1993 = (\ NUD2003 ¡ \ NUD
1993
2003)
| {z }
coeﬃcients eﬀect
+(\ NUD
1993
2003 ¡ \ NUD1993)
| {z }
characteristics eﬀect
(4.6)
= (\ NUD2003 ¡ \ NUD
2003
1993)
| {z }
characteristics eﬀect
+(\ NUD
2003
1993 ¡ \ NUD1993)
| {z }
coeﬃcients eﬀect
; (4.7)
where \ NUDt are estimated as described in equation (4.5). The decompositions (4.6) and (4.7)
diﬀer with respect to the chosen counterfactual densities \ NUD
~ t
t. In equation (4.6), \ NUD
1993
2003
3 Estimates of individual union membership can generally be used to predict densities for more narrowly deﬁned
labor market segments. Lorenz and Wagner (1991), Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999), and Beck and
Fitzenberger (2004), for instance, predict union densities for two-digit industries. In particular, the latter
studies impute membership propensities for individuals in the IAB employment sample, taking advantage of
the bigger sample size of this data set to achieve more detailed and more precise NUD predictions.
4 It would also have been possible to analyze the change for West Germany over the even longer period 1985–
2003. However, we opt for 1993–2003 in order to facilitate East-West comparisons in table 4.1.110 Union Membership
Figure 4.2: Net Union Density in East and West Germany
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denotes the prediction for individuals in the year 2003, assuming that the coeﬃcients stayed as in
1993. In equation (4.7), \ NUD
2003
1993 uses predictions for individuals in 1993 based on the coeﬃcients
of 2003. To investigate the sensitivity of the decomposition result, we compute both versions
(4.6) and (4.7).5 The characteristics eﬀect involves the part of the overall change between 1993
and 2003 which can be attributed to changes in personal, workplace, and social characteristics of
the individuals in the sample at given coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcients eﬀect captures the part which
is due to changes in the coeﬃcients at given characteristics. The necessary counterfactuals can
be estimated as averages analogous to equation (4.5).
For the diﬀerences between East (E) and West (W) Germany in any given year, we use
\ NUDW ¡ \ NUDE = (\ NUDW ¡ \ NUD
E
W)
| {z }
coeﬃcients eﬀect
+ (\ NUD
E
W ¡ \ NUDE)
| {z }
characteristics eﬀect
(4.8)
= (\ NUDW ¡ \ NUD
W
E )
| {z }
characteristics eﬀect
+(\ NUD
W
E ¡ \ NUDE)
| {z }
coeﬃcients eﬀect
; (4.9)
where the involved counterfactual densities \ NUD
~ r
r are deﬁned as above.
5 It is well-known that the decompositions resulting from the diﬀerent counterfactuals do not necessarily yield
identical results. Diﬀerent approaches to the issue of non-uniqueness have been proposed in the literature; see
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Silber and Weber (1999) for surveys. Yet each of the approaches relies on
ad-hoc assumptions of some type, so we choose to report the two most prominent cases.Union Membership 111
The results of the diﬀerent decompositions are reported in table 4.1. Standard errors to assess the
accuracy of the decompositions are obtained by means of a parametric bootstrap by resampling
from the estimated distribution of the parameters
¡
¯rt 0;¹rt;»rt 0;¾rt
²
¢0.
Table 4.1: Diﬀerences in Net Union Density: Decomposition Analyses
Net Union Density [%] Char. Coeﬀ.
1993 2003 Change Eﬀecta Eﬀecta
West 26.71 20.97 -5.74 -1.81 (0.58) -3.93 (0.80)
Germany (0.57) (0.61) (0.71) -0.4 (0.55) -5.34 (0.82)
East 38.03 18.78 -19.25 -3.56 (1.84) -15.69 (1.70)
Germany (1.67) (1.22) (1.12) -0.11 (1.64) -19.14 (2.18)
Diﬀerence -11.32 2.19
(1.75) (1.35)
Char.Eﬀectb 4.7 7.94 6.03 6.37
(4.27) (0.66) (2.77) (0.56)
Coeﬀ.Eﬀectb -16.02 -19.26 -3.84 -4.18
(4.13) (1.80) (2.80) (1.44)
a Counterfactual with characteristics of 2003/1993 in normal/italic font.
b Counterfactual with West/East characteristics in normal/italic font.
Standard errors in parentheses estimated by 1000 bootstrap resamples. Data source: GSOEP.
The results are not very sensitive to the choice of counterfactuals in (4.6) and (4.7), nor in (4.8)
and (4.9). Interpreting ﬁrst the (horizontal) decompositions of the changes in NUD over time,
both characteristics and coeﬃcients eﬀects contribute to the observed deunionization. However,
the coeﬃcients eﬀect dominates in almost all cases. The characteristics eﬀect does not explain
more than a third of the 6 pp decline in West Germany and does not even account for a ﬁfth of the
19 pp decline in the East. This result is in contrast to the ﬁnding in Beck and Fitzenberger (2004)
that the decline in union density in West Germany between the 1980’s and 1990’s was mainly
driven by changes in the composition of the work force.6 The small impact of the characteristics
eﬀect in East Germany is quite remarkable in light of the structural change during the 1990’s;
compare the summary statistics in tables 4.4 and 4.5. The strong coeﬃcients eﬀect involves the
negative time trend as well as changing impacts of particular characteristics.
Regarding the (vertical) East-West comparison, the characteristics eﬀects and the coeﬃcients
eﬀects generally work in opposite directions. The characteristics eﬀect is in favor of a higher
density in West Germany by 5 to 7 pp: The composition of the West German work force exhibits
more attributes supporting union membership. Thus, the higher NUD in East Germany in 1993
resulted from diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients in the order of 16 to 19 pp: For given characteristics,
6 Note that Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) do not apply decomposition techniques.112 Union Membership
East Germans were more strongly unionized than West Germans. This ﬁnding suggests a lower
quality of union membership matches in East Germany resulting from the widespread, arbitrary
recruitment after uniﬁcation. A stronger decline in union membership thus comes as no surprise.
Ten years later, in 2003, union density in East Germany is already 2 pp smaller than in West
Germany. The composition of the work force still being more in favor of union membership in
the West, the coeﬃcients in the two parts of the country have become more similar such that
the—still negative—coeﬃcients eﬀect has lost its bite.
4.6 Conclusions
The importance of unions in the German labor market is undisputed. However, the question why
people join a union is anything but beyond dispute. This study uses detailed micro-panel data
to provide insights into the determinants of individual union membership. We use the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to estimate membership equations for West (1985–2003) and
for East Germany (1993–2003). The application of a Chamberlain (1980)-Mundlack (1978)-type
correlated random eﬀects probit model controls for unobserved heterogeneity and allows for a
correlation between individual- speciﬁc eﬀects and observed characteristics.
Our ﬁndings quantify the inﬂuence of socio-demographic personal characteristics, such as age or
marital status; the inﬂuence of workplace characteristics, i.e., match, ﬁrm, or industry speciﬁc
eﬀects; and the inﬂuence of attitudinal factors for the individual choice to be or not to be a union
member. The membership equations are allowed to diﬀer between East and West Germany and
over time.
Projections of net union densities (NUD) based on our estimates consistently trace the trends
towards deunionization in both parts of the country. Compared to the West, membership in East
Germany started out from a higher level at the beginning of the 1990’s, but exhibited a stronger
decline afterwards. By the year 2003, NUD was even lower in East Germany than in the West.
Decomposition analyses shed light on (1) the changes in unionization over time and (2) on the
diﬀerences in NUD between the two regions. Changes in the composition of the work force do
in no case explain more than one third of the observed decline in NUD over time. In East-West
comparison, the West German work force exhibits more attributes supporting union member-
ship. The higher union density in East Germany in the year 1993 and the stronger subsequent
decline reﬂect a lower quality of membership matches resulting from the widespread, arbitrary
membership recruitment after uniﬁcation.
The erosion of union membership in Germany is likely to weaken the bargaining power of unions
and therefore the unions’ impact on the labor market (Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2005). DespiteUnion Membership 113
the still high coverage of collective agreements (especially in West Germany), the results of wage
bargaining are likely to deteriorate from the perspective of union members—but possibly result
in higher employment. We plan to explore the link between union membership, wages, and
employment in future research, for which the results of this study provide a necessary input.
4.A Additional Tables
Table 4.2: Description of Variables
Dummy Variables = 1 if true
MEMBER being a union member
FEMALE being female
MARRIED being married
FOREIGNER being a foreigner
Education:
ABITUR Abitur is the highest educational attainment
APPRENTICESHIP apprenticeship or a similar vocational training is
the highest professional degree
UNIVERSITY person has obtained a technical college or a university degree
Political Orientation:
CHRISTIAN-DEMOCRAT person feels close to the Christian Democratic Party
SOCIAL-DEMOCRAT person feels close to the Social Democratic Party
Vocational Status:
PART-TIME working part-time
SEMISKILL-BLUE being an unskilled or a semi-skilled blue-collar worker
SKILL-BLUE being a skilled blue-collar worker
WHITE-COLLAR being a white-collar worker
CIVIL SERVICE being employed in the civil service
TRAINEE being currently in professional training
UNEMPLOYMENT HISTORY person has been unemployed at least once during past 5 years
(10 years for 1985 wave)
Firm Size:
FIRM-SIZE19 ﬁrm has less than 20 employees
FIRM-SIZE199 ﬁrm has 20–199 employees
FIRM-SIZE1999 ﬁrm has 200–1999 employees
FIRM-SIZE_MORE ﬁrm has more than 1999 employees
SECTORj: working in sector ja
MISSINGt: person is not observed in year t
TIMEt: observation is in year t
Other Variables
AGE age of person divided by 10
EARNINGS total earnings last month in thousands of DM,
at constant prices (1985 = 100)
TENURE duration of employment in the current ﬁrm, in years
SATISFACTION satisfaction of the worker with her/his job, scaled from
0 (not satisﬁed) to 10 (very satisﬁed)
a See table 4.3 for the industry classiﬁcation and grouping of sectors.114 Union Membership
Table 4.3: NACE Industry Classiﬁcation in the GSOEP and Grouping
Used in our Empirical Analysis
No.a Industry NACEb
01 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Mining; Energy and
Water Supply
01–14, 40–41
02 Manufacture of Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 15–16
03 Textiles 17–19
04 Woodwork, Paper, Printing, Publishing 20–22
05 Chemical Products 23–26
06 Manufacture of Iron, Steel, Metal; Machinery; Vehicles 27–29, 34–35
07 Other Manufacturing; Recycling 30–33, 36–37, 96–97, 100
08 Construction 45
09 Trade 50–52
10 Hotels and Restaurants 55
11 Transport and Communication 60–64
12 Financial Intermediation 65–67
13 Education; Research 73, 80
14 Health Care System and Social Work 85
15 Public Administration and Defence, Social Security 75
16 Other Services 70–74, 90–95, 98–99
a Sector classiﬁcation used in the empirical analysis.
b GSOEP industry classiﬁcation based on 2-digit NACE.Union Membership 115
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics, West Germany
Variable 1985 1989 1993 1998 2001 2003
MEMBER 29.94 29.01 26.74 22.44 21.59 20.04
FEMALE 38.04 38.86 41.67 42.52 44.27 45.32
MARRIED 66.88 63.62 63.36 61.12 62.04 61.19
FOREIGNER 29.45 28.84 28.03 21.25 19.36 17.62
APPRENTICESHIP 59.09 60.42 59.51 64.57 63.51 64.15
ABITUR 8.90 9.73 11.45 15.48 17.36 18.29
MISSING_ABITUR 0.20 0.32 0.70 0.93 1.74 2.45
UNIVERSITY 8.80 8.84 9.73 13.23 15.39 15.88
CHR-DEM 11.50 8.62 10.06 9.54 10.01 12.83
SOC-DEM 30.15 29.75 21.09 24.20 24.10 21.18
PART-TIME 11.05 10.85 13.40 14.93 16.52 17.53
SEMISKILL-BLUE 29.52 30.03 26.60 21.57 20.46 18.51
SKILL-BLUE 20.68 18.29 18.10 16.20 16.41 15.24
WHITE-COLLAR 34.94 37.64 41.48 48.87 50.78 53.89
CIVIL SERVICE 8.26 7.67 7.67 7.86 7.29 7.59
TRAINEE 6.59 6.38 6.15 5.50 5.03 4.76
UNEMPL_HIST 18.47 9.71 7.84 9.91 9.84 7.24
FIRM-SIZE19 18.55 20.11 21.05 23.05 21.85 21.63
FIRM-SIZE199 26.96 26.95 26.01 26.03 27.11 25.63
FIRM-SIZE1999 22.30 25.20 25.46 25.76 23.32 22.99
FIRM-SIZE_MORE 27.88 27.48 27.17 24.99 23.55 24.04
MISSING_FIRM-SIZE 4.30 0.25 0.31 0.16 4.17 5.72
SECTOR01 2.11 2.25 2.46 2.34 2.00 1.97
SECTOR02 3.01 3.12 2.44 2.31 2.08 1.87
SECTOR03 3.05 3.09 2.31 1.22 0.95 0.83
SECTOR04 2.64 2.78 2.79 2.66 2.52 2.41
SECTOR05 5.44 6.25 6.61 6.14 5.15 4.92
SECTOR06 16.90 19.22 16.56 13.86 14.38 12.73
SECTOR07 6.16 7.46 7.03 8.79 6.68 6.38
SECTOR08 8.28 7.65 7.64 5.50 5.87 5.34
SECTOR09 7.75 9.15 11.18 12.88 12.67 11.34
SECTOR10 1.68 1.82 2.13 1.54 2.05 1.84
SECTOR11 4.81 4.53 5.03 4.62 4.75 4.48
SECTOR12 2.76 3.58 3.98 4.67 4.22 4.73
SECTOR13 4.05 4.05 3.93 4.38 4.57 4.99
SECTOR14 5.67 6.55 8.15 10.12 9.40 10.00
SECTOR15 8.16 8.39 8.24 8.02 8.04 8.45
SECTOR16 6.40 7.63 7.67 9.91 11.20 11.34
MISSING_SECTOR 11.11 2.48 1.85 1.04 3.44 6.38
AGE 3.76 3.74 3.78 3.84 3.92 3.98
EARNINGS 2.58 2.82 2.95 3.11 3.12 3.25
SATISFACTION 7.40 7.23 7.26 7.24 7.25 7.07
TENURE 9.76 10.16 9.84 10.17 10.15 10.65
N. of Obs. 5111 4719 4552 3765 3456 3149
Mean values of variables.
See text for details on the selected sample.
Data source: GSOEP.116 Union Membership
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics, East Germany
Variable 1993 1998 2001 2003
MEMBER 36.99 22.03 19.33 17.73
FEMALE 47.03 47.13 49.19 49.56
MARRIED 70.47 63.13 60.36 57.56
FOREIGNER 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.19
APPRENTICESHIP 75.37 74.79 71.40 72.11
ABITUR 16.17 17.96 21.35 23.00
MISSING_ABITUR 0.30 1.06 1.32 1.78
UNIVERSITY 28.14 27.22 27.79 27.89
CHR-DEM 7.91 7.75 10.64 14.74
SOC-DEM 10.48 9.98 11.05 9.97
PART-TIME 7.22 9.48 12.14 14.55
SEMISKILL-BLUE 12.76 12.10 12.43 11.25
SKILL-BLUE 30.02 26.77 25.43 24.78
WHITE-COLLAR 48.22 49.25 49.71 52.16
CIVIL SERVICE 1.68 3.51 4.32 4.45
TRAINEE 7.32 8.31 8.06 7.37
UNEMPL_HIST 12.17 19.91 19.85 15.44
FIRM-SIZE19 24.48 29.50 27.10 24.71
FIRM-SIZE199 33.68 34.30 33.03 31.39
FIRM-SIZE1999 22.45 19.07 18.12 19.63
FIRM-SIZE_MORE 18.74 16.68 16.46 16.96
MISSING_FIRM-SIZE 0.64 0.45 5.29 7.31
SECTOR01 7.42 4.91 4.09 3.56
SECTOR02 1.53 1.56 1.61 1.65
SECTOR03 0.89 0.89 1.09 1.21
SECTOR04 1.73 1.73 1.61 1.72
SECTOR05 3.51 3.07 2.47 2.67
SECTOR06 8.51 7.53 8.29 7.56
SECTOR07 3.96 6.41 4.55 4.76
SECTOR08 12.41 10.93 9.72 7.12
SECTOR09 11.67 12.16 13.23 11.94
SECTOR10 1.68 1.84 2.59 2.48
SECTOR11 7.67 5.41 5.06 4.83
SECTOR12 2.52 2.96 2.99 3.30
SECTOR13 7.17 5.19 6.67 6.16
SECTOR14 8.85 11.82 11.45 10.67
SECTOR15 11.18 10.82 9.32 9.97
SECTOR16 7.52 11.43 10.99 10.86
MISSING_SECTOR 1.78 1.34 4.26 9.53
AGE 3.72 3.83 3.89 3.94
EARNINGS 2.07 2.44 2.45 2.59
SATISFACTION 6.42 6.72 6.76 6.55
TENURE 6.91 7.27 7.54 8.30
N. of Obs. 2022 1793 1738 1574
Mean values of variables.
See text for details on the selected sample.
Data source: GSOEP.Union Membership 117
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.5 Equal Pay for Equal Work? On Union Power and
the Structure of Wages in West Germany, 1985–1997
5.1 Introduction
The inﬂuence of institutions on economic performance in general, and on wage setting in the
labor market in particular, is currently under debate (OECD 2004, 2006). In times of increas-
ingly heterogeneous economic conditions the catchword is eurosclerosis, stating that institutional
rigidities restrain labor market performance and the dynamics of economic development. A ma-
jor focus is on the impact of trade unions; see, e.g., the handbook of Addison and Schnabel
(2003).
The main channel for unions to inﬂuence the wage structure is via collective bargaining. In Ger-
many, this inﬂuence goes beyond mere negotiating of wage premia for union members since collec-
tive agreements on individual membership premia are forbidden by constitutional law. Given the
high rate of collective bargaining coverage in the German labor market, union-bargained wages
apply to the major part of all employees and unions inﬂuence the wage structure of members as
well as of non-members.1
How does union power aﬀect wage levels and the degree of wage dispersion against this back-
ground? Do unions aim to realize “equal pay for equal work”? That is, does the impact of
unions reduce residual wage inequality between employees with similar observable characteris-
tics? Moreover, does union power also reduce wage dispersion between employees with diﬀerent
characteristics? Are the eﬀects asymmetric across the conditional wage distribution, correspond-
ing to a minimum wage argument, for instance? Is there a trade-oﬀ between reduced inequality
1 It is generally possible to distinguish between union members and non-members when applying opening clauses.
For example, the metalworking industry union IG Metall negotiated bonuses exclusively for their members in
some ﬁrm-level agreements in the collective bargaining area of North Rhine-Westphalia; see Berliner Zeitung
(2004). However, such discriminatory agreements constitute rare exceptions. Firms do not want to create
incentives for their employees to become union members.
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and higher wage levels, such that a reduction in wage inequality comes along with a lower wage
level? And did any of the eﬀects change over time?
In order to answer these questions, our paper draws a detailed descriptive picture of the correla-
tion between union membership and the wage structure in the German labor market. We argue
that net union density is a good proxy for union power because of the associated ﬁnancial power
and the personal representation within ﬁrms, both governing the union’s threat point in the col-
lective bargaining process and therefore determining the bargaining outcome. This approach is
complementary to studies based on collective bargaining coverage which focus on the application
of bargaining agreements.
Since there is no detailed information on net union densities available for Germany, we employ
estimations by Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) to impute propensities to be a union member
for individuals in the IAB employment sample (IAB Beschäftigtenstichprobe, IABS) 1975–1997.
Taking averages of these propensities, we project net union densities (NUD) for adequately
deﬁned labor market segments in the period 1985–1997 and analyze the correlation of NUD on
the one hand and measures of the wage structure within and between the segments on the other.
Our descriptive results show that a higher net union density is ceteris paribus associated with
a lower wage level and reduced residual wage dispersion. This—possibly surprising—result is
in line with an insurance motive for union membership as discussed by Agell and Lommerud
(1992) and Burda (1995). Furthermore, skill wage diﬀerentials are smaller in segments with
strong unions, too—the union’s impact even goes beyond “equal pay for equal work”. Finally,
wage compression is in fact asymmetric and occurs notably in the lower parts of the distribution.
This ﬁnding corresponds to a minimum wage interpretation of union-negotiated wages.
The course of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 motivates the use of net union
density as a proxy for union power and sketches theoretical considerations about the relation-
ship between union power and the distribution of wages. Section 5.3 provides a brief overview
of complementary microeconometric studies of the German collective bargaining system. Our
empirical analysis is conducted in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Union Power, Union Density, and the Distribution of Wages
In this section we discuss the use of union density as a measure of trade union power and we
outline considerations in the theoretical literature in order to derive testable hypotheses on the
relationship between union membership on the one hand and wage levels and wage dispersion
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5.2.1 Measuring Labor Market Institutions
In the tradition of Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988), cross-country comparative studies usually use
single indices to reduce dimensionality when operationalizing labor market institutions; see the
surveys in Kenworthy (2001, 2003), OECD (1997, 2004), or Schettkat (2003). Corresponding
empirical evidence on the relationship between the institutional design of the labor market on
the one hand and measures of economic performance such as GDP, unemployment rates, and
the level of wages on the other hand, is generally ambiguous. The only exception is a stable
correlation of institutional settings and the wage structure: Higher degrees of centralization and
coordination of wage bargaining are ceteris paribus associated with lower wage dispersion; see
the synopses in Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), Blanchﬂower (2006), Flanagan (1999), Gerlach and
Meyer (1995), OECD (1997, 2004), and the handbook articles of Blau and Kahn (1999) and
Nickell and Layard (1999). Blau and Kahn (1996) ﬁnd an asymmetric eﬀect such that a higher
degree of centralization compresses the wage distribution mainly from below.
Schettkat (2003) oﬀers a two-step interpretation of institutional impacts and points out that in
contrast to the negative correlation between centralization or coordination and wage dispersion
in the ﬁrst step, there is a lack of unambiguous evidence on the relationship between wage
dispersion and (un)employment in the second step.
In addition to the sensitivity with respect to the chosen measure, comparative studies based on
single measures exhibit several shortcomings. For example, Soskice (1990) and Rowthorn (1992)
emphasize the concomitant importance of coordination and centralization. Changes of institu-
tional settings over time (Wallerstein and Western, 2000) should be taken into account as well as
the endogeneity of institutions (Flanagan, 1999). According to Acemolgu, Aghion, and Violante
(2001), skill-biased technological change may be responsible for the deunionization trends in re-
cent decades. Moreover, the eﬀect of particular institutional elements is likely to interfere with
further country-speciﬁc institutions; see, e.g., Hübler and Jirjahn (2003), Jirjahn (2003), and
Klikauer (2004) on the interaction of collective bargaining, union representation, and ﬁrm-level
co-determination in Germany. Fitzenberger and Franz (1994) conclude that detailed institutional
knowledge is necessary in order to judge the actual design of the German wage-setting system.
Country-speciﬁc studies based on micro data can meet the requirement to interpret institutional
eﬀects with reference to social norms within society (Flanagan, 1999). Against this background,
our study focuses on union power and the structure of wages in the German labor market.
5.2.2 Union Density as a Measure of Union Power
The game theoretical literature puts emphasis on the “bargaining power” of negotiating parties,
which empirical studies need to operationalize. In the Anglo-Saxon literature union power is128 Equal Pay for Equal Work?
deﬁned as the product of union density and the union wage gap; see Addison, Bailey, and
Siebert (2004). This concept is inappropriate for the German case because collective agreements
constituting discriminatory wage policies with disadvantages for non-members are forbidden by
constitutional law (negative freedom of association, negative Koalitionsfreiheit, Grundgesetz Art.
9). As wage gains from union membership are not internalized, there exists a free-rider problem
of missing individual incentives to join a union.2 In fact, the scope of collective agreements
goes beyond the organized parties. Wages set at the ﬁrm level as well as individually bargained
wages are geared to collective bargaining agreements, be it in order to reduce transaction costs
or to avoid incentives for employees to join a union. In West Germany collective agreements
are binding for the majority of workers; see Kohaut and Schnabel (2003a, 2003b).3 Prevalent
wage-setting models in the literature therefore even assume that collective bargaining agreements
apply to all employees; see, e.g., Fitzenberger (1999), chapter 6.
Firms’ decision whether to apply collective bargaining agreements is pivotal to the degree of
bargaining coverage. Having said that, net union density governs the union’s threat point in the
collective bargaining process and therefore is pivotal to the outcome of the bargaining. The more
union members pay membership fees, the better is the union’s funding. Yet ﬁnancial obligations
also increase with the size of the union. Relative ﬁnancial power thus is best represented by net
union density deﬁned as the share of contributors among all potentially represented workers. In
case of industrial conﬂicts, higher ﬁnancial power enables the union to pay strike beneﬁts for a
longer period of time. This increases individual support for union action, the probability and the
length of a strike, and therefore the expected damage inﬂicted upon employers.4 Furthermore,
ﬁnancially powerful unions can invest more in public relations in order to sanitize their public
image. The more homogenous the public appearance of union representatives is, the higher is
the sustainability of press coverage. Again, the focus is on union density instead of absolute
size since union growth is associated with increased heterogeneity within the union. Conﬂicting
interests and contradictory statements then undermine the union’s representative role; see also
Ebbinghaus (2003) and Keller (2005).
In sum, a high net union density strengthens the union’s position in the wage bargaining process.
The succeeding analysis of the eﬀect of union power on the wage structure thus builds on union
2 However, there are additional motives for union membership. The literature discusses selective incentives
provided in addition to public goods (Olson, 1965), collective-voice mechanisms (Hirschmann, 1970), or the
existence of social norms (Akerlof, 1980; Booth, 1985).
3 Collective agreements can also be declared generally binding by the Minister for Labor and Social Aﬀaires.
The direct impact of this provision may be of minor relevance—only 0.8% of all employees subject to social
security contributions are covered by agreements which are binding by declaration (BMWA, 2004). Yet the
mere possibility of such a declaration constitutes incentives per se; see OECD (1994).
4 Skeels and McGrath (1997) conﬁrm this aspect for the US. They ﬁnd that more liquid funds per union member
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membership data. This approach is complementary to studies of bargaining coverage and the
application of collective wage agreements, which are discussed in section 5.3 below.
5.2.3 Union Power and the Distribution of Wages
Bargaining models regard the negotiation of wages as a rent-sharing problem, the solution to
which depends on the bargaining power of the negotiating parties. Classical models predict a
monotonic positive (negative) relationship between union power and the level of bargained wages
(employment); see the surveys of Farber (1986) and Oswald (1985).
Some more recent studies incorporate eﬀects on higher moments of the wage distribution in
addition to eﬀects on the wage level. Agell and Lommerud (1992) and Burda (1995) focus on
wage dispersion and discuss an insurance motive for union membership. Faced with uncertainty
of future productivity or wages, risk aversive employees a priori have a taste for wage compression.
Unions act as agents of the work force and bargain for a compression of the wage distribution
relative to the productivity distribution. The compression comes at the price of an insurance
premium in the form of a reduced wage level.5 Ceteris paribus, the degree of wage compression
is higher, the higher the bargaining power of the union.
Ex ante, individuals prefer wage compression along unobservable as well as observable dimensions
which may inﬂuence future productivity. For instance, they might demand insurance against
negative shocks to their skill level or secure smoothed earnings over the life cycle. Ex post, union
membership is irrational for individuals who have reached a position in the upper part of the
(conditional) wage distribution and who may expect to keep this position because, say, match-
speciﬁc information about their productivity has been revealed in the course of their working
life. In this case the insurance motive would be time inconsistent. Unions could counteract this
problem by approving an increase of wage inequality with increasing age or experience of the
employees.
In the reasoning above, wage diﬀerences result from diﬀerences in workers’ marginal productivity.
Besides, search and matching theories (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) stress the importance
of imperfect information and the existence of search frictions for match-speciﬁc rents, which can
cause wage dispersion even among individuals with identical characteristics. In case of wage-
posting by the ﬁrms, workers also accept wage oﬀers which are below their marginal productivity.
Unions, equipped with higher bargaining power than individual workers, counteract the monop-
sony power of the ﬁrms and retard downward deviations, realizing a lower wage dispersion.
5 If the wage distribution is skewed to the right the redistribution motive is consistent with median voter models
of the union; see Burda (1990), Farber (1986), and Freeman (1982). The reallocation implied by a compressed
wage structure can be understood as a substitute for explicit means of redistribution such as taxation; see
Agell (1999, 2002).130 Equal Pay for Equal Work?
By enforcing “equal pay for equal work” unions additionally seek to limit favoritism and dis-
crimination by superiors and colleagues, and to encourage solidarity among the work force; see
Freeman (1982).
On principle, union action can also work towards higher wage dispersion. For example, some
search and matching models predict that, in the absence of unions, ﬁrms pay the reservation
wage to all workers, regardless of their actual productivity. This would lead to wage compression
if the distribution of reservation wages was more compressed than the productivity distribution.
Again, powerful unions would claim a share of the match speciﬁc rents, now enforcing a higher
wage dispersion. It is also conceivable that powerful unions generally enforce a high level of
wages when bargaining with successful ﬁrms, but oﬀer opening clauses or renegotiations to ﬁrms
ﬂourishing less; see, e.g., Fitzenberger and Franz (2000).
Due to the extreme assumptions underlying the arguments for a positive correlation, empirical
evidence is unlikely to match these arguments. Instead, we expect a negative correlation between
union power and wage dispersion, and we anticipate a trade-oﬀ between reduced inequality and
a higher wage level; see also Calmfors (1993).
At any rate, the impact of unions on the wage structure likely varies across the wage distribution.
If collective wages serve as wage ﬂoors, the (conditional) wage distribution is compressed from
below. In the wage bargaining model of Büttner and Fitzenberger (2003) eﬃciency wages are paid
in the upper part of a productivity distribution, whereas union-bargained wages above marginal
productivity are binding for less productive matches. This is in line with the perception of unions
which represent mainly less productive employees, striving for higher wages particularly at the
lower end of the distribution. Then, compression of the wage distribution from below is the
higher, the stronger the inﬂuence of the union.
Referring to the interaction of industry-level collective agreements and local wage formation,
Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998) consider two kinds of wage ﬂexibility. Wages can react to the
overall economic conditions (operationalized by the national rate of unemployment) as well as to
local conditions (regional unemployment rates): Baseline wages are set at the industry level with
respect to the economy-wide environment, but deviations are negotiated under consideration of
the particular conditions at the local level. In this case, a high impact of the national unemploy-
ment rate on the remuneration of low-skilled workers at the lower end of the wage distribution
reﬂects a minimum wage interpretation of industry-level contract wages. Since union inﬂuence
is greater at the industry level than at the local level, this ﬁnding also alludes to the asymmetry
of the union impact across the wage distribution.
In sum, we expect to ﬁnd a positive correlation of union power and the degree of wage compression
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5.3 Complementary Empirical Studies for Germany
Bargaining coverage, as measured by the share of employment contracts following collective
agreements, was relatively stable in West Germany until the end of the 1990’s. Yet union
density, which had also shown mere variation with the business cycle in former decades, has
been declining distinctly since the end of the 1980’s; see Franz (2003) and OECD (2004) for
overviews of the German collective bargaining system and Ebbinghaus (2003) and Bosch (2004)
for comprehensive inquiries into recent institutional developments. Detailed insights can be
gained on the basis of micro data. This section surveys related studies in the literature which
scrutinize the design of the collective bargaining system or analyze institutional wage eﬀects.
5.3.1 The Collective Wage Bargaining System
Individual determinants of union membership are estimated by Lorenz and Wagner (1991),
Fitzenberger, Haggeney, and Ernst (1999), and Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) based on diﬀer-
ent waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and by Schnabel and Wagner (2003,
2005) based on data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The eﬀects of socio-
demographic personal and job-related characteristics6 on individual decisions to join a union are
found to be rather similar in West Germany across the diﬀerent waves, and eﬀects have also
converged between East and West Germany during the ﬁrst decade after uniﬁcation. Therefore,
the decline in union membership during the 1990’s is to a large extent attributed to composition
eﬀects among the labor force. In light of the free-rider problem of union membership, the study
of Goerke and Pannenberg (2004), which is also based on the GSOEP, explicitly addresses the
impact of social norms on individual propensities to join a union.
Collective bargaining coverage is markedly lower in East Germany than in the West, and it
has been declining in both parts of the country in recent years. This “erosion” is examined by
several studies using ﬁrm data. Based on the IAB establishment panel, Kohaut and Bellmann
(1997), Bellmann, Kohaut, and Schnabel (1999), and Kohaut and Schnabel (2003b) estimate de-
terminants of ﬁrms’ decision to apply collective wage agreements. Kohaut and Schnabel (2003a)
diﬀerentiate between a direct commitment to collective agreements and ﬁrm-level or individual
agreements which are geared to the collective ones. Age and skill level of the work force and
ﬁrm size positively aﬀect the probability of bargaining coverage apart from industry-speciﬁc ef-
fects. In addition, the existence of a works council signiﬁcantly reduces the propensity of a ﬁrm
to abolish collective coverage. Survey evidence from works councils discussed in Bispinck and
6 See Schnabel (1993) for an extensive discussion of various personal and job-related determinants of union
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Schulten (2003) reconﬁrms tendencies to more decentralized wage setting in recent years; see also
Bosch (2004).
5.3.2 Eﬀects of the Wage Bargaining System
The design of the collective wage bargaining system aﬀects the level and the dispersion of wages.
There is a vast literature on union wage eﬀects in Anglo-Saxon systems; see Card, Lemieux, and
Riddell (2003) for an overview. However, this literature is of limited relevance for the case of
Germany as collective agreements on membership premia are forbidden by constitutional law
(negative freedom of association); see also Schmidt (1994).
Using diﬀerent cross sections (1990, 1995, 2001) of the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES,
Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung) for Lower-Saxony, Gerlach and Stephan (2002, 2005a,
2005b) estimate wage distributions for labor market regimes with and without collective and
ﬁrm-level wage agreements. In the manufacturing sector, average hourly wages paid in
accordance with a collective or a ﬁrm-level agreement are higher than the average of
individually negotiated wages. Yet unconditional as well as conditional wage dispersion is
highest among individual contracts. Similar results are obtained in Statistisches Landesamt
(2004) based on the SES subsample for Baden-Württemberg. Multi-level regression models in
Stephan and Gerlach (2003, 2005) reveal that diﬀerences in the wage level are consistent with a
higher base wage in case of collective coverage. Returns to human capital—skill, experience,
and tenure—as well as residual wage dispersion are lower under collective coverage. Gerlach
and Stephan (2006) ﬁnd that collective agreements compress within-ﬁrm compensation schemes
across occupations.
Dustmann and Schönberg (2004) focus on the relationship between collective coverage and pro-
fessional training. Firms applying collective contracts as a commitment device ceteris paribus
employ a higher share of workers with an apprenticeship degree. Moreover, the employed linked
data of the IAB employment statistics and the IAB establishment panel suggest that under col-
lective coverage, employee turnover is higher, wage cuts happen more often, and (conditional)
wages have a lower variance.
Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998) analyze the joint impacts of industry-level collective bargaining
and local agreements on the wage distribution; compare section 5.2.3. Using the IAB employment
sample (IABS), they ﬁnd that overall economic conditions—as measured by the national rate of
unemployment—are taken into account at the centralized level of wage bargaining. Resulting
contract wages work as minimum wages and aﬀect the wage distribution mainly in the lower
part. On the other hand, local speciﬁcs—captured by regional unemployment rates—result in
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cell-data regressions for the period 1976–1990 further indicate that union inﬂuence reduces wage
dispersion: A higher net union density ceteris paribus comes along with an (albeit insigniﬁcant)
increase in wages at low quantiles of the distribution and a (signiﬁcant) decrease at higher
quantiles.
Also drawing on the IABS 1975–1990, Fitzenberger (1999, chapter 6) estimates a structural model
of industry-level wage bargaining. In this study, a union maximizes a Stone-Geary utility function
with speciﬁc weights for employment, average wages, and—in some of the speciﬁcations—wage
dispersion within two skill classes of the work force. In line with a right-to-manage assumption
as in Pencavel and Holmlund (1988), employment is determined by the ﬁrms. There are eﬀects
of habit formation in the function weights for employment and average wages, and unions put
speciﬁc emphasis on the employment goal. In speciﬁcations which include wage dispersion in
the objective, unions put a positive weight on the reduction of dispersion and make concessions
in particular with respect to the employment goal. In manufacturing, an increase in net union
density is associated with a signiﬁcantly stronger preference for high employment relative to the
wage levels and the reduction of wage dispersion.
5.4 Empirical Analysis
This section draws a detailed descriptive picture of the relationship between union power and
the wage structure within and between segments of the German labor market. The analysis is
based on the IAB employment sample (IAB Beschäftigtenstichprobe, IABS) 1975–1997, which
is appreciated for its big sample size and exact administrative wage information; see Bender,
Hilzendegen, Rohwer, and Rudolph (1996) and Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000) for detailed de-
scriptions of the data set. In order to circumvent a number of selection problems, we focus on
prime-age males employed full-time in West Germany; see the appendix for a review of our data
selection. Since the IABS does not provide data on union membership, Beck and Fitzenberger
(2004) employ survey information provided with the waves 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 of the
GSOEP to estimate determinants of individual union membership decisions. Estimated determi-
nants are rather stable over time and are thus used to predict probabilities to be a union member
for individuals in the IABS over the period 1985–1997.
For our analysis we additionally allow the individual propensities—i.e., the predicted
probabilities—to vary by industry sector in case of workers who were employed in diﬀerent
sectors within a year. Net union densities for diﬀerent labor market segments can then be
estimated by means of aggregation. The following sections motivate our segmentation,
illustrate developments of union membership, and analyze the correlation between union
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In light of the literature on bargaining coverage and the wage structure summarized in the pre-
vious section, it would be desirable to simultaneously analyze the eﬀects of collective bargaining
coverage and union density on the wage structure. Unfortunately, this is not possible as the
IABS does not provide information on bargaining coverage.7
A further alternative to our approach would be to use the GSOEP for the entire analysis. On
principle, labor market segments could be constructed (as explained in the next section) with the
GSOEP in the same manner as with the IABS data. However, the much smaller sample size of
the GSOEP would result in a set of cells with very few or even no observations. Corresponding
estimates of the conditional wage structure, which are central to our analysis, would be rather
inaccurate. For this reason we rely on the IABS to generate measures of the wage structure
and only impute union membership from GSOEP results. At the chosen level of aggregation the
prediction error should be largely negligible such that our estimates are not signiﬁcantly biased
by measurement error.
The evolution of the German wage structure over the last decades has been extensively docu-
mented in the literature; see Fitzenberger and Kohn (2006), Fitzenberger and Kurz (2003), Kohn
(2006) and the literature cited therein. We thus refrain from an expatiated discussion at this
point.
5.4.1 Labor Market Segments and the Operationalization of Union Power and Wage
Inequality
In order to partition the labor market, we ﬁrst deﬁne cells spanned by the dimensions time (13
years) £ age (seven ﬁve-year classes for individuals aged between 25 and 60 years) £ industry
(17 sectors).
The industry dimension is central to analyses of the wage structure; see Krueger and Summers
(1988) and Bellmann and Gartner (2003), Bellmann and Möller (1995), or Fitzenberger and Kurz
(2003) for the case of Germany. Not only do these studies ﬁnd inter-industry wage diﬀerentials,
but they also detect asymmetries such as greater dispersion for higher wage quantiles. In addition,
union strength traditionally varies between industries; see Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) who
highlight signiﬁcant inter-industry diﬀerences in union density. Table 5.5 in the appendix contains
our grouping of industry sectors.
Employees age as they advance on the life cycle path. The interaction of age and time then
allows to study cohort eﬀects on the wage structure (Fitzenberger and Kohn, 2006). In the
7 For this reason, the use of linked employer-employee data—such as the newly available LIAB data—is war-
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context of union membership, the age dimension further promises information about the ex-
post rationality of membership. Besides, age serves as an—albeit imperfect—proxy for work
experience. Educational attainment likewise measures the formal qualiﬁcation of an employee.
We distinguish between three skill classes: high-skilled employees with a university or technical
college degree, medium-skilled employees who have completed a vocational training, and low-
skilled employees with neither university nor apprenticeship degree.
The deﬁnition of cells is advantageous for two reasons. First, it reﬂects the structure of the
German wage bargaining system. The sector classiﬁcation accounts for the fact that collective
negotiations take place at the industry level. The observation that collective agreements further
diﬀerentiate between various wage groups is captured by the dimensions age and skill. Unfortu-
nately, an additional segmentation by regions is not possible because the number of observations
in the respective cells would get too small. In each cell z we calculate net union density NUDz,
our measure of union power, as the mean of individual membership propensities, weighted by
the durations of the respective employment spells. The cell level aggregation enables us to an-
alyze the eﬀect of union power independently of individual membership. As pointed out in the
discussion in section 5.3.2 above, it would not make sense to estimate individual membership
premia.
Second, the cell-level approach allows us to study both wage dispersion between the deﬁned
segments and residual wage dispersion, which remains within the homogenous segments. Due to
the censoring of wages at the social security taxation threshold, we estimate cell-speciﬁc wage
levels (LNWz) using Tobit regressions of individual log real wages on a constant:
lnwiz = LNWz + ²iz: (5.1)
The regressions are run separately for each industry£age£time-cells z, weighting individual
observations i by the length of the respective employment spells. Measures of wage dispersion
between skill groups, i.e., skill premia BHz for the high-skilled and (negative) premia BLz for
the low-skilled, are obtained from analogous Tobit regressions
lnwiz = LNWMz + BLz ¢ DLiz + BHz ¢ DHiz + ²iz (5.2)
which contain dummies for low (DL) and for high-skilled workers (DH) as additional regressors.
The level eﬀect LNWMz now comprises the average wage of a medium-skilled worker.
Quantile diﬀerences QD serve as measures of cell-speciﬁc unconditional wage dispersion. We
focus on the diﬀerence between the fourth and the ﬁrst quintile, QD8020, and on the diﬀerences
QD5020 and QD8050 in order to examine asymmetries across the distribution. In addition, the
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However, ¾TOBIT depends on the functional form of the Tobit speciﬁcation, and so we intend
to additionally employ quantile diﬀerences from conditional log wage distributions. For this
purpose, we take skill as an additional cell dimension and estimate equation (5.1) separately
for industry£age£skill£time-cells ~ z. Compared to the ﬁrst approach above, this approach has
the disadvantage that the number of observations gets rather small in several cells and that—
especially for the high-skilled—the censoring problem is more severe such that larger parts of the
data cannot be used for the analysis. However, it oﬀers the advantage that quantile diﬀerences
QD are additionally conditioned on the skill level of the workers. We therefore obtain a measure
for residual wage dispersion which is independent of any underlying distribution, and we can
examine asymmetries as well.
5.4.2 Evolution of Net Union Density
Net union density varies between 4.4 and 85.1% in the diﬀerent segments. In order to capture
the variation along diﬀerent dimensions, table 5.6 in the appendix shows the results of weighted
regressions of NUD on the components industry, age, and time (column 2) as well as additionally
on skill (column 4).
Diﬀerences by industry are most prominent. Union density is highest in the formerly state-owned
postal and railway services, and it is lowest in ﬁnancial intermediation. Moreover, union density
ceteris paribus increases with age. Insofar as this ﬁnding reﬂects an actual age eﬀect, membership
does not decline over the life cycle and there is no evidence for a lack of ex-post rationality of
membership. Yet an interpretation as a cohort eﬀect is also intuitive: Younger cohorts do not
identify themselves with unions as much as older cohorts. With respect to diﬀerences by skill
level, net union density among the low-skilled is only marginally higher than NUD among the
medium-skilled, whereas NUD is lower by 12 percentage points among the high-skilled, ceteris
paribus. The time dummies further indicate that NUD remained relatively stable during the
1980’s but it has declined signiﬁcantly since 1990.
Figure 5.2 in the appendix illustrates these trends by plotting NUD by industries against age
for the two cross sections 1985 and 1997.8 Again, the signiﬁcant diﬀerences across industries
are striking. In the year 1985, NUD increases uniformly with age in almost all industries. The
only exception is the oldest age group, from which union members disproportionately select into
early retirement. The 1997 cross section reveals that the decline in NUD is heavily borne by
decreasing membership rates among younger cohorts. Moreover, the decline is the more distinct
8 The evolution of NUD is rather similar across skill levels. So it is unlikely that our results merely reﬂect the
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the higher the base level of industry-speciﬁc NUD. This leads to a continuing compression of
the membership structure across industries.
5.4.3 Net Union Density and the Structure of Wages
We regress the measures of wage level and wage dispersion on NUD in order to quantify the
eﬀect of union power on the wage structure. Dummy variables for the cell dimensions control
for additional eﬀects in the determination of the wage bargaining outcome.9 Tables 5.1 to 5.4
report the ceteris paribus eﬀects of a transition from a situation without union representation
(NUD = 0) to a situation with full representation (NUD = 1). In the following, we discuss
marginal eﬀects resulting from an increase in net union density by one percentage point.
Table 5.1: Net Union Density and the Structure of Wages I
Level LNW LNWM LNW50
NUD -0.249 -0.255 -0.355
(0.049) (0.045) (0.051)
# Cells 1545 1545 1545
Dispersion QD8020 QD5020 QD8050 BU BH ¾TOBIT
NUD -0.530 -0.427 -0.144 0.565 -0.239 -0.248
(0.089) (0.054) (0.044) (0.076) (0.095) (0.036)
# Cells 1235 1545 1235 1545 1513 1545
Estimations by weighted least squares, cells weighted by cell-speciﬁc employment. Exclusion of cells censored at
the 50% quantile (80% quantile for QD8020 and QD8050). Covariates: dummies for time, age, and industry.
White robust standard errors in parentheses. Data source: extended IABS 1985–1997.
Table 5.1 displays evidence for industry£age£time-cells z. An increase in NUD by one per-
centage point ceteris paribus comes along with a decrease of the level of mean wages (LNW or
LNWM, respectively) by 0.25 log percentage points (pp). This result is surprising at ﬁrst glance
as studies in the literature on the eﬀects of collective bargaining coverage ﬁnd higher wages in
ﬁrms applying collective contracts (compare section 5.3.2), and bargaining coverage and union
density within ﬁrms are likely to be positively correlated. Unfortunately, the IABS data do not
allow us to analyze the impact of bargaining coverage. Possible explanations for the diﬀerent
results should be investigated in future research using appropriate data: On the one hand, it
is not clear a priori whether a positive correlation between collective bargaining coverage and
9 For example, industry dummies take account of diﬀerences in the intensity of competition in diﬀerent product
markets as well as of diﬀerent rates of employer unionization. Employees’ fall-back options are determined by
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union representation persists if additional covariates are controlled for. On the other hand, union
density aﬀects the structure of wages in a labor market segment irrespective of actual bargain-
ing coverage. In light of the argument put forward in section 5.2, we consider this the most
important cause of the diﬀerence. It is plausible to assume that only a strong union with high
union density has got the power to achieve equality objectives for a whole labor market segment
independently of the degree of collective coverage. Collective contracts are most likely accepted
in ﬁrms capturing high rents, and on average these ﬁrms pay higher wages to their workers.
The median LNW50 is even decreased by 0.36 pp. Moreover, higher union representation in-
volves a reduction of the unconditional quantile diﬀerence QD8020 by about 0.53 pp, most of
which is observed in the lower half of the distribution (QD5020: -0.43 pp, QD8050: -0.14 pp).
The union eﬀect on wage compression is in fact asymmetrical: While total dispersion decreases,
the skewness of the log wage distribution rises.
The skill diﬀerentials BL and BH are signiﬁcantly reduced by respective 0.57 and 0.24 pp:
Higher union power comes along with a lower wage dispersion between skill groups. This ﬁnding
is in line with the result of Kahn (2000), who observes a negative correlation of union density
and skill wage diﬀerentials in a cross-country study. Provided that an employee’s productivity is
adequately reﬂected by her/his skill level, the ﬁnding suggests that the union impact exceeds the
objective “equal pay for equal work”, compressing wages even between groups of workers with
observationally diﬀerent productivity.
The Tobit-Sigma (¾TOBIT) estimated from equation (5.2) is lower in case of a stronger union
representation. This ﬁnding indicates a reduction of residual wage dispersion in addition to the
compression of skill diﬀerentials BL and BH. Further insights about within-group dispersion
are gained from table 5.2, which reports the ceteris paribus eﬀects for industry£age£skill£time-
dimensioned cells ~ z.
The ﬁrst panel of table 5.2 displays the results of regressions for a pooled sample of all skill
groups. We observe a decline in the level of wages similar to that in table 5.1 above. What is
more, the ﬁnding of reduced quantile diﬀerences (QD8020: -0.65 pp) now reﬂects a decrease in
residual wage dispersion: In segments with stronger unions, within wage dispersion as well as
the average wage are lower, ceteris paribus. This result corresponds to the insurance motive for
union action discussed by Agell and Lommerud (1992) and Burda (1995), and it corroborates
the results of Büttner and Fitzenberger (1998) on the eﬀects of net union density as well as those
of Dustmann and Schönberg (2004) on the application of collective contracts.10
The dispersion eﬀects obtained from the pooled estimations are rather symmetrical. However,
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Table 5.2: Net Union Density and the Structure of Wages II: Diﬀerences by Skill Level
Total LNW LNW50 QD8020 QD5020 QD8050 ¾TOBIT
NUD -0.282 -0.327 -0.654 -0.319 -0.320 -0.306
(0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.029) (0.031) (0.025)
# Cells 3442 3442 3032 3442 3032 3442
Low-skilled
NUD 0.459 0.496 -0.598 -0.229 -0.369 -0.330
(0.049) (0.057) (0.066) (0.034) (0.044) (0.029)
# Cells 1474 1474 1441 1474 1441 1474
Medium-skilled
NUD -0.270 -0.407 -0.584 -0.452 -0.166 -0.316
(0.048) (0.049) (0.072) (0.050) (0.036) (0.038)
# Cells 1545 1545 1400 1545 1400 1545
High-skilled
NUD -0.658 -0.394 0.805 0.350 0.169 -0.026
(0.129) (0.118) (0.421) (0.158) (0.169) (0.146)
# Cells 423 423 191 423 191 423
Estimations by weighted least squares, cells weighted by cell-speciﬁc employment. Exclusion of cells censored at
the 50% quantile (80% quantile for QD8020 and QD8050). Covariates: dummies for time, age, industry, and
skill. White robust standard errors in parentheses. Data source: extended IABS 1985–1997.
heterogeneous picture. In the core group of medium-skilled workers, wage level and dispersion are
reduced to a similar extent as in the pooled regressions, but the wage distribution is compressed
asymmetrically from below (QD5020: -0.45 pp, QD8050: -0.17 pp). At the lower end of the
(conditional) wage distribution, union-bargained wages serve as minimum wages.
In the group of low-skilled workers, a more powerful union is associated with a higher average
wage (LNW: +0.46 pp). This ﬁnding reﬂects the equalizing eﬀect with regard to the skill
diﬀerentials. Again, residual wage dispersion declines with rising labor union power, but now a
10 A referee pointed out two alternative explanations for the negative correlation between union density and the
wage level. First, higher wages could be paid in speciﬁc segments in order to prevent workers from unionization.
Second, a higher proportion of women in a labor market segment could be accompanied by lower wages for men
as well as a higher union density among men. In a strict sense, we can not reject these alternatives on the basis
of our analysis. However, we consider them as little plausible for the following reasons: First, it is not clear
how to explain our ﬁndings with respect to wage dispersion in these settings. Second, our estimations control
for industry and other eﬀects which take up the alternative explanations. Third, the positive correlation
between collective bargaining coverage and the wage level found by other studies (compare section 5.3.2) is in
contrast to the deterrence eﬀect. Fourth, the partial eﬀect of being female is negative in the union membership
estimations of Beck and Fitzenberger (2004). Hence, it is unlikely that the union density of men is particularly
high in segments with a high proportion of female workers.140 Equal Pay for Equal Work?
larger part of the compression occurs in the upper half of the conditional distribution (QD5020:
-0.23 pp, QD8050: -0.37 pp). Wages in the mid-parts of the distribution are most pronouncedly
moved up by union action.
High-skilled workers on average earn signiﬁcantly less in sectors with strong unions (LNW: -0.66
pp). However, the number of utilizable cells for this group is severely restricted due to the high
degree of wage censoring, such that we obtain no signiﬁcant eﬀects on wage dispersion.
We inferred from section 5.4.2 that net union density is higher among workers of older age or
older cohorts. In order to scrutinize the ex-post rationality of union membership over the life
cycle, we further examine whether the union wage eﬀects vary systematically with age. For that
purpose, the regressions in table 5.3 include interaction terms of NUD and age dummies. The
analyses are implemented separately for low-skilled and for medium-skilled workers. Due to the
severe problem of wage censoring among the high-skilled, we do not expect reliable results for
this group.
Table 5.3: Net Union Density and the Structure of Wages III: Diﬀerences across Age
Low-skilled LNW LNW50 QD8020 QD5020 QD8050 ¾TOBIT
NUD £ D(25 · age · 29) 0.592 0.649 -0.620 -0.224 -0.394
¤ -0.326
NUD £ D(30 · age · 34) 0.498 0.539 -0.602 -0.222 -0.377
¤ -0.334
NUD £ D(35 · age · 39) 0.448 0.481 -0.558 -0.202 -0.354
¤ -0.335
NUD £ D(40 · age · 44) 0.388 0.425 -0.597 -0.234 -0.364
¤ -0.336
NUD £ D(45 · age · 49) 0.331 0.363 -0.571 -0.222 -0.351
¤ -0.305
NUD £ D(50 · age · 54) 0.335 0.367 -0.540 -0.204 -0.339
¤ -0.293
NUD £ D(55 · age · 59) 0.351 0.417 -0.483 -0.140 -0.343
¤ -0.259
# Cells 1474 1474 1441 1474 1441 1474
Medium-skilled
NUD £ D(25 · age · 29) -0.184 -0.302 -0.496 -0.423
¤ -0.110 -0.233
NUD £ D(30 · age · 34) -0.237 -0.369 -0.551 -0.451
¤ -0.134 -0.275
NUD £ D(35 · age · 39) -0.265 -0.401 -0.603 -0.450
¤ -0.186 -0.311
NUD £ D(40 · age · 44) -0.288 -0.430 -0.593 -0.459
¤ -0.166 -0.328
NUD £ D(45 · age · 49) -0.278 -0.412 -0.585 -0.446
¤ -0.192 -0.328
NUD £ D(50 · age · 54) -0.268 -0.402 -0.534 -0.444
¤ -0.143 -0.321
NUD £ D(55 · age · 59) -0.264 -0.404 -0.527 -0.445
¤ -0.146 -0.302
# Cells 1545 1545 1400 1545 1400 1545
Estimations by weighted least squares, cells weighted by cell-speciﬁc employment. Exclusion of cells censored at
the 50% quantile (80% quantile for QD8020 and QD8050). Covariates: dummies for time, age, industry, and
skill.
¤ coeﬃcients not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (® = 0:05, variances White robust). Data source: extended IABS
1985–1997.
With growing age, the extent of the reductions in wage levels among the medium-skilled increases
and the union-inﬂicted mark-up among the low-skilled decreases. In both skill groups younger
workers beneﬁt more considerably from stronger unions. There is no evidence for seniorityEqual Pay for Equal Work? 141
bonuses paid to older workers or for premia to older cohorts which are more closely related to
trade unions. On the contrary, the result is consistent with an insurance motive securing wage
smoothing over the life cycle.
The eﬀect towards residual wage compression among the low-skilled also decreases slightly with
age. With the exception of the oldest age group, however, the diﬀerences are generally small
or even insigniﬁcant. A similar ﬁnding applies to the wage compression in the lower half of the
distribution (QD5020) among the medium-skilled. In this group, the wage-compressing eﬀect is
slightly lower for younger as well as for older workers compared to those of age 35–39, but most
of the diﬀerences stem from diﬀerences in the eﬀects on QD8050. Summing up, the union impact
concerning the equality objective declines slightly with age, mostly as a result of reduced wage
compression in the upper half of the distribution. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion that
unions do in fact take account of the ex-post rationality of membership to some extent.
In order to analyze whether the union eﬀects on the wage structure have changed over time, we
additionally run regressions which include interactions of NUD and year dummies. Figure 5.1
depicts the changes of the NUD coeﬃcients over time, relative to the base period 1985.
Most of the individual eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. In light of the joint signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences
across years (especially with respect to LNW50, QD5020, and ¾TOBIT) it is nevertheless
worthwhile to look at the developments in more detail. To a large extent, the eﬀects on the
wage level, LNW and LNW50, evolve parallely to the eﬀects on wage dispersion, QD8020 and
¾TOBIT. There is a general trade-oﬀ between the two union objectives regarding higher wages
and the reduction of wage inequality. Until 1989 the unions put increasing weight on wage
levels, but the equality objective got an increasing weight during the subsequent years until
1994. Starting from 1990 this development was accompanied by a decrease in union membership
(compare section 5.4.2). However, while the decline in union membership even continued to grow
in strength after 1994, the eﬀect on the wage level increased again starting from 1995. Unlike the
eﬀect on QD8020, the inﬂuence of NUD on ¾TOBIT continued to change towards decreasing
dispersion over the years 1994 to 1997. Generally, larger parts of the changes over time happened
in the lower half of the conditional distribution (QD5020), while only small changes are observed
in the upper half (QD8050) after 1994.
Finally, we analyze whether the correlations estimated on the basis of both longitudinal and
cross-sectional variation are compatible with observed long diﬀerences. Does the decline in union
membership comply with the results of tables 5.1 and 5.2 over the entire period 1985–1997—i.e.,
does it come along with an increasing wage inequality and a rise in the wage level? In order to
illustrate this point, we regress changes of our wage measures between 1985 and 1997, ¢LNW
etc., on a constant and the change in net union density over the same period, ¢NUD. The142 Equal Pay for Equal Work?
approach ﬁlters out industry-, age-, and, if applicable, skill-speciﬁc eﬀects. Table 5.4 displays
the results.
Table 5.4: Changes of Net Union Density and the Structure of Wages, 1985–1997
Segmentation z ¢LNW ¢LNWM ¢LNW50 ¢BL ¢BH ¢¾TOBIT
¢NUD 0.182 0.030 0.096 0.496 -0.101 -0.079
(0.100) (0.100) (0.116) (0.131) (0.195) (0.068)
# Diﬀerences 119 119 119 119 113 119
Segmentation ~ z ¢LNW ¢LNW50 ¢QD8020 ¢QD5020 ¢QD8050 ¢¾TOBIT
¢NUD 0.105 -0.036 -0.453 -0.273 -0.173 -0.150
(0.079) (0.092) (0.123) (0.081) (0.062) (0.054)
# Diﬀerences 249 249 219 249 219 249
Estimations by weighted least squares, diﬀerences weighted by employment average of 1985 and 1997. Exclusion of
cells censored at the 50% quantile (80% quantile for QD8020 and QD8050). Segmentation z: industry£age£time
cells; segmentation ~ z: industry£age£skill£time cells. White robust standard errors in parentheses. Data source:
extended IABS 1985–1997.
By and large, the results for the measures of wage dispersion meet the implications of tables
5.1 and 5.2. In particular, the decline in union density over the observation period came along
with signiﬁcant reductions of both residual wage dispersion and the wage diﬀerential between
low- and medium-skilled workers. However, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect with respect to the wage
level—the negative eﬀect estimated from the combination of longitudinal and cross-sectional data
is not maintained when relying on long diﬀerences only.
5.5 Conclusions
Net union density is an appropriate proxy for union power because the associated ﬁnancial power
and the personal representation within ﬁrms govern the union’s threat point in the collective
wage bargaining process and therefore determine the bargaining outcome. In order to analyze
empirically the correlation between union power and the structure of wages in the German labor
market, we thus impute union membership propensities for individuals in the IAB employment
sample (IABS) 1985–1997 from the estimations of Beck and Fitzenberger (2004) and compute
net union densities for labor market segments corresponding to the structure of the German wage
bargaining system.
According to an insurance motive for union membership as discussed by Agell and Lommerud
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reduced residual wage dispersion. If unions have a strong preference for wage equality and also
want to prevent negative employment eﬀects, a higher net union density can even be accompanied
by a lower wage level. Our empirical results corroborate the insurance argument with respect to
negative eﬀects on the wage level and on wage dispersion within and between labor market seg-
ments. Even beyond “equal pay for equal work”, skill wage diﬀerentials are also lower in segments
with powerful unions. In line with a minimum wage interpretation of union-bargained wages, the
wage distribution is compressed disproportionately from below—powerful unions ceteris paribus
increase the skewness of the distribution. When looking at the age dimension we also ﬁnd a
wage smoothing eﬀect or, put diﬀerently, an insurance motive over the life cycle. Neither is there
evidence for the conjecture that unions counteract ex post rational membership quits of older
workers by bargaining for seniority bonuses, nor do unions privilege older cohorts which stand
more closely by the unions. However, there is some evidence that the compression of wages in
the upper parts of the distribution decreases with age. Union eﬀects further vary over time, but
there are no clear trends against the background of the perpetual decline in union membership
since 1990.
The literature also discusses employment eﬀects of union representation which our study does not
consider explicitly. Yet our results imply that higher union power can have a repressive eﬀect
on employment if the inﬂexibility associated with excessive wage compression leads to higher
unemployment. According to Schettkat (2003), empirical cross-country evidence on the relation-
ship between wage inequality and employment performance is mixed. However, in Fitzenberger
and Kohn (2006) we ﬁnd that a higher degree of wage dispersion between skill groups would
contribute to a reduction of skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates in Germany.
Although our results are surprising at ﬁrst glance, they are not in contrast to the positive cor-
relation between collective bargaining coverage and the wage level as discussed in the literature.
Union power and collective coverage do not necessarily coincide. Wages paid by ﬁrms without
collective coverage are often geared to collective agreements in the corresponding labor market
segment, and the wage policy implemented in collective agreements crucially depends on the
power of the union.
Unfortunately, our regressions can not take account of the apparent endogeneity of union density,
and so the results should not be interpreted as causal eﬀects. The implementation of structural
models proves to be intricate (compare Fitzenberger (1999), chapter 6) and it is awkward to
ﬁnd appropriate instruments. While we consider the insurance motive an intuitively plausible
explanation for the descriptive evidence, further research to investigate the robustness of the
results is certainly warranted.
Valuable insights are to be expected from an analysis on the basis of linked employer-employee
data which would capture the eﬀects of both union density and collective bargaining coverage.144 Equal Pay for Equal Work?
Finally, union eﬀects on the wage structure and on employment should be analyzed simultane-
ously.
5.A Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the administrative IAB employment sample (IABS) 1975–
1997, a representative 1% random draw of German employees with employment spells subject to
social insurance contributions. Excluding civil servants, self-employed, and freelancers, the IABS
covers about 80% of all employed persons. For an extensive description of these register-based
data see Bender, Hilzendegen, Rohwer, and Rudolph (1996) and Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000).
Selected data comprise spells of men who are employed full-time in West Germany (excluding
Berlin), not in training, and without parallel employment.
Individuals aged between 25 and 60 years are classiﬁed into ﬁve-year age groups (25–29 years,
30–34 years, ..., 55–59 years). With respect to the individuals’ educational attainment, we
construct three skill groups: The group of the low-skilled consists of employees without any
vocational training. Those with a vocational training degree are considered medium-skilled, and
individuals with a university or technical college degree form the group of the high-skilled. To
deal with measurement error in the education information when deﬁning the skill groups, we
correct the skill information such that formal degrees an individual has once obtained are not
lost later.
Since the IABS contains no information on hours worked, we undertake a headcount to derive a
measure of cell-speciﬁc employment, weighting each observation with the length of the respective
employment spell. This procedure assumes that the number of (weekly) working hours does not
change over time and does not diﬀer between individuals. It therefore justiﬁes our concentration
on full-time employees only.
We extend the IABS by imputing individual propensities for union membership from Beck and
Fitzenberger (2004), who estimate determinants of union membership using survey data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for diﬀerent years between 1985 and 1998. We
can thus use the years 1985–1997 of the extended data set. Net union densities are obtained by
means of aggregation at the cell level.
At any rate, our cell-data analysis is restricted to cells with a minimum of 20 observations. Table
5.7 provides information about the cell size for the diﬀerent segmentations.
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Table 5.5: Industry Classiﬁcation and Grouping of Sectors Used in the Empirical Analysis
No.a Industry WZWb
01 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining, Energy and Water Supply 01–08
02 Chemical Products 09–11
03 Synthetic Materials 12–13
04 Stone and Earth Products 14–16
05 Iron and Steel, Machinery, Vehicle Construction 17–32
06 Electric Appliances, Precision Instruments and Optics 33–39
07 Woodwork, Paper, Printing, Publishing 40–44
08 Textiles and Apparel 45–53
09 Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 54–58
10 Construction, Building Expenses, and Conversion 59–61
11 Wholesale Trade, Commercial Mediation, Retail Trade 62
12 Railways, Postal Services 63–64
13 Other Transportation 65–68
14 Financial Intermediation 69
15 Hotels and Restaurants, Personal Services, Private Non-proﬁt Or-
ganizations, Private Households, Government, Social Insurance,
Other Services
70–73, 79–99
16 Education and Science 74–77
17 Health Care System 78
a Sector classiﬁcation used in the empirical analysis.
b Industry classiﬁcation provided with the IABS 1975–1997.146 Equal Pay for Equal Work?
Figure 5.1: Net Union Density and the Structure of Wages IV: Variation over Time
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Estimations by weighted least squares, cells weighted by cell-speciﬁc employment. Deviations of NUD-coeﬃcients
relative to eﬀects in the base period 1985; 95%-conﬁdence intervals (White robust). Exclusion of cells censored at
the 50%-quantile (80%-quantile for QD8020 and QD8050); no high-skilled. Covariates: dummies for time, age,
industry, and skill; interactions NUD£skill (base: medium-skilled) and NUD£age. Data source: extended IABS
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Table 5.6: Decomposition of Net Union Density
NUD NUD
D(agriculture, mining, energy) -0.035 (0.005) -0.035 (0.004)
D(chemical products) -0.039 (0.002) -0.030 (0.003)
D(synthetic materials) -0.163 (0.002) -0.166 (0.002)
D(stone and earth) -0.170 (0.002) -0.174 (0.002)
D(iron and steel, machinery, vehicles) base base
D(electric appliances) -0.208 (0.004) -0.198 (0.004)
D(paper, printing) -0.105 (0.002) -0.110 (0.002)
D(textiles) -0.087 (0.002) -0.093 (0.002)
D(food, beverages) -0.193 (0.002) -0.198 (0.002)
D(construction) -0.284 (0.002) -0.288 (0.002)
D(trade) -0.311 (0.003) -0.311 (0.003)
D(railways, postal services) 0.289 (0.005) 0.283 (0.005)
D(other transportation) -0.240 (0.002) -0.245 (0.002)
D(ﬁnancial intermediation) -0.366 (0.003) -0.357 (0.003)
D(misc. services) -0.244 (0.003) -0.230 (0.002)
D(education, science) -0.291 (0.002) -0.254 (0.003)
D(health care) -0.325 (0.002) -0.297 (0.003)
D(25 · age · 29) base base
D(30 · age · 34) 0.023 (0.003) 0.030 (0.003)
D(35 · age · 39) 0.044 (0.003) 0.051 (0.003)
D(40 · age · 44) 0.062 (0.003) 0.066 (0.003)
D(45 · age · 49) 0.078 (0.003) 0.080 (0.003)
D(50 · age · 54) 0.091 (0.003) 0.091 (0.003)
D(55 · age · 59) 0.090 (0.003) 0.088 (0.003)
D(time = 1985) base base
D(time = 1986) -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.003)
D(time = 1987) -0.007 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)
D(time = 1988) -0.008 (0.003) -0.006 (0.003)
D(time = 1989) -0.009 (0.003) -0.006 (0.003)
D(time = 1990) -0.017 (0.003) -0.014 (0.003)
D(time = 1991) -0.024 (0.003) -0.021 (0.002)
D(time = 1992) -0.030 (0.003) -0.025 (0.002)
D(time = 1993) -0.034 (0.003) -0.029 (0.003)
D(time = 1994) -0.040 (0.003) -0.035 (0.003)
D(time = 1995) -0.047 (0.004) -0.042 (0.003)
D(time = 1996) -0.054 (0.004) -0.049 (0.004)
D(time = 1997) -0.061 (0.005) -0.055 (0.004)
D(low-skilled) 0.020 (0.002)
D(medium-skilled) base
D(high-skilled) -0.124 (0.002)
Intercept 0.462 (0.004) 0.460 (0.004)
N 1547 4119
R
2 0.978 0.960
Estimations by weighted least squares, cells weighted by cell-speciﬁc employment. White robust standard errors
in parentheses. See table 5.5 for a complete deﬁnition of the industry sectors. Data source: extended IABS
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Table 5.7: Cell Size for the Diﬀerent Segmentations
Segmentation # Observations in Cells
industry£age£time # Cells Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Total 1547 1040.6 932.7 113 5024
LNW50 not censored 1545 1040.6 933.3 113 5024
LNW80 not censored 1235 1092.5 1000.7 113 5024
Segmentation # Observations in Cells
industry£age£skill£time # Cells Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Total 4119 389.3 549.9 20 4091
LNW50 not censored 3442 444.7 584.3 20 4091
LNW80 not censored 3032 455.5 605.5 20 4091
Low-Skilled 1474 168.2 148.4 20 952
LNW50 not censored 1474 168.2 148.4 20 952
LNW80 not censored 1441 170.9 149.0 20 952
Medium-Skilled 1547 783.1 722.6 75 4091
LNW50 not censored 1545 783.0 723.1 75 4091
LNW80 not censored 1400 787.7 749.2 75 4091
High-Skilled 1098 131.4 136.3 20 976
LNW50 not censored 423 172.1 183.9 20 976
LNW80 not censored 191 167.9 191.2 20 976
Data Source: extended IABS 1985–1997.Equal Pay for Equal Work? 149
Figure 5.2: Evolution of Net Union Density
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Calculations based on the extended IABS 1985–1997. Numbers in the diagrams indicate industry sectors; see
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Der deutsche Arbeitsmarkt ist seit einigen Jahrzehnten durch steigende Arbeitslosigkeit
gekennzeichnet, die insbesondere gering qualiﬁzierte Arbeitnehmer betriﬀt. So betrugen im
Jahr 2004 die qualiﬁkationsspeziﬁschen Arbeitslosenquoten in Westdeutschland für Personen
ohne Berufsabschluss 21,7%, für jene mit Ausbildungsabschluss 7,3% und für
Hochschulabsolventen 3,5%. Zudem lagen die entsprechenden Quoten in Ostdeutschland mit
51,2%, 19,4% und 6,0% weit über dem westdeutschen Niveau (Reinberg und Hummel, 2005).
Eine Mitschuld an dieser Situation wird verschiedenen Arten von Rigiditäten zugeschrieben, die
ﬂexiblen Anpassungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt entgegen stehen.
Eine zentrale Rolle für die Anpassung der Beschäftigung und die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosig-
keit kommt der Lohnstruktur oder den Lohnverteilungen für verschiedene Arbeitnehmergruppen
zu. Seit einiger Zeit stehen neben dem Lohnniveau auch Lohndispersion oder -kompression zwi-
schen und innerhalb von homogenen Arbeitnehmergruppen im Zentrum arbeitsmarktökonomi-
schen Interesses. Mit der zunehmenden Verfügbarkeit von großen Mikrodatensätzen widmet sich
eine schnell wachsende Anzahl empirischer Untersuchungen mit mikroökonometrischen Metho-
den unterschiedlichen Facetten heterogener Lohnstrukturen. Besonderes Augenmerk gilt dabei
den Erträgen aus Humankapitalinvestitionen und der Entwicklung von Qualiﬁkationsprämien
(Katz und Autor, 1999).
Die Entwicklung von Lohnstrukturen in Westdeutschland seit den 1970er Jahren bis zur Mitte
der 1990er ist in dieser Hinsicht intensiv untersucht worden, wobei sich die Struktur im großen
und ganzen als im internationalen Vergleich wenig gespreizt und über die Zeit hinweg recht sta-
bil erwiesen hat. Sowohl Qualiﬁkationsprämien als auch residuale Lohnungleichheiten zeigten
eine bemerkenswert geringe Variation. Andererseits sank über den gleichen Zeitraum die rela-
tive Nachfrage nach gering qualiﬁzierten Arbeitnehmern – etwa durch qualiﬁkationsverzerrten
technischen Fortschritt – schneller als das relative Angebot, so dass für eine Markträumung
steigende Qualiﬁkationsprämien erforderlich gewesen wären. Insofern wird der “unerträglichen
Stabilität” (Prasad, 2004) eine Schlüsselrolle für den asymmetrischen Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit
zugeschrieben.
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In engem Zusammenhang damit wird der Einﬂuss von institutionellen und organisatorischen Rah-
menbedingungen auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im allgemeinen und auf die Lohnsetzung
auf dem Arbeitsmarkt im speziellen diskutiert. In Zeiten zunehmend heterogener wirtschaftlicher
Bedingungen lautet der Tenor in der arbeitsmarktökonomischen Debatte, dass institutionelle
Inﬂexibilitäten das Funktionieren der Arbeitsmärkte und damit die Dynamik der Beschäfti-
gungsentwicklung hemmen (OECD, 2006). Im Mittelpunkt des Interesses steht nicht zuletzt
die Bedeutung der Gewerkschaften.
Gewerkschaftliche Organisationsgrade haben im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte in vielen Indus-
trieländern einschließlich Deutschlands beträchtlich abgenommen. Im Jahr 2004 etwa befand sich
der Bruttoorganisationsgrad, d.h. der Anteil aller Gewerkschaftsmitglieder an der Gesamtzahl
der Beschäftigten, für Deutschland auf dem historischen Tiefstand von 27% (Fitzenberger, Kohn
und Wang, 2006). Zu den Determinanten dieses Phänomens wie auch den daraus resultieren-
den Konsequenzen existiert eine breite Literatur (Addison und Schnabel, 2003). Wenngleich
die Gewerkschaften – von auf der Betriebsebene abgeschlossenen Beschäftigungspakten vielleicht
abgesehen – keinen direkten Einﬂuss auf die Personalpolitik von Arbeitgebern besitzen, beein-
ﬂussen sie die Beschäftigung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt im Zuge von Tariﬂohnverhandlungen, also
mittels ihres Einﬂusses auf die Lohnstruktur. So mag etwa Lohnzurückhaltung zu mehr Beschäf-
tigung führen, während hohe Tariﬂohnsteigerungen beschäftigungsschädlich wirken können; und
ein starkes gewerkschaftliches Gleichheitsziel, welches sich in einer Stauchung der Lohnvertei-
lung zwischen gering und höher qualiﬁzierten Arbeitnehmern niederschlägt, kann wiederum die
Beschäftigungsaussichten der gering Qualiﬁzierten schmälern. Grundsätzlich ist angesichts des
beobachteten Trends über die Zeit abnehmender Organisationsgrade und der damit einherge-
henden Einbuße gewerkschaftlicher Verhandlungsmacht eine Verringerung der Gewerkschaftsein-
ﬂüsse zu erwarten.
Die vorliegende Arbeit basiert auf vier eigenständigen Aufsätzen, die sich dem Spannungsfeld von
Lohnstrukturen, heterogener Arbeitsnachfrage und Gewerkschaftsmacht auf dem deutschen Ar-
beitsmarkt mit Hilfe mikroökonometrischer Methoden nähern. Die folgenden Abschnitte fassen
die Ansätze und die Kernergebnisse dieser Arbeiten zusammen und geben Ausblicke auf weiter-
führende Forschungsfragen.
Zur Entwicklung der Lohnungleichheit
Der erste Aufsatz (Kohn, 2006) zeichnet ein detailliertes Bild der Entwicklung der Lohnungleich-
heit in Ost- und Westdeutschland in den Jahren des ausgehenden 20. und des beginnenden 21.
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Bis Anfang der 1990er Jahre zeichnete sich der westdeutsche Arbeitsmarkt durch eine im inter-
nationalen Vergleich niedrige und lediglich geringen Veränderungen über die Zeit unterworfene
Lohnstreuung aus, und in Ostdeutschland war in den späten Jahren der DDR ein noch höheres
Maß an Lohnkompression zu beobachten. Neuere Daten der IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe (IABS)
1975–2001 lassen nun Analysen für jüngere Jahre zu. Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die
Entwicklung von Lohnniveau und Lohndispersion zwischen und innerhalb von verschiedenen
Gruppen von Arbeitnehmern für den Zeitraum zwischen 1992 und 2001. Als zentrales Resul-
tat lässt sich festhalten, dass über diesen Zeitraum die Lohnungleichheit entlang verschiedener
Dimensionen zugenommen hat.
Zunächst oﬀenbaren unbedingte jahresspeziﬁsche Lohnverteilungen, dass die Lohnstreuung
sowohl in Ost- als auch in Westdeutschland insgesamt angestiegen ist. Ausgehend von einem
geringeren Niveau war der Anstieg in Ostdeutschland stärker als in Westdeutschland, so dass
im Jahr 2001 beide Landesteile kaum mehr Unterschiede im Ausmaß der Lohnstreuung
aufwiesen. Grundsätzlich war der Anstieg bei Frauen ausgeprägter als bei Männern, wobei der
Großteil der Zunahme bei Frauen im unteren Bereich der Lohnverteilung, bei Männern jedoch
im oberen Bereich stattgefunden hat. Während in den ersten Jahren nach der
Wiedervereinigung eine Konvergenz der Lohnniveaus in Ost- und Westdeutschland zu
verzeichnen war, ﬁndet seit 1996 keine weitere Angleichung mehr statt, so dass beachtliche
Ost-West-Gefälle im Lohnniveau fortbestehen.
Die Schätzung zensierter Quantilsregressionen liefert daraufhin Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich zen-
traler Determinanten der beobachteten Lohnverteilungen, wie etwa Alter und Qualiﬁkations-
niveau der Beschäftigten. Der Humankapitaltheorie entsprechend, zeigen sich Alters-Lohn-Proﬁle
umso steiler, je höher das Qualiﬁkationsniveau der Beschäftigten ist. Zudem waren die Proﬁle
für Ostdeutschland im Jahr 1992 besonders ﬂach. Oﬀenbar führte der Wiedervereinigungsschock
im Osten zu einer Abschreibung von Humankapital. Mit dem Eintreten jüngerer Kohorten in
den Arbeitsmarkt verliert dieser Eﬀekt jedoch an Bedeutung, so dass sich die Proﬁle in Ost- und
Westdeutschland für 2001 in stärkerem Maße ähneln.
Unterschiede in den Lohnverteilungen zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland sowie entsprechende
Veränderungen über die Zeit lassen sich mit Hilfe von Zerlegungstechniken näher untersuchen.
Ich verwende Machado-Mata-Dekompositionen (Machado und Mata, 2005), die auf der
Schätzung der ﬂexiblen Quantilsregressionen aufbauen und über die Lohnverteilung heterogene
Charakteristika- und Koeﬃzienten-Eﬀekte oﬀenbaren, welche Unterschiede in der
Zusammensetzung der Beschäftigten (Charakteristika-Eﬀekt) beziehungsweise Unterschiede im
geschätzten Einﬂuss der Beschäftigtenmerkmale (Koeﬃzienten-Eﬀekt) auﬀangen. Im
Ost-West-Vergleich leisten unterschiedliche Charakteristika bei Männern praktisch keinen
Beitrag zur Erklärung des Lohngefälles. Bei vollzeitbeschäftigten Frauen jedoch spricht der154 Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung
Charakteristika-Eﬀekt grundsätzlich für höhere Löhne in Ostdeutschland; nur am unteren Ende
der Lohnverteilung ist dieser Eﬀekt im Jahr 2001 nicht mehr zu beobachten. Hinsichtlich der
Veränderung der Löhne über die Zeit tragen Änderungen in der Zusammensetzung der
Beschäftigten einem Großteil der Lohnzuwächse in den oberen Teilen der Verteilungen für
Westdeutschland Rechnung. Dieses Ergebnis spiegelt insbesondere die Zunahme des
durchschnittlichen Qualiﬁkationsniveaus der Beschäftigten wider. Veränderungen des
Qualiﬁkationsniveaus und Verschiebungen in der sektoralen Beschäftigungsstruktur erklären
allerdings nur einen geringen Teil der Lohnzuwächse in Ostdeutschland. Am unteren Ende der
Lohnverteilung für Frauen in Ostdeutschland wirkte der Charakteristika-Eﬀekt sogar in
Richtung realer Lohnkürzungen, was den in dieser Gruppe besonders ausgeprägten Anstieg der
Lohnungleichheit erhärtete.
In dem ersten Aufsatz steht die detaillierte empirische Bestandsaufnahme, nicht jedoch eine
tiefer greifende ökonomische Analyse möglicher Gründe und Konsequenzen der aufgezeigten Ent-
wicklungen in der Lohnstruktur im Vordergrund. Angesichts alternativer Erklärungsansätze,
wie etwa sich beschleunigenden, nicht-neutralen technischen oder organisatorischen Wandels,
zunehmender internationaler Verﬂechtung, abnehmender Gewerkschaftsmacht oder ﬂexiblerer
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen, gilt es die deskriptive Evidenz durch die Schätzung struktureller
Modelle oder die Verwendung noch aussagekräftigerer Datensätze zu komplementieren. Die
nachfolgenden Aufsätze unternehmen Schritte in dieser Richtung.
Qualiﬁkationsprämien, Kohorteneﬀekte und heterogene Arbeitsnachfrage
Der zweite Aufsatz (Fitzenberger und Kohn, 2006) untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen
Lohnstrukturen und Beschäftigung im Rahmen eines Arbeitsnachfragemodells für Westdeutsch-
land, welches Qualiﬁkationsniveau und Alter der Beschäftigten als wichtige Dimensionen der
Heterogenität des Faktors Arbeit inkorporiert.
Zunächst zeigt die Schätzung altersspeziﬁscher Qualiﬁkationsprämien anhand der IABS 1975–
1997, dass die Altersproﬁle von Lohndiﬀerenzialen sich im Zeitverlauf nicht parallel entwickelt,
sondern vielmehr eine Verdrehung erfahren haben. Dementsprechend ist es unwahrscheinlich,
dass die Entwicklungen in der Lohnstruktur allein Alters- und Zeiteﬀekten zuzuschreiben sind,
welche alle Arbeitnehmerkohorten gleichermaßen beeinﬂusst haben. Zudem ﬁnden wir einen
Bruch in altersspeziﬁschen Qualiﬁzierungstrends dergestalt, dass jüngere Geburtsjahrgänge dem
Pfad der älteren in Richtung eines zunehmenden durchschnittlichen Qualiﬁkationsniveaus nicht
mehr folgen. Insofern suggeriert die empirische Evidenz, dass Kohorteneﬀekte sowohl Qualiﬁka-
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haben. Wir weisen die Existenz solcher Eﬀekte anhand des Testverfahrens von MaCurdy und
Mroz (1995) nach.
Die entsprechende Heterogenität des Faktors Arbeit erschwert die Operationalisierung von Löh-
nen und Beschäftigung in einem Arbeitsnachfragemodell. Wir erweitern deshalb den struk-
turellen Ansatz von Card und Lemieux (2001), in deren zweistuﬁgem CES Modell die simultane
Berücksichtigung von Qualiﬁkationsniveau und Alter nicht nur die Separation von Alters-, Zeit-
und Kohorteneﬀekten erlaubt, sondern auch die Schätzung von nachfragetheoretisch konsistenten
Modellspeziﬁkationen mit einer relativ großen Anzahl verschiedener Einsatzfaktoren ermöglicht.
Darüber hinaus berücksichtigt das Modell qualiﬁkationsverzerrten technischen Wandel. Wir
schätzen Modellvarianten mit und ohne Instrumentierung, welche der Endogenität von Löhnen
und Beschäftigung Rechnung trägt, und erhalten Substitutionselastizitäten von 4,9 bis 6,9 für die
Substitution zwischen den Qualiﬁkationsklassen sowie von 5,2 bis 20,1 für die Substitution zwi-
schen den Altersklassen. Im Vergleich zu den Ergebnissen anderer Studien in der Literatur sind
diese Werte recht hoch und spiegeln die in Deutschland insgesamt geringe Lohndispersion sowie
ein relativ geringes Maß an Qualiﬁkationsunterschieden zwischen den jeweiligen Ausbildungs-
und Erfahrungskategorien wider.
Auf Basis der geschätzten Substitutionsparameter lassen sich Simulationsexperimente zum
Zusammenhang von Lohnstruktur und Beschäftigung durchführen. Im besonderen simulieren
wir Lohnänderungen, die in den einzelnen Qualiﬁkationsklassen notwendig gewesen wären, um
die qualiﬁkationsspeziﬁschen Arbeitslosenquoten im Jahr 1997 um die Hälfte zu reduzieren.
Dabei nehmen wir identische Änderungen für alle Altersklassen an, halten also die
relativen Löhne innerhalb der Qualiﬁkationsklassen unverändert. Die notwendigen
Nominallohnsenkungen liegen zwischen 8,8 und 12,2% und fallen umso größer aus, je geringer
das Qualiﬁkationsniveau der Beschäftigten ist. Gemessen an einer Situation mit niedrigerer
Arbeitslosigkeit war die Lohndispersion zwischen den Qualiﬁkationsklassen also zu gering.
Unsere Analyse unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit, verschiedene Dimensionen von Heterogenität
in aussagekräftige empirische Arbeitsnachfragemodelle zu integrieren. Die aus dem zweistuﬁgen
CES Ansatz resultierenden Ergebnisse führen zu einer Anzahl von interessanten Ansatzpunkten
für zukünftige Forschungsfragen: Worin liegt beispielsweise der hohe Grad an Substituierbarkeit
der Beschäftigten auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt begründet? Woher rührt der beobachtete
Bruch in der Zunahme des durchschnittlichen Qualiﬁkationsniveaus? Und hat sich dieser Trend
in jüngeren Jahren fortgesetzt? Die Literatur zu technischem und organisatorischem Wandel etwa
weist darauf hin, dass jenseits der formalen Qualiﬁkation der Beschäftigten die Tätigkeitsmerk-
male per se in den letzten Jahren starken Veränderungen unterworfen waren (Autor, Levy und
Murnane, 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006). Findet auch in Deutschland eine zunehmende Polarisierung
auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in gute und schlechte Jobs statt, wie von Goos und Manning (2003) für156 Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung
Großbritannien beobachtet? Und welche Rolle kommt den Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen bei den
jeweiligen Entwicklungen zu?
Zur Entwicklung der Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft
Einer zentralen Arbeitsmarktinstitution wendet sich der dritte Aufsatz (Fitzenberger, Kohn und
Wang, 2006) zu, der die Entwicklung der Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft in West- und Ostdeutsch-
land untersucht. Gewerkschaften setzen sich für höhere Löhne, gerechte Bezahlung, Verringerung
der Wochenarbeitszeit, faire Arbeitsbedingungen oder etwa verstärkten Kündigungsschutz ein.
Von den Errungenschaften gewerkschaftlichen Engagements proﬁtieren in Deutschland allerdings
nicht nur Gewerkschaftsmitglieder, sondern der Großteil aller Beschäftigten, da die im Grundge-
setz verankerte negative Koalitionsfreiheit expliziten und impliziten Mitgliedschaftszwang verbie-
tet. Die zentralen Gewerkschaftsleistungen haben daher den Charakter eines öﬀentlichen Gutes
und sind Trittbrettfahrerverhalten seitens der Arbeitnehmerschaft ausgesetzt.
Warum treten also Arbeitnehmer überhaupt einer Gewerkschaft bei? Unsere Studie nutzt Daten
des Deutschen Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), um Determinanten individueller Mitglied-
schaftsentscheidungen im Zeitraum 1985–2003 (Westdeutschland) beziehungsweise 1993–2003
(Ostdeutschland) zu schätzen. Dieser Ansatz besitzt dreierlei Vorzüge. Zum ersten quantiﬁzieren
unsere Ergebnisse die Einﬂüsse soziodemographischer individueller Eigenschaften, wie etwa Al-
ter oder Familienstand; die Einﬂüsse von Arbeitsplatzcharakteristika, d.h. match-, ﬁrmen- oder
sektorspeziﬁsche Eﬀekte; sowie den Einﬂuss persönlicher Einstellungen auf die Entscheidung für
oder gegen eine Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft. Dabei lassen die verwendeten Probit-Modelle mit
korrelierten zufälligen Eﬀekten in der Tradition von Chamberlain (1980) und Mundlack (1978)
nicht nur Unterschiede in den Einﬂüssen zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland und zwischen den
einzelnen Jahren zu, sondern berücksichtigen auch unbeobachtete Heterogenität.
Zum zweiten verwenden wir die Schätzergebnisse, um gewerkschaftliche Nettoorganisationsgrade
für Ost- und Westdeutschland zu projizieren, welche jeweils den Anteil beschäftigter Gewerk-
schaftsmitglieder an der Gesamtzahl der Beschäftigten angeben. Die Projektionen, die den Rück-
gang der Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft in beiden Landesteilen konsistent nachzeichnen, lassen
sich dann mit Hilfe von Zerlegungstechniken näher untersuchen. Wir passen Blinder-Oaxaca-
Dekompositionen (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) für unseren nichtlinearen Schätzansatz an und
analysieren die Unterschiede im Organisationsgrad zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland sowie die
entsprechenden Veränderungen über die Zeit. Zum einen kommt Veränderungen in der Zusam-
mensetzung der Arbeitnehmerschaft nur eine untergeordnete Rolle bei der Erklärung der Trends
zu abnehmender Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft zu. Zum anderen sprechen im Ost-West-Vergleich
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tionsgrad in Westdeutschland. Der tatsächlich höhere Organisationsgrad in Ostdeutschland im
Jahr 1993 und der sich anschließende stärkere Rückgang in diesem Landesteil reﬂektieren daher
eine schwächere Bindung der Mitglieder, welche aus der breit gestreuten, umgehenden Rekru-
tierung direkt nach der Wiedervereinigung resultiert.
Der dritte Vorzug unseres Ansatzes erschließt sich vor dem Hintergrund, dass Gewerkschaf-
ten selbst keine detaillierten Informationen über die Gruppenzusammensetzung ihrer Mitglieder
veröﬀentlichen. Seit 1991 stehen nur Zahlen für Gesamtdeutschland zur Verfügung, und es wird
nicht zwischen beschäftigten Mitgliedern und arbeitslosen, pensionierten oder studentischen Mit-
gliedern unterschieden. Eine entsprechende Unterscheidung ist jedoch aus ökonomischer Sicht
wichtig, da die Finanzkraft einer Gewerkschaft und ihre Fähigkeit, Arbeitskräfte in den Firmen
zu mobilisieren, maßgeblich vom Anteil der beschäftigten Mitglieder abhängt. Insofern ist der
Nettoorganisationsgrad ein besserer Indikator für die Macht einer Gewerkschaft als der Brut-
toorganisationsgrad. Gleichzeitig diﬀeriert die Macht von Gewerkschaften beachtlich zwischen
verschiedenen Arbeitsmarktsegmenten. Beispielsweise sind Gewerkschaften im produzierenden
Gewerbe traditionell stark, während sie in privaten Dienstleistungssektoren schwerer Fuß fassen.
Die veröﬀentlichten Mitgliederzahlen der Gewerkschaften lassen sich jedoch nicht auf speziﬁ-
sche Arbeitsmarktsegmente herunterbrechen. Stattdessen sind mikroökonometrische Mitglied-
schaftsschätzungen zur Bestimmung gewerkschaftlicher Nettoorganisationsgrade in homogenen
Segmenten – wie etwa Regionen und/oder Sektoren – heranzuziehen. Mit Hilfe der resultierenden
Machtindikatoren lässt sich dann der Gewerkschaftseinﬂuss auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung,
die Beschäftigung oder die Lohnstruktur abschätzen.
Gewerkschaftsmacht und Lohnstruktur
Das letzte Kapitel1 der Dissertation greift diesen Gedanken auf und verwendet entsprechend
geschätzte Organisationsgrade zur Untersuchung des Gewerkschaftseinﬂusses auf die Lohnstruk-
tur in Westdeutschland. Die Analyse erfolgt auf der Ebene aggregierter Arbeitsmarktsegmente,
deren Deﬁnition sich an der Struktur des deutschen Tarifverhandlungssystems orientiert. Dies
ist insofern von zentraler Bedeutung, als es in Deutschland im Gegensatz zu angelsächsischen
Ländern nicht sinnvoll ist, Lohneﬀekte individueller Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft zu schätzen,
da die negative Koalitionsfreiheit tarifvertragliche Mitgliedschaftsprämien verbietet und sich die
Anwendung von Tarifverträgen auf den Großteil aller Beschäftigten erstreckt.
Wie wirkt sich vor diesem Hintergrund die Gewerkschaftsmacht auf das Lohnniveau und den
Grad der Lohndispersion auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt aus? Verfolgen Gewerkschaften das
1 Hierbei handelt es sich um eine Übersetzung des deutschen Aufsatzes Fitzenberger und Kohn (2005).158 Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung
Ziel “Gleicher Lohn für gleiche Arbeit”, reduziert der Gewerkschaftseinﬂuss mithin die residuale
Lohnungleichheit zwischen Arbeitnehmern mit gleichen beobachtbaren Eigenschaften? Oder geht
der Einﬂuss gar darüber hinaus, so dass es auch zwischen Arbeitnehmern mit unterschiedlichen
Eigenschaften zu verringerter Lohndispersion kommt? Zeigt sich der Zusammenhang asym-
metrisch über die Lohnverteilung, etwa einem Mindestlohnargument entsprechend? Werden für
eine Ungleichheitsreduktion Zugeständnisse in Bezug auf die Lohnhöhe gemacht? Und hat sich
der Einﬂuss im Laufe der Zeit verändert?
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen imputieren wir die Gewerkschaftsinformation aus dem SOEP für
Individuen in der IABS 1975–1997, deren umfangreichere Stichprobengröße verlässliche Unter-
suchungen der Lohnverteilung erlaubt, projizieren Nettoorganisationsgrade (NOG) für entlang
der Dimensionen Wirtschaftszweig, Qualiﬁkation, Alter und Zeit deﬁnierte Arbeitsmarktseg-
mente und analysieren den Zusammenhang zwischen NOG auf der einen und Lohnstrukturmaßen
auf der anderen Seite.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein höherer Nettoorganisationsgrad ceteris paribus mit einer re-
duzierten residualen Lohndispersion und einem geringeren Lohnniveau einhergeht. Dieses auf
den ersten Blick überraschende Resultat entspricht einem von Agell und Lommerud (1992) sowie
Burda (1995) theoretisch diskutierten Versicherungsmotiv für die Aktivität von Gewerkschaften,
welche ein starkes Gleichheitsziel verfolgen und, um negative Beschäftigungseﬀekte zu vermeiden,
dabei Einbußen im Hinblick auf das Lohnniveau hinnehmen.
Überdies fallen auch qualiﬁkatorische Lohndiﬀerenziale in Segmenten mit starken Gewerkschaf-
ten geringer aus, so dass der Einﬂuss in der Tat über “Gleichen Lohn für gleiche Arbeit” hin-
ausgeht. In Übereinstimmung mit einem Mindestlohncharakter gewerkschaftlich ausgehandelter
Löhne erfolgt die Stauchung der Lohnverteilung ferner asymmetrisch insbesondere in der unteren
Hälfte – ceteris paribus erhöhen starke Gewerkschaften die Schiefe der Verteilung. Mit Blick auf
die Altersdimension ﬁnden wir auch über den Lebenszyklus einen Lohnglättungseﬀekt. Es liegt
damit keine Evidenz dafür vor, dass Gewerkschaften ex post rationale Mitgliederaustritte mittels
der Durchsetzung von die Ungleichheit erhöhenden Senioritätszuschlägen verhindern oder Mit-
glieder älterer Kohorten, die den Gewerkschaften näher stehen als jüngere, besonders bevorzugen.
Schließlich variieren die Gewerkschaftseﬀekte über die Zeit. Klare, signiﬁkante Trends vor dem
Hintergrund des Rückgangs in der Gewerkschaftsmitgliedschaft sind jedoch nicht zu erkennen.
Bezüglich einer kausalen Interpretation der vorliegenden Ergebnisse ist Vorsicht geboten, da
der Analyserahmen einer möglichen Endogenität des Organisationsgrades nicht Rechnung trägt.
Weder stellt die theoretische Literatur bisher Modelle für eine strukturelle Modellierung bereit,
noch stehen valide Instrumente im Datensatz zur Verfügung. Im Rahmen zukünftiger Forschung
lässt die Verwendung aussagekräftigerer verknüpfter Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Daten auf Ab-
hilfe hoﬀen. Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Daten, wie etwa die Verdienststrukturerhebungen derDeutschsprachige Zusammenfassung 159
Statistischen Ämter oder die verknüpften Daten des IAB-Betriebspanels und der Beschäftigten-
statistik (LIAB), ermöglichen zudem die gemeinsame Berücksichtigung von Tarifbindung und
gewerkschaftlichem Organisationsgrad (Fitzenberger, Kohn und Lembcke, 2006). Schließlich
sollte eine simultane Untersuchung des Gewerkschaftseinﬂusses auf die Lohnstruktur und auf die
Beschäftigung erfolgen.160Bibliography
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